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Working with the Enemy: Polish Perception of the Canadian Delegation in the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam

TransCanadiana 7, 49-61

2014-2015

Artykuł został opracowany do udostępnienia w internecie przez Muzeum Historii Polski w ramach prac podejmowanych na rzecz zapewnienia otwartego, powszechnego i trwałego dostępu do polskiego dorobku naukowego i kulturalnego. Artykuł jest umieszczony w kolekcji cyfrowej bazhum.muzhp.pl, gromadzącej zawartość polskich czasopism humanistycznych i społecznych.

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**WORKING WITH THE ENEMY:
POLISH PERCEPTION OF THE CANADIAN
DELEGATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM**

Abstract

The article describes the relations between the Canadian delegation and their Polish counterparts in the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Vietnam. The commission was established in July 1954 at the Geneva Conference, to guard the implementation of agreements that ended the First Indochina War. Led by India, self-declared *neutral nation*, the ICSC also included Poland and Canada, two countries representing opposing military and political blocs that defined the shape of the world at that time. In the article I present both the official relations between the delegations of Poland and Canada, and the day-to-day reality of the rank and file from ideologically hostile countries working together. The latter was quite interesting, since beside the problem of political differences, most of the Polish officers assigned to the ICSC could not speak neither French nor English. Still, they had to somehow interact with their Canadian counterparts both on the professional and personal level.

Résumé

L'article décrit les relations entre la délégation canadienne et leurs homologues polonais dans la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle (CISC) au Vietnam. La commission a été créée en juillet 1954 pendant la Conférence de Genève, pour garantir la mise en œuvre des accords qui ont mis fin à la Première Guerre d'Indochine. Menée par l'Inde, nation se déclarant comme neutre, CISC a également incorporé la Pologne et le Canada, deux pays représentant des blocs militaires et politiques opposés qui ont façonné le monde à l'époque. Dans l'article, nous présentons à la fois les relations officielles entre les délégations de Pologne et du Canada et la réalité quotidienne des simples militaires des pays idéologiquement hostiles qui travaillent ensemble. Ce qui était très intéressant, car à côté du problème

des différences politiques, la plupart des officiers polonais affectés à la CISC ne parlaient ni le français ni l'anglais. Pourtant, ils ont en quelque sorte à interagir avec leurs homologues canadiens tant sur le plan professionnel que personnel.

On the night of 20th-21st July, 1954, agreements ending the First Indochina War were signed in Geneva. To supervise their observance, attending countries established the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Indochina (ICSC), composed by India, Poland and Canada. In Vietnam, it established fourteen permanent inspection groups and a smaller number of mobile groups. They were tasked with supervising the redeployment of troops of the parties involved in the conflict, ensuring the freedom of movement of the civilian population, preventing military equipment being brought into the territory of Vietnam, and overseeing the elections scheduled by the Geneva Agreements in next two years. The Commission ultimately worked until 1973, but since 1960, when the Americans ceased worrying about the ICSC in Vietnam, its actual role was marginalized. To this point, however, it was an important element of the political puzzle in Vietnam and in the whole region.

Indian diplomacy was from the very beginning heavily involved in the course of the Geneva negotiations, forcing their role of *neutral power* that was supposed to help the two hostile blocs in coming to an agreement. India's participation in the Supervisory Commission was therefore a logical continuation of this policy. For Indians it was a part of building the prestige of their young country, the *only real neutral power*, as they liked to think of themselves. However, at the same time they had very specific interests in Southeast Asia, and they wanted to safeguard them. Motives of the Polish and the Canadian participation in the work of the Commission were more complex. This article will focus on the Polish-Canadian relations in the framework of the ICSC and delegations of the two countries themselves. Thus, the Indian delegation will appear only in the most important cases, mainly as a background or the reason for the interaction between the other two delegations.

Canadians came to Vietnam as representatives of the Western World. They did not have any vital interests in Southeast Asia at that time. The proposal to participate in the work of the ICSC was greeted in Ottawa without much enthusiasm. While the participation in the work of the Commission was undoubtedly very prestigious, it was also associated with significant problems and risks, and meant the need to send a highly specialized and large delegation of several hundred people, which would be a significant burden on the military and diplomatic personnel resources of Canada. However, what was feared most was the reaction of the United States. Close ally and guarantor of the

security of Canadians openly showed dissatisfaction with the results of the Geneva Conference. In a certain sense Canada fell victim of her own existing diplomatic activity and as High Commissioner in London wrote to his superior in Ottawa, "Task suggested is certainly ungrateful but I do not see how we can do other than accept it" (Donaghy 1677). Americans also assured Canadians that they would by no means hold their participation in the work of the ICSC against them, and that they were even happier that it was Canada and not any other country, that would be the representative of the West in the Commission. Eventually, on July 28, 1954, Ottawa decided to respond affirmatively to the invitation, considering participation in the work of the Commission as her "stern international duty" (Donaghy 1686) and acknowledging that "(...) there was probably no other Western country in a better position than Canada to work harmoniously and effectively with India." (Donaghy 1696)

Polish People's Republic was not a truly independent state in 1954. Stalin had died just a year earlier, and smaller communist states were only tentatively beginning to develop their own foreign policies in the framework imposed by their USSR overseers. Poland was no exception from this rule. However, as the biggest and strongest of the Soviet satellite states, Polish People's Republic had ambitions to play a much larger role in the world than fellow *fraternal states* from the *progressive bloc*. Participation in internationally recognized bodies, like the ICSC, was seen as a good way of gaining prestige and recognition on the world stage. In addition, Warsaw felt that their participation in the work of the Commission was strengthening the Polish position in the Eastern Bloc itself, since it meant in a way that Poland was delegated to help and protect the newly-born communist state of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Last but not least, Poles already had some international experience in the matter, since they had already sent a delegation to participate in the Neutral Commission in Korea. Both countries had their share of various problems.

Canada did not have any knowledge about the area of the world into which it was to send its representatives. Help was requested from the U.S. State Department, which promised to provide the necessary materials. The biggest problem, however, was the personal composition of the delegation. Canadians were aware that in the course of the Commission's work they would most likely have to regularly struggle with the Poles, but the key for the success would be pulling the Indian delegate on their site, or at least shielding him from the Polish representative's influence. Thus, it was crucial to send the best people available to Vietnam. Given the considerable size of the delegation, it was a significant problem. The main priority of the Canadian delegation was judicial impartiality, which was aimed at convincing other parties of the sincerity of Canada's intentions. In addition, the general assumptions of Canadian policy towards Southeast Asia were to be followed:

1. Maintaining peace achieved in Geneva.
2. Support for the creation of a regional security pact, similar to NATO and at the same time convincing *neutral states* that it is not a neo-colonial project as presented in communist propaganda.
3. Economic and social support for countries in the region to reduce the impact of communism in their society.
4. Encouragement to the creation of strong, independent, anti-communist regimes in the region, even at the expense of the ambitions of France (Donaghy 1719-1720).

Ottawa was very reluctant about Polish participation in the work of the Commission. Canadians were afraid that Poles will use all available means to delay, drag, or even prevent the ICSC activity. Generally, they expected the worst from their future coworkers, including offensive vocabulary and personal insults, and anticipated manual control of the Polish Ambassador by the communist powers (Donaghy 1721). They were also concerned that the Commission would be used for espionage in South Vietnam.

Perplexities over the sense of participation in the work of the Commission, comparable to the Canadian ones, are hard to find in Polish archives. The command sent from Moscow had to be carried out and the authorities in Warsaw responded to the message of Molotov and Eden affirmative already on July 23, only a day after receiving the invitation. Organizational work began even earlier, on July 20, so even before the official announcement of the results of the Geneva Conference. Being suddenly faced with the task of sending a large delegation to the other side of the world, Poland had to face a number of challenges of diverse nature, such as transport, uniform sorts and health issues. However, a key challenge for the Polish delegation was to find an adequate number of English and/or French speakers. At the same time, beside some rare and special occurrences, only politically reliable persons were allowed to leave the country. In the reality of the first half of the 1950s in Poland, where the simple knowledge of the languages of the *enemy camp* alone could be the cause of interest from the security apparatus, and very few spoke it anyway, the task of finding such people was not easy. This problem was especially affecting the officers of the Polish Army, critical for the work of the Commission, whose knowledge of foreign languages other than Russian was simply vestigial. The political line of the Polish delegation, which was not surprising and was in line with the expectations of the Canadians, was based on the defense of the interests of the communist side. Canadian thesis about the *remote control* of the Polish delegate proved not to be true. Although Przemysław Ogrodziński obviously had fairly clear instructions, the archives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs lack any documents suggesting that he had to consult each (or even most) of his decisions with Warsaw, Beijing or Moscow. It seems that in this regard, decision

was made to leave the ambassador with greater discretion to make decisions on the spot, trusting that he would know better how to support *the people's side*. This level of freedom probably also resulted from the fact that, especially in the initial period, the Polish delegation had highly improvised character. It should be noted, however, that before the Kennedy administration engaged in Indochina on a larger scale, Moscow perceived this region as an insignificant periphery of its global struggle against capitalism. Thus, the Polish Ambassador could be left without direct oversight, as long as he complied with the general communist line of interests. Interestingly, one of the main priorities of the Polish delegation was “defense of democratic freedoms” throughout Vietnam, since in the evaluation of the Communists, “even the existence of a formal democracy (in the bourgeois sense) ensures the victory of the popular forces” (*Raport nr 2*).¹

With regard to contacts with other members of the Commission, the Poles, just like the Canadians, assumed that the key to success would be to gain the recognition of the delegate of India. It can be clearly seen in the Polish instructions issued prior to the first joint conference of ICSC members, which clearly told that “tactics requires that the Indians should not be antagonized” (*Towarzysz Minister*).² Communists hoped that by applauding the openly declared neutrality and anti-colonialism of India, they would pull them to their anti-American positions.

As for the delegation of Canada, the Poles, just like the Canadians towards them, feared everything worst. Ottawa envoys were directly considered being the representatives of the “agencies of the US” (*Raport nr 2*) and the agents of influence of Washington in Indochina. Polish Foreign Ministry’s attention was drawn to the Canadian attempts to minimize the size of their delegations. The biggest concern for the Polish diplomacy was a large number of common points between the Indian and Canadian military men, ranging from the language, to the common service under the British banner, which meant that in a social setting the Poles could find themselves in a highly disadvantageous position.

As can be seen, both the Poles and the Canadians embarked for work in the Commission in a fighting mood against each other, and with a similar objective in relation to the third delegation.

The first opportunity for mutual contact came with the preliminary technical conference in New Delhi, which was held on 1-6 August 1954. However, contrary to the expectations, it did not bring any spectacular clashes of ideology or verbal fencing between the delegations. It turned out that Poles and Canadians had more common points than they thought. As it was already mentioned, both delegations were not interested in going into disputes with

¹ Report by Przemysław Ogrodziński from 19 September 1954, coming from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives.

² Internal memorandum of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 20 August 1954.

their hosts. In addition, it turned out that the Indians, constantly emphasizing the fact that their country was chairing the Commission, were interested in taking on themselves the majority of technical and administrative duties in the ICSC. For Canada, that wished to limit its delegation as much as possible, it was great news. It was a similar story for Poland. In face of mounting difficulties involved with forming of their delegation, the Poles were interested in decreasing its size. Thus, the conference had an exceptionally peaceful and smooth conduct.

The only short-circuit happening was a dispute between the Poles and the Indians on the issue of an independent radio communication with Warsaw. Ultimately, however, the Poles backed down, not wanting to aggravate their relations with the hosts. Representatives of Ottawa were recognized as aloof and cool, although polite. Canadians assessed the Polish delegation in a similar fashion, although their attention was caught by Przemysław Ogrodziński, the chief of the Polish delegation to Vietnam: "He impressed us as able and forceful, and he also has charm, a dangerous combination." (Donaghy 1706)

The Commission started to work in Vietnam on August 18 and the first months of proper cooperation passed very peacefully. Without a doubt, it was influenced by the fact that the two delegations were still in a state of organizing and devising the procedures for the work itself in the Commission, as well as their mutual relationship.

In their reports for Ottawa Canadians admittedly pointed out that the Poles cooperated with the authorities of North Vietnam, but they did it discreetly enough to avoid being openly accused of being biased. For example, they tried in various ways to slow down or block the Commission's activities in the areas where this could have negative consequences for the Communists (Donaghy 1741). This applied especially to the rapid trips of the inspection groups to places where the Catholic population concentrated wishing to go south of Vietnam, and where local authorities sought to make it impossible, thus breaking Geneva Agreements. If the inspection could reveal violations of the Geneva by the communists, the Polish delegation tried to multiply procedural issues and delay the trip, so that the Communists could *set the stage* for the arrival of the inspection group. To counter this, Canadians tried to convince the Indian representative to the need of a rapid trip. When the latter accommodated to Canadian demands, the Poles generally backed down, not wanting to be the ones who oppose the majority opinion of the Commission (*Prace Komisji*).³ The freedom of movement – by implication it meant the journey from North to South Vietnam – was the main axis of the Canadian

³ Examples of such measures can be found for example in a periodic report sent to Warsaw in February and March of 1955.

policy inside ICSC, both because of the pressure from the United States, and as well as their own public opinion, concerned about the fate of Christians in the communist country (Donaghy 1753-56).

Most of the Canadian-Polish struggles for influence on the decisions of the Commission took place in the form of fencing with legal arguments. Personal, ideological rhetoric that Canadians so feared from the Poles did not appear or at least it was not common enough to mention it in their reports to Ottawa.

From the point of view of the Polish delegation, the first months of collaboration with the Canadians proceeded remarkably smooth and efficient. Przemysław Ogrodziński recalled that, when at the beginning of August spearhead of Commission arrived in Vietnam, the ICSC had no rooms for its use, and the chiefs of the delegations had to deliberate together in their own hotel bedrooms, but in his opinion, such circumstances “improved the atmosphere.” However, the Polish Ambassador struggled with a variety of problems. The most important and potentially crippling one was the lack of an adequate number of people with knowledge of the working languages of the Commission. But it was only the tip of the iceberg of issues confronting the Polish delegation in the initial period and, as Ogrodziński wrote in his report, his delegation’s activity was only possible “at the expense of simply unbelievable improvisations” (*Raport nr 2*). Uniforms made in Poland proved unsuitable, disintegrating after a few washes in tropical climate – from the point of view of the prestige of the delegation it was an important issue, especially considering the large number of official speeches and meetings. From the very beginning there were problems with money, the Ambassador had to borrow from the Vietnamese Friends (i.e. Viet Minh Government) at the start of his activities, and the members of the delegation received a salary several times smaller than their Canadian and Indian counterparts. In addition to the problems with the lack of language skills, ranks of officers sent to the delegation were another headache for Ogrodziński. By the decision of the Ministry of National Defence (or to be more precise, the decision of marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky) officers sent to Vietnam were one-two ranks lower than their foreign colleagues performing the same functions. Thus, for example, in the inspection team, a Polish captain had to deal with a Canadian major and an Indian colonel. The result was a frequent “high docility to the senior officers” (*Uwagi i wnioski*)⁴, which from the point of view of the political goals of the Polish delegation was unacceptable. Some officers were even sent back to the country after “signing politically incorrect reports” (*Sprawozdanie*)⁵ despite precise instructions from the Polish Ambassador. Some personnel that arrived in Vietnam did not have competences

⁴ Comments and conclusions to the report of the Polish inspection that took place from 21 November to 13 December 1954.

⁵ Main part of the report mentioned above.

attributed to them or simply did not fit into the positions designated for them. Describing his teams in the report sent to Warsaw Ogrodziński wrote: "Saigon (...) our strongest team. Still too weak for Saigon, and lacks the translator" (*Załącznik do raportu nr 2*).⁶

The delegation was also shaken by personal disputes. An inspection carried out in late November and early December of 1954 revealed for example that the chief of staff of the delegation, Colonel Aszkenazy, and the political advisor, comrade Bibrowski, had an ongoing heated controversy about who of them was the deputy to Ambassador Ogrodziński (who, in turn, could not stand Bibrowski). Furthermore, it was pointed out that Colonel Aszkenazy's relations with his subordinates were "standoffish, (...) even flagrant" and that the leadership of the delegation had no time for ideological-political work with the common members due to the enormous amount of duties. There was even a statement in the report that there was a "total separation of the executives from the rest of the representation" (*Sprawozdanie*).⁷

As it was already mentioned, contrary to the predictions of the Canadians, the Polish Ambassador had quite a degree of flexibility in his activities. This can be assessed by a very *hot* exchange of messages concerning Ogrodziński's too excessive (according to Ministry) expectations of the staff sent out of the country to Vietnam. The Ambassador did not mince his words when he complained about his fate and hardships, and Warsaw had to admonish him for his excessive emotions, still at the same time ensuring him about their continuous support and understanding of his difficulties (*List do ambasadora*).⁸ It is worth mentioning that when it came to light that Ogrodziński had arbitrarily given titular military ranks to civilians and had increased the ranks of some of his officers – which in his opinion was necessary for the smooth functioning of the delegation – he received only a soft reminder to cease these practices and not to break the regulations of the Ministry of National Defense (although an interdepartmental strife between the Defense and Foreign Affairs ministries probably played some part in this mild treatment).

The fact that is really interesting is that all these problems of the Polish delegation remained invisible to the Canadians or at least did not appear in the reports sent to Ottawa. Thus, it seems that the "simply unbelievable improvisation" was more effective than it seemed to be to the Ambassador Ogrodziński himself.

With regard to the relations with the the Canadian delegation, the Poles were surprised, if not downright suspicious about the lack of pro-American

⁶ Annex to the report about staff situation on 20 September 1954.

⁷ Inspection report mentioned above.

⁸ The Letter from Warsaw addressed to Ambassador Ogrodziński from October 1954.

tendencies and the good cooperation with the Canadians. As Ogrodziński wrote in one of his reports, "(...) you cannot see pro-American tendencies in the Canadians (which is extremely interesting)." The Ambassador added immediately afterwards, however, that "Agencies of the US in these delegations so far have the operating in secret." Eventually, he concluded that "Canadians clearly lined up with the line of Anglo-French policy. Hence, the blow of the US policy is likely to be directed against the Commission as such" (*Raport nr 2*). Especially in the first months of collaboration with the Canadians, Ogrodziński stated that due to the many converging points of both delegations, he had to submit only minor changes, and that the "Idyll of unanimity continues in the Commission" (*Raport nr 2*).

The idyll did not last long, however. With the solidification of both delegations – and especially the arrival of more Polish translators, which allowed the Poles to be more active within the Commission – the number of disputes and tensions between the two delegations grew. As it was already mentioned, the Poles tried to protect the communist side in North Vietnam by all possible means. The flashpoint there was the freedom of movement of the population, guaranteed by the Geneva Agreements. It was the biggest problem for the Vietnamese Communists, who wanted to prevent the mass exodus of the Catholic population to the South, encouraged to do so by an extensive propaganda campaign organized by the American Colonel Edward Lansdale (Moyar 38-40). As it was already mentioned, the Poles clung to every possible legal and procedural measure to prevent the inspection group from finding out about the violations of the Geneva provisions by the communist side.

The rhetoric of Polish reports at the turn of 1954 and 1955 is significantly more acute and reminiscent of an armed conflict than of cooperation and diplomatic negotiations. In text messages sent to Warsaw, for example, appears wording such as "growth of Canadian aggressiveness" and that the "main war machine of Canadian delegation" is the freedom of movement in the North, which is at the same time "the weakest link in the system of political fortifications of DRV". Expected accusation of Communists of violating the Geneva Agreements by Canadians is in turn referred to as their "final assault" (*Raport z działalności*).⁹

The Polish change in attitude was also noted by the Canadian side. In a personal letter to Secretary of State for External Relations, Lester Pearson, Canadian Ambassador, Sherwood Lett, confided:

⁹ Quotations from a periodic Polish report about the delegation's activities for February and March 1955.

A month's close association daily with the Polish Ambassador, and his subordinates, has convinced me that whatever his attitude and instructions may have been in the early stages of the Commission's work, he is definitely now playing the Communist game of obstruction, evasion, stalling, double talk, legalistic and technical objections and any other tactic he can employ to assist the D.R. authorities to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Agreement to the exclusive advantage of Communist policy. I would go so far at the moment to say that I think that he or someone of his political views is either directly or indirectly consulting with and advising the new D.R. regime (...) (Donaghy 1767-68).

As can be seen by the previously mentioned information from the Polish archives, the Canadian diplomat hit the mark. It should be noted, however, that simultaneously Lett wrote: "I am not so concerned with Polish moves which can now be predicted quite easily in most cases as with the Indian attitude." (Donaghy 1790)

On the other hand, despite tightening rhetoric, at a press conference in May 1956 the Polish Foreign Ministry highly praised the cooperation with Canadians despite the fact that in many cases both delegations did not agree. Most of the issues, however, were settled on the social level, so that the Commission was able to maintain unanimity in the issued documents (*Stenogram z konferencji*).¹⁰ For all parties working in the Commission preservation of the appearance of unanimity was essential for prestige reasons. Both Poles and Canadians tried very hard so their disputes inside the ICSC would not turn into a scandal visible on the outside. The desire to maintain the image of high importance and prestige of the Commission pushed both sides to cooperate from time to time, as was in the case when television crews from Canada and Poland arrived almost simultaneously in Indochina to shoot materials devoted to the work of the ICSC (Donaghy 1780).

With time, however, the number of disputes grew. Canadians, at the suggestion of the Americans, tried to push for establishing an effective control on the Sino-Vietnamese border to prevent the import of weapons, forbidden by the Geneva Agreements. On the other hand, Poles demanded a similarly effective control in the ports and airports of South Vietnam.

As the date of the general elections scheduled for summer 1956 approached, the tension associated with this event also grew. Ottawa also probed the option of disbanding the ICSC in Vietnam. The Canadians' standing argument was that since the Commission managed to successfully end the issues of regrouping of troops and movement of the population, and since the Ngo Dinh Diem government was boycotting the Geneva Agreements, the continuous functioning of the ICSC in Vietnam had lost

¹⁰ Record of the press conference held by Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 30 May 1956.

sense. However, the Poles and Indians vigorously protested, and eventually it was decided that the Commission would reduce its size and scale of operations.

In an increasingly stripped down composition and being increasingly ignored on both sides of the demarcation line, it would finally end its operations in 1973. With the exacerbation of the situation in Indochina and the increasing involvement of Americans in this region of the world, Canadians and Poles in the course of their work in the Commission found themselves in a growing opposition. Polish officers claimed, for example, that they were not able to assess the country of origin of the ammunition and guns found in Viet Cong weapons caches. In turn, their Canadian counterparts stationing in the demilitarized zone claimed that they could not identify the jets flying north as American, because the planes were too high and they could not see their signs (Śledź 132).

It should be noted, however, that all kinds of disputes in the ICSC almost never reflected the social relationships between the members of the delegation. While particularly in the initial period Canadians are described as polite but aloof, over the years the relations seemed to be getting better. In the memoirs of Polish officers their Canadian colleagues are appearing almost always as nice and polite persons, not shunning from social contact. After work hours, the members of the two delegations visited each other without any resistance in order to watch movies, listen to music and lead long discussions enriched with alcohol brought by the members of both teams. There were also no problems with helping each other with small favors, such as drop-off to the doctor or lending a film projector. As can be seen, the visions of *fire breathing Communists* and *wicked capitalist exploiters* quickly departed into oblivion in the face of daily contacts. The interactions also allowed verifying the more banal stereotypes and perceptions. For example, in the 1968, the Canadian officer could not believe that the stylish shoes of his Polish colleague were made in Poland (Zasadziński 160).

In summary, the interaction between the Canadian and Polish delegation in the ICSC turned out to be quite different from the predictions made before the start of the activities of the Commission. Despite the ideological and political differences, which grew especially after the increase of the American involvement in Vietnam, the two delegations were able to work together. Of course, the effect of this work is debatable, since on the one hand Poles explicitly ignored the actions of the communist side, and on the other Canadians turned a blind eye to the American activities. The question of the effectiveness of the ICSC in Vietnam was, however, a matter more dependent on the will of the parties of the ongoing conflict, and not the members of the Commission itself, ready to perform their duties, but having no conditions for doing so, neither in the North nor in the South.

While both delegations eventually took the position expected by each other, there was that initial period in which there was the aforementioned “idyll of unanimity.” It stemmed from a variety of causes. On the Polish side, the initial weakness of the delegation plagued by a range of problems, which significantly weakened the *striking power* of Poles in the Commission, seemed decisive. At the same time, however, these problems were masked sufficiently enough so that Canadians remained with an unsolved mystery of why the Poles cooperated so easily in the first few months. On the other side, the emphasis of Canadians on the judicial impartiality during the initial period their activities, and uncertainty about the direction of the US policy, gave the Polish Communists a riddle of their own, and left them wondering why cooperation with a country representing a hostile political bloc ran so smoothly and seamlessly.

Joint participation of Polish and Canadian delegation in ICSC in Vietnam also showed that, despite ideological differences, their members were not only able to work, but also to maintain cordial relations on the interpersonal level, often probably far beyond the level comfortable for the authorities in Ottawa and Warsaw.

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