
Submitted Summaries

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Michał Heller, The idea of the eternal return: from Zawirski to the present day

Zygmunt Zawirski, a member of the Lwow-Warsaw Philosophical School, in 1927-28 published an extensive paper (in three parts) devoted to the critical examination of the eternal return hypothesis — the idea that the history of the universe is fundamentally a cyclic process. After presenting the development of this idea throughout the ages Zawirski discusses arguments on its behalf coming mainly from the second law of thermodynamics and from the Poincaré recurrence theorem. Zawirski's criticism is confronted with the present state of art. in this domain. Three new theoretical inputs are taken into account: first, our present knowledge of the global structure of space-time geometries with closed timelike curves; second, some results of relativistic thermodynamics; third, Tipler's no-return theorem (relativistic counterpart of the Poincaré theorem). Our knowledge regarding the eternal return, although not less hypothetical, is more „formalized” and more sophisticated than it was in Zawirski's time.

Anna Jedynak, About linguistic relativism

According to linguistic relativism, we acquire knowledge about the world through language and thus the use of different languages results in different visions of the world. This view is sometimes supported by a statement saying that some of those visions are mutually inconsistent and they cannot be accepted simultaneously: the use of one of them is inconsistent with the use of the other. The paper discusses this statement referring to an example of languages of two logical calculi, and shows it to be an overstatement. Theses of different languages are not inconsistent, for they are based on different concepts. Concepts, needed for negating theses expressed in either language, cannot be found in the other one. The paper therefore poses a question

whether it is possible to compile conceptual apparatuses of languages which are believed to be incommensurable. It concludes that in fact there are no logical obstacles. Such languages can be used together without the risk of cognitive conflict. However, it can be difficult due to pragmatic reasons. Although this would not undermine the beliefs of people using the broadened language, it could undermine some of their values and attitudes. This way broadening of the cognitive perspective by compiling conceptual apparatuses of different languages is likely to weaken those attitudes towards reality, from which the languages in question originated.

Elżbieta Kaluszyńska, Demistification of the concept of truth

In the article the possibility of an access to reality, and thus the possibility of an attainment of truth is discussed. In the contrary of Adam Grobler's claims it is argued that the problem with the relation language–reality is not an interpretation of a language in a way fitting the reality, but a search for an appropriate language, a conceptual frame to grasp recognized phenomena. So a recognition of reality is primary, not a language.

Włodzimierz Zięba, Epistemic interests and relativism

This paper considers Adam Grobler's fallibilism as an attractive alternative for both epistemological foundationalism and nihilism. Fallibilism claims that science is only a collection of temporary opinions, which entails rejecting of the idea of justification in aid of establishing critical preferences. In Grobler's thought that role is played by the conclusion to the best explanation (abductionism). Grobler's ideas dismantle the belief that relativity implies relativism. This paper deals with several Grobler's problems, such as theory-ladenness thesis (interpretation of observation), problems of facts, litigation of absolutism with relativism. I claim that problem of epistemic interests should be viewed as theoretical, e.g. considered as an element of our background knowledge, or wider philosophical framework (for example metaphysics). Some formulations of local internal realism are subject to paradox of self-referentiality.

Tadeusz Szubka, Epistemic conceptions of truth and relativism

Epistemic conceptions of truth, for which truth is defined in terms of justifiability or assertibility in properly idealized conditions, are very often considered as unavoidably linked with relativism. The paper argues that such a link is not unavoidable. The reason is that there are accounts of justification that do not have relativistic consequences, and therefore one may propose an epistemic conception of truth that does not have those consequences either.

Zbysław Muszyński, On Conceptual System and External Realism. Remarks on Margins of Adam Grobler's *Truth and Relativity*

The notion of conceptual system is usually connected with criticism or defence of relativism but sometimes the notion appears in discussion on realism/anti-realism. The aim of the article is: (1) to present connection between understanding of notion of conceptual system and ways of understanding of realism/anti-realism; (2) to present that notion may constitute a foundation of argument for realism, although usually it is taken as argument for anti-realism. Investigations of the article create the basis for discussion of the conception of relativity proposed by Adam Grobler in *Truth and Relativity*.

Mariusz Ciszek, The Peter Singer's relative conception of bioethics as criticism against traditional ethics

Peter Singer is one of the most famous bioethicists in the world. His controversial opinions disseminated in his countless publications and his undoubtedly good erudition made him very popular. Using logical arguments he always tries to prove that only a conscious being, a person, has the right to live. No wonder that his opponents call him „the famous death messenger”.

Australian philosopher is an ethic relativist in the way that he resigns from objective values in his conception. Moreover, he doesn't approve unchangeable moral principles. According to him such moral values as 'good' and 'bad' are relative, depending on consequences which decide what is right in particular situation. He is polemical to traditional ethic adherents who value every human life. There is no objective life category in his conception. Life can be only considered according to its quality and, therefore, only beings possessing feelings and consciousness are subjects of morality. They only have the right to live.

Aleksandra Derra-Włochowicz, Does minimalism in theory of truth leads to relativism?

The author considers the problem of relation between the so called minimalist theories of truth and relativism in philosophy — trying to answer the question: *Does minimalism in the theory of truth result in relativism?* In order to make the above question more precise, the author takes two steps. Initially, she defines minimalism (deflationism) with respect to truth in philosophy, enumerates various theories which are counted as deflationary and submits basic claims of deflationary views trying to find their theoretical hard-core. She takes Paul Horwich's deflationary theory of truth as a representative example of minimalist approaches and present the goals which Horwich is trying to reach in this theory. She points out its elementary assumption and Horwich's solution to the problem of truth. Afterwards, the author confronts the problem of relativism. Firstly, she distinguishes various ways of understanding the very notion of 'relativism'. Secondly, she points out what kind of relativism can be

dangerous (and why) in philosophy. Finally, she concludes that minimalism in the theory of truth does not result in such philosophically dangerous standpoint.

Maciej Witek, What is the theory of truth that relativists need?

The aim of this paper is to justify the claim that relativism assumes a deflationary account of truth. In the first section the author articulates some terminological conventions regarding the use of the terms „relativism” and „deflationism”. It is assumed that relativism advocates two theses. The first one is the thesis of relativity. It says that opinions adopted by members of some community depend on social or cultural factors determining their cognitive point of view. The second one is the thesis of symmetry. It claims that the idea of the absolute and objective correctness has no sense. In other words, the choice of a cognitive point of view cannot be objectively justified. Nevertheless, it can be explained by describing its social causes. Next, the author analyses the most popular deflationary views on truth. It is assumed that the most reliable form of deflationism is the so-called disquotational conception. According to the conception in question the meaning of a concept of truth is entirely captured by instances of the disquotational scheme: „*S*” is true if and only if *s*. It is stressed that the instances of the scheme define the *immanent* notion of truth. The point is that the notion so defined can be predicated only on sentences one understands. In the second section the author develops the main argument of this paper. A few relativistic accounts of truth are analysed. It is argued that relativists have no alternative but to accept the deflationary account of truth. The main idea of the argument is that rejecting the notion of transcendent truth relativism makes the notion of truth empty and strictly immanent. In other words, it makes the notion deflationary. The third section contains some remarks on possible ways of arguing against relativism.