

# Zbigniew Czachór

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## The European Council in view of external security and international threats to the European Union. Between idealism and realism

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ZBIGNIEW CZACHÓR

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

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## **The European Council in view of external security and international threats to the European Union. Between idealism and realism<sup>1</sup>**

### **I. Teleological justification**

For a long time, the European Union and the European Council (EC) have been involved in numerous political activities and have had at their disposal numerous instruments in the areas of diplomacy, security, defense, finance, trade and cooperation for the benefit of development and humanitarian aid, which make it possible to respond to new challenges and threats. On the other hand, the past three years have been a time of regression which may lead to the irreversible failure of the EU's aspirations to play a significant role in international relations. This is true even if we bear in mind that the European Union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and the Nobel Committee noted that for more than six decades, the Union and its forerunners have contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation in the world (European Council, 2012 – EUCO 156/12, p. 2).

We are facing a decline in the importance of the West and the European Union itself. The consolidation of new emerging forces, the growing impact of information technologies, demographic trends and growing inequalities make the global geopolitical context more complex, where it is more difficult to propagate a model based on the norms and values typical of open societies. The formula of organizations and diversified institutions, peaceful by their nature, does no longer suffice as they are not capable of adjusting to the dysfunctional challenges of the new, multipolar world. The vacuum is filled again by countries with their numerous and conflicting interests. As a result, international and supranational standards are deteriorating, accompanied by the changing dimensions of the importance of geopolitics. A larger number of entities, including transnational non-state actors and supranational enterprises (the so-called private powers), coupled with the development of breakthrough technologies make it difficult for the European Council to adopt a homogenous strategic global agenda and manage complex environments (systems) (*Opinia*, pp. 1–3).

In the European Council an opinion prevails that the progressing unification of the world, which abounds in extreme inequalities and injustice, is a source of instability and uncertainty. We have entered an era of conflicts and threats where military intervention is insufficient for obvious reasons. We are facing disturbances on a global scale which

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need to be identified and addressed. The goal of the imperative changes is to control and balance geopolitical competition, not only in the vicinity of EU member states.

The conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya or in the Sahel region directly affect the European Union in terms of trade, energy supplies or the transfer of refugees or immigrants together with the risk of terrorism. This impacts the strategic European model based on cooperation and positive conditionality.

With the above in mind, the European Council assumes that the Old Continent needs to restart the EU foreign policy. The conflicts in the immediate vicinity of the European Union and further away have highlighted the EU's poor readiness for responding to crises in foreign policy. For this reason, the Union will have to face a significant reduction of its role in the world but also reluctance in the political centre of the EU itself to tackle the complicated reality (Wessels, 2013, pp. 1–4).

The subsequent internal crises have led to a spread of a culture negating the existing conceptual paradigms in the realm of common foreign policy and the EU's external safety. The EU institutions have become fragile while the involvement of member states in the process of Europeanizing foreign policy is gradually diminishing. It is high time to arrest or even reverse this process altogether. The only institution capable of initiating relevant changes is the European Council cooperating with the European Commission and the European Parliament.

The major documents of the European Council suggest that the European Union should be a robust global entity. This belief has been expressed in Annex 1 to the conclusions from June 2014, entitled "Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change" (European Council, 2014 – EUCO 79/14, pp. 1–2). It says that migration perturbations, conflicts, disputes and outrages are all evidence of how fast-shifting the strategic and geopolitical environment has become, not least at the Union's eastern and southern borders. Instability in the EU's wider neighborhood is at an all-time high. At the same time it has never been as important to engage the partners on issues of mutual or global interest. To defend the Union's interests and values and to protect EU citizens, a stronger engagement of the European Union in world affairs is crucial. In this context, the European Council deems the following foreign policy priorities to be of key importance in the years ahead:

- maximize the European Union's clout: by ensuring consistency between member states' and EU foreign policy goals and by improving coordination and coherence between the main fields of EU external action, such as trade, energy, justice and home affairs, development and economic policies;
- be a strong partner in its neighborhood: by promoting stability, prosperity and democracy in the countries closest to the Union, on the European continent, in the Mediterranean, Africa and in the Middle East (European Council, 2013 – EUCO 3/13, p. 5ff.);
- engage the EU's global strategic partners, in particular EU transatlantic partners, on a wide range of issues – from trade and cyber security to human rights and conflict prevention, to non-proliferation and crisis management – bilaterally and in multilateral fora;
- develop security and defense cooperation so the EU can live up to its commitments and responsibilities across the world: by strengthening the Common Security and

Defence Policy, in full complementarity with NATO; by ensuring that member states maintain and develop the necessary civilian and military capabilities, including through pooling and sharing; with a stronger European defense industry (European Council, 2014 – EUCO 79/14, pp. 3–4).

## II. Theoretical justification

The perception of the emerging new international reality, viewed from the perspective of the EU's external policy, involves a requirement of scientific verification and partial abstaining from the liberal research and theoretical perspectives in European integration studies. This is because the boundaries between the domestic and the international have been clearly reconstructed in the European Union and all over the world (Pietraś, 1998, p. 21).

An analysis of documents of the European Council from recent years requires a revision of the thinking stemming from a dogmatically idealistic approach including (Czachór, Krasuski, 2010, pp. 43–45):

- a conviction that countries' interests are convergent as they stem from the natural world harmony;
- an emphasis placed on the commonality of interests of states and international organizations and “common good” or “the good of the international community” (Tallberg, 2008, pp. 685–708);
- an assumption that foreign policy can be and should be conducted with reference to the permanent rules in accordance with moral standards;
- a strong belief that for the sake of completing their tasks, states perceive the system of international relations through the community (Pietraś, 1986, pp. 32–40);
- an assumption that the entire EU needs to absolutely express a shared position in international relations;
- in the context of the growing co-dependence and in relation with the commitment to effective multilateralism, it is in the EU's best interest to actively participate in the decision processes on a global scale (*Joint Communication*, 2011, p. 3).

In the perspective of the European Council, the European Union's foreign policy is not only a collection of external pluralist actions, interactions, behavior and events aimed to accomplish the goals of the entities/actors of this policy in the international arena based on the Kantian idea of “perpetual peace.” It is also a structure, or rather a system, of formally and informally defined functions, mechanisms and procedures as well as roles of the still independent member states. They prove to be necessary in managing the external area of the European Union's activity (Giering, 1997, pp. 140–145).

This conceptualization of the EU's foreign policy implemented by the European Council naturally includes the fact that states are still reluctant to give up on “state-centric” i.e. realistic conditions of foreign policy. They are clinging to monopolistic assumptions based on a claim that they are the major/fundamental players of international relations and integral, autonomous and sovereign actors, completely independent from each other. States use the global crisis, including the European crisis, coupled with the weakness of international organizations (like the UN and NATO) to promote the belief that:

- the issues of security and survival are the major subjects of countries' interest and concern in international relations (only states can ensure peace and welfare to the world/Europe);
- in its international relations, a state needs to rely on itself, on building up its position in the system by maximizing its power;
- it is in a state's interest to ensure its survival and maximize independence, power and influence;
- anarchy is an intrinsic feature of the international system structure; for this reason the relations between countries are affected by a constant conflict of interests, rivalry and no compromise (Sałajczyk, 1994, p. 52);
- international organizations (including the EU) are not independent agents of international relations but only a form of multilateral cooperation of countries which serves their respective interests.

A new research approach to the European Council's external activities, interposed between idealism and realism, is related to the changeable positioning and therefore situating the EU in the global international system. At the same time, we need to take into account that, at present, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) need to be based on intense translocation (transposition, transition) of the actors (chiefly EU institutions like the European Council, the European Commission and the High Representative) in the international system i.e. based on a constant role change and the resulting constant adjustment to the many variables of the world in crisis. It is important to "relocate," but the quality of mutual interactions is also significant. The tactics of "fast moves" on the chessboard occupied by numerous players necessitates energy as well as a good spatial perspective (sense of observation) and intelligence (smart politics) (Tomassini, 1994, pp. 97–113).

An academic analysis leads to a belief that by the co-creation of treaty-related and non-treaty principles the European Council has initiated a brand new and original way of establishing norms single-handedly, with little participation or even without the participation of the remaining EU institutions. The Council has become an autonomous and independent actor of international relations (European Council, 2016 – EUCO 3/17, pp. 1–2). On the other hand, the European Council is not only a collection of states or a sum of their interests. It creates its own synergistic intergovernmental and community-related interest and thereby affects the Union's international policy as a whole and that of each member state separately. It becomes an object which is not a passive background for political actions on the part of states but enforces limitations and creates new opportunities for the states and for itself. It has become a new, active force of international importance.

### III. Methodological justification

From a methodological point of view, academic research into the European Union's foreign policy in relation to the members of the European Council should take into consideration four justifications. The first one is based on the European way of thinking referring to the fundamental values and principles underlying the European

Union's foreign policy and security. The second justification is an analysis of European integration i.e. an in-depth research into the integration and disintegration processes in the perspective of the activities and disturbances in relations between the EU and the outside world. The third justification is based on an analysis of the development and institutionalization of foreign policy from an intergovernmental and community point of view. The fourth justification stands for European competence and instruments referred to as tools necessary for the CFSP and the CSDP to operate (Czachór, 2014, pp. 178–214).

In the course of creating, programming and analytical operationalization of the new global (globalized) foreign policy of the European Union designed by the European Council, it is recommendable to refer to the synchronic method, describing international relations in a specific moment of time, in specific circumstances and with an assumption of their relative stability. Next, reference should be made to the diachronic method, taking into account the EU foreign policy dialectically in its development, changeability, trends and temporal order. In this respect, the survey included qualitative differences, the reasons for their intensification, the changes to the importance and the role of the determinants. Additionally, the determinants of prospective growth and long-term fluctuations have been identified which are of great importance to the future of international relations. One should also take into account the comparative method which makes it possible to juxtapose and compare, analyze and evaluate the past and present changes occurring in the foreign policy system. These changes are produced by the behavior resulting from the confrontation of two paradigms: idealism (liberalism) and realism.

#### **IV. Formal-legal and institutional justification**

According to Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TUE), with reference to external conflicts and crises, the Union and the European Council strive to: (1) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; (2) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; (3) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those related to external borders; (4) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; (5) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; (6) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development; (7) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and (8) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. (*Treaty on European Union*, 2008, p. 1).

At the time of the recent crisis in the European Union, the content of Articles 24 and 34 of the Treaty is also of importance. The assumption is that member states

shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area. According to the Treaty, member states shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. Based on this rule, the European Council decided in 2014 to impose common sanctions on Russia (European Council, 2014 – EUCO 7/1/14, pp. 4–6).

The EU law also requires member states to coordinate their operations in international organizations and during international conferences, maintaining the Union's position. Additionally, if not all member states are represented in international organizations or during international conferences, the participating EU states maintain the Union's position. This holds true for both the UN (e.g. the UN Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development), the G20, the G7/G8 and many other international formats (European Council, 2012 – EUCO 4/3/12, pp. 5–10).

Of importance is also the content of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty, where the EU's attitude to external conflicts and crises is related to the Common Security and Defence Policy. It ensures the Union's operational capacity of civil and military means at its disposal during missions outside of the Union territory carried out to maintain peace, prevent conflicts and reinforce international security in line with the rules of the Charter of the United Nations. The tasks are completed based on the capacities provided by member states. These missions include common disarmament activities, humanitarian and emergency interventions, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping, tasks of combat forces aimed at crisis management including re-establishment of peace and stabilization of the developments following conflicts. All these missions are capable of combating terrorism, including support for third states in combating terrorism in their territories (Reiche, 2007, pp. 2–3).

Section 6 of Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union says explicitly that those member states whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework (Koenig, Walter-Franke, 2017, p. 12).

The Treaty of Lisbon, effective as of December 1, 2009, urged to maintain cohesion of the EU's external operations in various areas and the operations' consistence with the Union's other policies. The Treaty created a new rational and constitutional context (the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is at the same time the Commission's Vice President, and the European External Action Service) which allowed to comprehensively regulate the EU's external operations in all areas, with special emphasis placed on preventing conflicts and responding to crisis situations. Of importance was Protocol (no. 10) on regular structural cooperation established by virtue of Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union (Koenig, Walter-Franke, 2017, pp. 8–10).

Notably, as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Council and consequently the EU Security and Defence Council suggested a number of so-

lutions pertaining to external security and international threats to the European Union referring to the Global Strategy for the European Union's foreign policy and security from June 2016 and the joint French and German position on establishing a union of safety and defense (Joint Position, 2016, pp. 1–3).

Following a session of the European Council in December 2016 (European Council, 2016 – EUCO 34/16, pp. 3–5) related to the issues discussed here, in 2017 the High Representative submitted suggestions related to: (1) the development of civilian capabilities; (2) the parameters of a member state-driven coordinated annual review on defense; (3) the process of developing military capabilities taking into account research and technology and industrial aspects; (4) the establishment of a permanent operational planning and conduct capability at the strategic level; (5) the strengthening of the relevance, usability and deployability of the EU's rapid response toolbox; (6) elements and options for an inclusive permanent structured cooperation based on a modular approach and outlining possible projects, and the covering of all requirements under the Capacity Building in Security and Development (CBSD) (European Council, 2017– EUCO 3/17, p. 1).

On June 7, 2017, a European Defence Fund was established; the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) followed suit one day later in order to plan, implement and coordinate EU military missions. The European Council also adopted with satisfaction the establishment of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki. The Council also agreed that inclusive and ambitious regular structural assistance (*Permanent Structured Cooperation* – PESCO) must commence. In order to reinforce the EU's rapid response toolbox, the European Council decided that the costs of deploying combat groups should be regularly borne as shared costs as part of the Athena mechanism administered by the EU (European Council, 2017 – EUCO 8/17, pp. 1–5).

## V. Empirical justification

### *1. Security, risks and external threats from the European Council's perspective*

In Europe (the European Union) we are confronted with new threats crossing the borders of specific countries. These new strategic threats, underpinned by uneven development (to name just one phenomenon) include:

- “international terrorism” or, to be more exact, terrorism on the part of fundamentalist Islamist groups targeted by default against the developed “West” deemed a hostile system;
- dissemination of weapons of mass destruction and rocket technology;
- economic and political instability resulting from regional conflicts. A case in point is the Russian-Ukrainian war and the unlawful – not accepted/not recognized by the European Council annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol (European Council, 2014 – EUCO 7/1/14, pp. 1–2);
- the so-called failed states: collapsing states like Libya, Mali, Syria and Iraq;

- threats resulting from organized crime or, more precisely, its “external dimension” i.e. trafficking of firearms, drugs and humans and the relations with international terrorism.

The rational arguments in favor of the European Council’s comprehensive approach (jointly with the European Commission) to external conflicts and crises include also the increase in number and complexity of global challenges like the effects of climate changes and degradation of natural resources; demographic pressure and migration flows; illegal trade; energy security; natural catastrophes; cyber security; maritime safety; regional conflicts; radicalization of social and national attitudes and terrorism.

## ***2. A comprehensive approach of the European Council and the European Commission to external security, external conflicts and crises***

The European Union is undoubtedly a global scale actor: the 28 member states with more than 500 million inhabitants and an economic potential of one fourth of the world’s gross domestic product largely exceed the framework of a regional union of states. Its political importance results in joint responsibility for active solving of international conflicts arising outside of Europe, especially those endangering the Old Continent’s safety (*Joint Communication*, 2015, p. 3).

The comprehensive approach adopted by consensus of the European Council is defined not only as a coordinated use of the EU’s instruments and resources (and capabilities) but also as the joint responsibility of the EU entities and member states for what is happening and will be happening in international relations. Even more so because the European Union has at its disposal an exceptional network of 139 EU Delegations, diplomatic capabilities as part of the European Diplomatic Action Service (including EU special representatives) and operational capabilities as part of the missions and operations of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

The European Council and the subordinate EU institutions are very ambitiously interested in all the stages of conflicts and external crises – from early warning and readiness through preventing conflicts and responding, crisis management to an early stage of breaking out of crisis, building stability and peace, aimed at assisting countries in crisis to regain long-term sustainable development.

Stage one consists in jointly identifying the reasons for a possible conflict or crisis, identifying the most important individuals and groups involved and the potential threats resulting from taking actions or abstaining from them. In stage one, EU interests and objectives should be determined and the EU’s potential role to contribute to peace, security, development, human rights and the rule of law, taking into account existing EU resources and action in the country or region in question. To further improve a shared analysis, the following tasks are deemed indispensable: (*Joint Communication*, 2013, p. 3):

- improve combined situational awareness and analysis capacity in particular by better linking up the dedicated facilities in the various EU institutions and services, including the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the EU Situation Room (EU SitRoom);

- facilitate access by EU institutions to information and intelligence including from member states in order to prevent crises and prepare, mitigate, and accelerate the response to crisis situations;
- strengthen early, pro-active, transparent and regular information-sharing, co-ordination and team-work among all those responsible in the EU's Brussels headquarters and in the field (including EU Delegations, CSDP missions and operations, member states and EU Special Representatives, EU agencies as appropriate);
- further develop and systematically implement a common methodology to conflict and crisis analysis, including development, humanitarian, political, security and defense perspectives from both the field and HQ, by all relevant available knowledge and analysis, including from member states;
- systematically prepare proposals and options for discussion with member states in the relevant Council bodies, including the Political and Security Committee. When a CSDP action is envisaged, this would generally follow the Political 6 Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) approach, articulating what the problem is, explaining why the EU should act (based on interests, values, objectives and mandates), and identifying what instruments could be available, and best suited, to act.

Stage two consists in defining a common strategic vision in the face of a conflict or a crisis and the EU's future involvement in various areas of politics. The required actions include (*Joint Communication*, 2013, p. 5):

- identifying the EU's strategic vision for a country or a region should whenever possible be set out in an overarching EU Strategy document. Recent examples include the Horn of Africa Strategic Framework and the EU Strategy for security and development in the Sahel, and the proposed elements for an EU Strategy towards the Great Lakes region;
- setting out the EU's and member states' objectives and priorities for particular countries.

The third stage includes the required preventive measures aimed at preventing conflicts before an actual crisis or an outbreak of violence. Preventing conflicts saves lives and reduces suffering, avoids the destruction of homes, businesses, infrastructure and the economy, and makes it easier to resolve underlying tensions, disputes and conditions conducive to violent radicalization and terrorism. It also helps to protect EU interests and prevent adverse consequences on EU security and prosperity. The following activities are envisaged in this regard (*Joint Communication*, 2013, p. 7):

- early warning/early action: use new and existing EU early warning systems, including those of EU member states, to identify emerging conflict and crisis risks, and identify possible mitigating actions;
- work across EU institutions and with member states to translate conflict and crisis risk analyses into specific conflict prevention measures, drawing on lessons learned from previous conflicts and crises. This holds true for the early warning system of the European External Action Service (now at a pilot stage).

The fourth stage is a process of the effective use of the different strengths, capacities, competencies and relationships of EU institutions (including the European Council) and member states, in support of a shared vision and common objectives. The planned activities include:

- using the Crisis Platform mechanism, chaired by the EEAS with the participation of Commission services, in a more systematic way to facilitate coordination, share information and contribute to the identification and intelligent sequencing of available EU instruments as required. These mechanisms proved their value during the Arab Spring and in the EU's response to the Horn of Africa;
- ensuring that all relevant EU actors are informed and engaged in the analysis and assessment of conflict and crisis situations and at all stages of the conflict cycle – comprehensive engagement and action build on joined-up preparatory work. The EEAS informs and brings together other services on a regular basis for such analytical and preparatory work;
- further strengthening of operational cooperation among the various emergency response functions of the EU, using their complementary expertise. To this end, a Memorandum of Understanding between the EEAS and the Commission services is being prepared;
- making best use of EU Delegations to ensure local coherence between EU and member states' actions;
- strengthening the capacity of EU Delegations to contribute to conflict risk analysis. Identify appropriate tools and respond to conflict and crisis by rapid temporary reinforcement through the deployment of additional staff or other experts, where possible, drawing on existing EU resources capacity at the Brussels headquarter or in the region and on member states' resources;
- developing procedures and capacities for rapid deployment of joint (EEAS, Commission services, member states) field missions where appropriate to conflict or crisis situations (Żołądek, Kuszel, 2014, p. 4).

The fifth and last stage revolves around EU institutions and organs (including the European Council) focusing on long-term engagement in peace and state building and long-term sustainable development. The suggested actions include, among others:

- strengthening of mechanisms for pooling and sharing European capacities and expertise (e.g. pool of experts for CSDP missions);
- coordination and where possible combination of the use of a full range of EU tools and instruments (e.g. political dialogue, conflict prevention, reconciliation, programming of development assistance and joint programming, CSDP missions and operations, conflict prevention and stabilization under the Instrument for Stability, support to disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and support to justice and security sector reform processes, etc.) to craft a flexible and effective response during and after the stabilization phase and in case of risks of conflict;
- the programming of aid in fragile and conflict-affected countries, which should integrate conflict analysis from the very beginning as well as the necessary flexibilities for re-programming to respond to new developments on the ground where appropriate;
- taking stock of lessons learned, including within the EU institutions, with member states and external actors, and feeding them back into the comprehensive approach cycle starting from early warning and including prevention efforts, training and exercises.

## **VI. In lieu of an ending. The postulates about developing the European Council's (and the European Commission's) capacity in the realm of external safety and threats to the European Union**

1. The main goal of the measures initiated by the European Council (and continued by the remaining EU institutions, chiefly the European Commission and the High Representative) is to make it possible for the EU and its member states to prevent crises and conflicts in a more independent way (*Stanowisko*, 2015, p. 1).

Support for the European Council in developing these capacities needs to be underpinned by rules on the EU's external operations like (European Council, 2016 – EUCO 34/16, p. 1):

- bigger responsibility;
- adjustment to long-term strategies;
- respecting human rights and abiding by the law;
- coherence with other EU operations as part of a broader comprehensive approach of the EU to external conflicts and crises;
- the need to apply a context analysis;
- developing risk management methodology;
- ensuring broad support of the international community and coordination with other entities in places of conflict and threats.

2. In line with the provisions of the EU documents (chiefly the European Council's and the European Commission's) as part of the extended *modus operandi* for the benefit of the EU capacity in external safety and threats to the European Union – on the strategic and operational levels care needs to be taken of:

- enhanced exchange of information about the latest and planned activities underpinning the development of capacity in broader areas of crisis prevention management (including support for justice and security) exercised as part of bilateral cooperation between the member states, the EU instruments and technical cooperation and activities as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), also in the realm of establishing the European Fund;
- intensifying exchange of information with the EU's multilateral partners (including the UN, NATO and the OSCE) and the remaining third states and strategic partners which share with the EU cohesive and complementary priorities;
- emphasis placed on introducing political frameworks of the crisis approach in order to reinforce the relations between institutions in charge of the cooperation policy for the benefit of the safety policy and combating threats. These efforts contribute to a comprehensive analysis of the European Council's and the European Commission's involvement in a specific context before decisions are made about the new measures as part of the CSDP or outside the CSDP;
- organization of more regular and systematic contacts between the EU Delegations and missions or operations;
- a joint assessment of performance, monitoring and the results of measures related to developing security capacities and a reform of the security sector regardless of the relevant political framework;
- special methodology of risk management as part of EU's support for the security sector. The methodology may be based on the UN policy on due diligence in human

rights, developed to channel the UN involvement aimed at supporting the security sector and as part of risk management developed with the EU budget support in mind.

3. The above presented systemic and process-related (stages) approach of the EU and the European Council to external security, external conflicts and crises seems extremely demanding and ambitious. To ensure that it is not a collection of implausible postulates, the European Council's (and the European Commission's) comprehensive approach to these issues needs to rely on: joint identification of the risk, benefits and losses; developing a common strategic and tactical vision based on mutual trust of member states and between the states and the EU institutions; emphasis placed on prevention; making use of the strengths and the potential of the EU and its countries; long-term commitments; connecting the EU policies with external and internal measures; a better use of the EU Delegations and partner states' agencies; intensive basic work in situ in endangered (dangerous) countries. This is fully confirmed by the European Council's position on the situation: in Turkey (the European Council, 2016 – EUCO 12/1/16, p. 1); in Ukraine (the conflict with Russia) (the European Council, 2015 – EUCO 11/15, pp. 1–4); in the Eastern Partnership countries (the European Council, 2013 – EUCO 169/13, p. 7); and in Syria (the European Council, 2012 – EUCO 4/3/12, p. 8).

4. The EU institutions (mainly the European Council, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission) need to double their efforts in order to prevent international problems by monitoring the major reasons for threats and conflicts like: armed conflicts; human rights violations; terrorism; coup d'états; inequalities; tensions accompanying deficits of natural resources and climate changes; pandemics and evictions (migrations).

5. In order to accomplish the goal of Europe's global dimension, the European Council supported by the European Commission as well as the European Parliament assumes that external policies are among the main areas of the EU's operations. Their importance has grown following the new institutional frameworks secured by the Treaty of Lisbon (Goebel, 2011, pp. 1251–1268). To this end, the new years-long financial frameworks (after 2020) need to strengthen the EU's determination in order to develop its role of an active player in the international arena with its regional and global interests but also responsibilities to the world (the European Council, 2013 – EUCO 37/13, p. 2ff.).

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### Summary

In order to accomplish the goals of the European Council with respect to external activities, the Treaty of Lisbon has provided a new institutional context. It is based on boosting the European Council's potential and ambitions. These may be realized by making use of the vast array of instruments and resources for the operations to be more effective and of a bigger strategic importance. It has been assumed that the concepts and principles underpinning the European Council's comprehensive approach need to become the rules underlying the EU's external activities in all areas, in particular with respect to security, preventing conflicts and responding to crises. To this end, the European Council has identified a number of specific activities to pursue in its quest to adopt an even more comprehensive approach to politics and external relations. In order to complete the task (as precisely analyzed in the article), efforts have been made to take care of all the aspects of the threats to security stemming from conflicts and external crises, from early warning and readiness through preventing conflicts, responding to them and crisis management to the early stage of getting over a crisis and reaching stability and peace.

According to the European Council – as the article proves – the requirement of complementary interventions in the area of external security and threats to the European Union results from new international problems on a global scale. The European Council consistently emphasizes that security is a prerequisite for the EU's stability and that lasting peace is not possible without eliminating threats and risks.

To the European Council, creating and reinforcing the political, social and economic conditions for stability is of key importance to security and is a prerequisite for changes to the EU's external policy. This interdependence between security and stability plays a vital role in enhancing the effectiveness of the EU's external activities. Any country striving to ensure security and peace needs to have or acquire the necessary skills in all the important areas including security and protection. These efforts will both contribute to increased global stability and to bringing peace in a constructive way, to achieve stability and to prevent crises.

In the past few years, the EU increasingly supported the correlation between security and anti-crisis stability, initiating interventions in various areas of the EU policy and resorting to different instruments. These activities include access to international instruments, a political dialogue, technical cooperation (like common scientific research and innovations) and training (knowledge transfer and development of skills).

**Key words:** external operations of the EU and the European Council, instruments and resources in the EU's external operations, preventing conflicts, responding to crises, a comprehensive approach to politics and external relations, security as a prerequisite for stability, the correlation between security and international peace, increasing the effectiveness of the EU's (the European Council's) external operations, developing capacity in security and defense

## **Rada Europejska a bezpieczeństwo zewnętrzne i zagrożenia międzynarodowe dla Unii Europejskiej. Między idealizmem a realizmem**

### **Streszczenie**

W dążeniu do realizacji celów Rady Europejskiej w zakresie działań zewnętrznych traktat lizboński stworzył nowy kontekst instytucjonalny. Opiera się on na wroście zarówno potencjału jak i ambicji RE, które może realizować ona przez wykorzystanie pełnej gamy instrumentów i zasobów – w dążeniu do działań bardziej skutecznych i o większym znaczeniu strategicznym. Uznano zatem, że koncepcje i zasady regulujące kompleksowe podejście Rady Europejskiej zyskać muszą rangę zasad przewodnich działań zewnętrznych UE we wszystkich dziedzinach, w szczególności w odniesieniu do bezpieczeństwa, zapobiegania konfliktom i reagowania w sytuacjach kryzysowych. Z tego względu Rada Europejska określiła szereg konkretnych działań, które podejmuje, dążąc do osiągnięcia coraz bardziej kompleksowego podejścia w polityce i działaniach z zakresu stosunków zewnętrznych. Dla realizacji tego zadania (co precyzyjnie analizuje powyższy tekst) zajęto się wszystkimi aspektami zagrożeń dla bezpieczeństwa płynących z konfliktów i kryzysów zewnętrznych – od wczesnego ostrzegania i gotowości, poprzez zapobieganie konfliktom oraz reagowanie i zarządzanie kryzysowe, aż po wczesny etap wychodzenia z kryzysu oraz budowania stabilizacji i pokoju.

Zdaniem Rady Europejskiej – co wykazuje niniejszy tekst – konieczność wzajemnie uzupełniających się interwencji w obszarach bezpieczeństwa zewnętrznego i zagrożeń dla Unii Europejskiej jest efektem nowych problemów międzynarodowych w skali globalnej. Rada Europejska konsekwentnie podkreśla, że bezpieczeństwo jest niezbędnym warunkiem stabilności UE i że trwałe pokój nie jest możliwy bez rozwoju i eliminacji zagrożeń i ryzyk.

Dla Rady Europejskiej tworzenie i wzmocnianie warunków politycznych, społecznych i gospodarczych dla stabilności ma zasadnicze znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa i jest warunkiem wstępnym zmian w unijnej polityce zewnętrznej. Ta współzależność między bezpieczeństwem i stabilnością odgrywa kluczową rolę w zwiększaniu skuteczności działań zewnętrznych UE. Każde państwo, które dąży do zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa i pokoju, musi posiadać lub nabyć odpowiednie zdolności we wszystkich istotnych obszarach, w tym w obszarze bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Umożliwi to nie tylko ustabilizowanie sytuacji na świecie, ale również przyczyni się w sposób konstruktywny do zaprowadzenia pokoju, uzyskania stabilizacji i zapobiegania kryzysom.

Na przestrzeni ostatnich lat UE w coraz większym zakresie wspierała tę współzależność między bezpieczeństwem i antykryzysową stabilnością, prowadząc interwencje w różnych obszarach polityki unijnej i korzystając z różnych instrumentów. Działania te obejmują m.in. dostęp do instrumentów międzynarodowych, dialog polityczny, współpracę techniczną (w tym wspólne badania naukowe i innowacje) oraz szkolenia (transfer wiedzy oraz rozwój umiejętności).

**Słowa kluczowe:** działania zewnętrzne UE i Rady Europejskiej, instrumenty i zasoby w zakresie działań zewnętrznych UE, zapobieganie konfliktom, reagowanie w sytuacjach kryzysowych, kompleksowe podejścia w polityce i działaniach z zakresu stosunków zewnętrznych, bezpieczeństwo jako warunek stabilności, współzależność między bezpieczeństwem i pokojem międzynarodowym, zwiększanie skuteczności działań zewnętrznych UE (Rady Europejskiej), nabywanie zdolności w obszarze bezpieczeństwa i obrony.