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Roman Darowski (Poland)

FIRST ARISTOTELIANS OF VILNIUS

The year 1978 had been the 2300th Anniversary of the death of Aristotle, and in the years 1978–1979 the 400th Anniversary of the foundation of the Academy of Vilnius was celebrated. These two events are certainly a good opportunity to recall to our minds the beginnings of the philosophical studies in Vilnius, having in mind the fact that the foreigners played a very important role in this field. There was a very close relationship between the philosophy practised in Vilnius at that time and the ideas of the Stagirite as the studies were based just on Aristotle's philosophy.

BEGINNINGS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN VILNIUS¹

In 1570 the Jesuits opened a college which included, since the very beginning, a complete, five-class gymnasium in which, during the classes of rhetoric, the rudiments of philosophy, or so called dialectic, were taught. Only one year later a separate course (the first in Lithuania) of Philosophy was opened and the lectures were delivered by the Croat Thomas Zdelarić. At the beginning of October 1571 he started to lecture on preliminary problems of philosophy (Prolegomena) but already at the end of that month the lectures were stopped because of the plague which dispersed the school. The resumption of the lectures and the official formal opening of the Faculty of Philosophy were celebrated on February 25, 1572. The lectures were attended by secular students and by 13 seminarists from the Society of Jesus. The lectures

¹ See: L. Piechnik, *Początki Akademii Wileńskiej* (The Beginnings of the Academy of Vilnius), "Nasza Przeszłość" 40 (1973), Cracow, pp. 21–31, 103–106.

were appreciated by the students and the lecturer gained a wide popularity. Unfortunately, this time he was delivering his lectures for a time not much longer than one month. He died of plague on April 8, 1572. He was temporarily replaced, first by the Pole Wojciech Tobolski, and next by Jan Viger from Geldria (a part of the present Holland). Yet a certain degree of stabilization in the field of teaching philosophy was achieved only at a later date when the Scot John Hay became a lecturer (1572-1575). For the next three years (1575-1578) his successor was the Spaniard Pedro Viana. In the meantime, in 1578, the Faculty of Theology was opened at the College, and in the period of 1578-1579 the Jesuit College of Vilnius was transformed into an Academy: King Stephen Báthory issued a foundation document in Lvov on July 7, 1578, and Pope Gregory XIII confirmed this foundation by his Bulla of October 29, 1579. The Jesuits were supervising the Academy for about 200 years until the suppression of the Order in 1773. The successor of Viana was the Pole Leonard Kraker who was teaching philosophy for 8 years (1578-1586). He was also the first professor of philosophy at the newly created Academy.

The philosophy taught at the Jesuit College in Vilnius (1571-1579) and during the first years of the existence of the Academy (1579-1586) will be the subject of this paper. So far it has proved impossible to get acquainted with the philosophical inheritance left by the first three lecturers, *i.e.* Zdelarić, Tobolski and Viger. This is, however, a very short period lasting only half a year. Fortunately, the attempts to know the philosophical ideas of the next lecturers have been successful. They comprise rather scarce works of Hay and quite a rich heritage of Viana and Kraker. It is possible that further researches may still add something to this inheritance.

The above mentioned period preceded the time when the first attempts were made to introduce a uniform system of teaching into the education sponsored by the Jesuits. And thus, in 1586 the General of the Society of Jesus Claudius Aquaviva promulgated the first project of the Ratio Studiorum which initiated a systematic process aiming at the establishment of a uniform organization in the educational system of the Jesuits. This process was completed in 1599 when the final form of the Ratio Studiorum was promulgated by Aquaviva, said regulations being in force and controlling the education until the suppression of the Order in 1773. The changes introduced later on referred only to the problems of minor importance, the main regulations being left unaltered all the time.

The organization and the curriculum of the Jesuit schools before 1586, that is, during the period in question, were based on the general

guidelines *De artium liberalium studiis* prepared in 1565–1570 under F. Borgia for the whole Society of Jesus, as well as on the detailed instructions developed for every school founded by the Jesuits. In 1570 the College of Vilnius acquired appropriate instructions from the provincial of Austria who, at the very beginning, was supervising the Jesuit houses in Poland and Lithuania. The instructions were, for the most part, concerned with organization problems. And yet, many of the recommendations could not be carried into effect because of the lack of qualified teachers. This was the case, for example, with the instructions saying that the Faculty of Philosophy was to be provided with three professors of logic, physics and metaphysics. The principles and recommendations which were in force at that time were rather of a general character. They referred to the ideas of Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Society of Jesus. Included into the Constitutions (Rules) of the Order, they recommended to follow Aristotle's philosophy in logic, philosophy of nature, ethics and metaphysics. To what degree these principles were realized in practice in Vilnius during the period of time discussed here, we may judge from the works of Hay, Viana and Kraker which will be discussed in the subsequent parts of this paper. Before this, however, let us outline the course of their life, studies and activities.

SHORT BIOGRAPHIES OF THE FIRST ARISTOTELIANS OF VILNIUS

John Hay was born in Dalgetty (Fifeshire), Scotland, in 1546. After completing the course of Rhetoric at Louvain, he joined the Society of Jesus in Rome in 1566 and at the Collegium Romanum he graduated in philosophy and completed a part of the theological studies. In 1570 he arrived in Poland and started teaching rhetoric and dialectic at the Jesuit College in Vilnius. In the period of 1572–1575 he was teaching philosophy there during all the three-year course. At this time he wrote two collections of philosophical theses which he prepared for a public disputation. We know about the collection of theses from 1573 only from the correspondence², as the attempts to find a printed copy have been a failure so far. The second collection was entitled: *Assertiones theologicae et philosophicae, in Collegio Vilnensi*

² Stanisław Warszawicki, Rector of the College of Vilnius, wrote from Vilnius on September 30, 1573, the following words, directed to the General of the Jesuits Everard Mercurian: "Magister Joannes iam hac renovatione incipiet tertium librum Physicorum. Renovationem nunc non fecimus sollemnem, cum... Conclusiones Cracoviae impressae nondum sint nobis allatae". Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Roma (abbreviation: ARSI), Germ. 153, f. 216v°.

Societatis Iesu, sub renovationem autumnalem defendendae, Anno Domini 1574, Cracoviae, Anno Domini M.D.LXXIII, 4°, 8 ff.

The author of the theses was not mentioned but the fact that Hay was at that time the only professor of philosophy in Vilnius proves, without any doubts, that he was the author of the philosophical theses³.

In his didactic activities Hay was achieving good results and this was testified in the letters written by his contemporaries⁴. In spite of this, he had to leave Poland because of his health and because of a divergence of the philosophical opinions that existed between him and the Spaniard Pedro Viana who, at the same time, was lecturing on moral and controversial theology in Vilnius. Hay was interpreting some of Aristotle's arguments following the ideas of Duns Scotus, whereas Viana was a follower of the orthodox Thomism. This was the main cause of the heated discussions and disagreements which sometimes assumed alarmingly violent forms and exercised highly unfavourable effect on the atmosphere of the College. Therefore, the provincial, a Spaniard Francisco Sunyer, decided to separate the two antagonists and Hay was recalled from Vilnius.

In 1575 Hay left Poland and settled down in France where he recovered, completed his studies and took holy orders. He became famous for his polemics with the Scottish and French calvinists. He was also teaching philosophy at various Jesuit colleges. He wrote several dissertations dealing mainly with the problems of the controversial theology. He was also Rector of the Jesuit College in Pont-à-Mousson where he died on May 21, 1608.

The successor of Hay at the Chair of Philosophy in Vilnius was Pedro V i a n a. He was born at the end of the year 1549 at Logroño in the diocese of Calahorra in Spain. Before entering the Society of Jesus, for 4 years he had studied philosophy in Alcalá where he took his baccalaureate in liberal arts. He entered the Society of Jesus on April 15, 1569, and completed his noviciate in Toledo. Before the arrival in Poland he had certainly been studying theology, most probably in Rome, from where he came to Poznań in 1573. During 1574/75 he was lecturing on moral (*casus*) and controversial (*controversiae*) theology at the College of Vilnius where he proved to be a man of versatile educa-

³ Estreicher does not register this printed work in his *Polish Bibliography*. Two copies of this work are kept in the University Library in Uppsala.

⁴ Stanisław Rozdrażewski SJ in his letter to Mercurian written on February 6, 1575, in Vilnius, gave a very high opinion about Hay: "Magister Joannes Hayus est vir valde doctus, ingenium tale, ut vix illi secundus saltem in Polonia reperiri possit. Philosophus, Rhetor et [...] bonus est Theologus ita ut etiam multi Vilnae prudentes hoc animadvertant. Haeretici vero Deum Jesuitarum eum apel- larunt...", ARSI, Germ. 136, f. 357v°.

tion and impressing didactic capabilities. The troubles in his contacts with others were caused by the above-mentioned divergence of philosophical opinions between him and John Hay which finally resulted in Hay leaving Vilnius and Viana being appointed Head of the Chair of Philosophy. In the years 1575–1578 he was in charge of the three-year course of philosophy for nineteen Jesuit seminarists and nineteen secular students. From this period of Viana's didactic activities originate ten printed collections of philosophical theses and two manuscripts. The name of Viana was neither mentioned in the works, nor was it registered in the *Polish Bibliography* compiled by Estreicher. The authorship of Viana was determined basing mainly on the fact that at the time from which the collections originate he was the only professor of philosophy in Vilnius and, according to the practice accepted by the Jesuits, he was the only person who could write these theses. Moreover, there is an obvious agreement between his ideas expressed in the printed theses and those asserted in the manuscript containing some lectures on the philosophy of nature and metaphysics (1577–1578) where his name was mentioned⁵.

These activities lasted for only 3 years. During that time he came into close contacts with Nicolas Christopher Radziwiłł and involved himself in politics; among others, he was suspected to participate in subversive activity against King Stephen Báthory which could baffle the plans of the King to found an academy in Vilnius. When the intervention of the superiors proved to be of no effect, he was ordered to come to Cracow from where in Autumn 1578 he went to Rome. He took with him the document of the erection of the Academy in Vilnius, signed by King Stephen Báthory, to present it to the Pope for his approval. Next, he moved to Padua and from Padua to Naples, where in 1579 he was delivering lectures on theology. In the years 1593–1602 he lectured on moral (*casus*) theology in Bologna, and from 1602 to 1605 in Parma, where he died of tuberculosis (*phtysis*) on June 10, 1609.

After Viana the lectures on philosophy in Vilnius were delivered by Leonard Kraker. He was the first Pole who held this post for a relatively long time; he was also the first professor of philosophy at the newly created Academy.

⁵ Detailed specification of Viana's philosophical writings and other data concerning his person and his ideas have been given in the paper of the author of the present article entitled: *Piotr Viana SJ (1549–1609) i jego działalność filozoficzna w Polsce* (P. V. and his Philosophical Activities in Poland), "Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce" XXIII (1978), pp. 35–53; see also the spanish version of this article: *Pedro Viana, S. J. (1549–1609) y su actividad filosófica en Polonia, "Pensamiento"*, 35 (1979), pp. 425–443.

Kraker was born in 1549 or 1550 in Poznań. He completed his secondary school in Poznań and Braniewo. On November 21, 1569, he joined the Society of Jesus in Rome where was passing his noviciate. He studied philosophy at the Collegium Romanum. He returned to Poland in 1573 and the following year (1574/75) he spent teaching mathematics and dialectic (during the classes of rhetoric) at the College of Vilnius. Then he was teaching in the lower and higher forms at Pułtusk. Next, for 8 years (1578–1586) he was lecturing on philosophy at the Academy of Vilnius. At that time, the number of the students, including Jesuit seminarists, did not exceed fifty. From that period of Kraker's didactic activities originate seven collections of the philosophical theses, prepared by him for public disputations⁶. Also during that time, at an unknown date, he obtained his M.A. degree in the field of philosophy and liberal arts. In 1586/87 in Vilnius, Kraker and Śmiglecki took part, on the behalf of the philosophers, in the activities of the Commission of the Polish Province of the Jesuits connected with a project of the Ratio Studiorum. The lectures on philosophy were taken over from Kraker by Marcin Śmiglecki, while Kraker was completing his theological studies at the Academy of Vilnius. Since 1591 he was lecturing on theology at the Academy, and on November 25, 1594, together with Śmiglecki, he was conferred a doctor's degree in the field of theology. Since the beginning of 1595 Kraker was Rector of the College at Jarosław, and in the years 1596–1600 he was Rector of the Academy of Vilnius. Since 1602 he was Instructor of the so called Third Probation (Study of Order Law and Ignatian Spirituality) at Jarosław where he died on April 16, 1605.

PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS

The remarks on the most essential ideas of the first Aristotelians in Vilnius discussed below are based on their available works, the number of which differs from author to author. The works of Hay which we know from autopsy are limited to nineteen theses (*Assertiones*) from 1574; they refer to logic (*De demonstratione*), philosophy of nature (*De natura*), uanology (*De caelo—On the Haevens, De generatione et corruptione—On the Generation and Corruption*), psychology (*De anima—On the Soul*) and metaphysics.

⁶ On Kraker and his writings, see: R. Darowski, *Leonard Kraker SJ (1549/1550–1605), pierwszy profesor filozofii w Akademii Wileńskiej* (L. K., the First Professor of Philosophy at the Academy of Vilnius), "Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce" XXIV (1979), pp. 65–82. In 1586/87 the lectures on philosophy were started by Marcin Śmiglecki (Smiglecius) who was not a priest yet. Therefore, Kraker was a supervisor of Śmiglecki and presided over the disputations (*praeses*).

The writings of Viana are much more numerous. They include ten printed collections, one manuscript of philosophical theses and one manuscript of lectures. The theses relate a part of the lectures. The major part of them was prepared for the so called monthly disputations or for the occasional disputations, e.g. for the beginning and the end of the academic year. Only one collection (from 1578) includes sixty theses chosen from the whole body of philosophy. This collection does not include, however, theses from ethics which was probably taught at that time nor from mathematics which was taught during this philosophical course by the Englishman James Bosgrave. The manuscript of the lectures also includes a commentary upon the following treatises of Aristotle: *De ortu et interitu*, *De anima*, *Meteorologica* and *Metaphysica*. This text was dictated by Viana in 1577–1578 and written by one of his pupils. It gives us a general idea of the character of Viana's lectures.

The bibliography of Kraker includes seven items: six printed collections of theses and one manuscript. The collections contain theses on the philosophy of nature (two collections), logic, physics and logic, and general theses pertaining to the whole body of philosophy (three sets). The last group includes one manuscript and two printed collections; those are, however, known to us only from a description in the *Polish Bibliography* by Estreicher. The manuscript from 1585, containing a collection of theses on the whole body of philosophy, is kept in Uppsala and includes twelve theses on each of the disciplines of philosophy taught at that time, thus referring also to mathematics and ethics which appeared for the first time in a collection of *Assertiones* from Vilnius. The theses were defended by Adrian Junga SJ when he was taking his M.A. degree in philosophy.

GENERAL OUTLINE AND DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY

Information on this subject was contained only in the manuscript of Kraker's theses from 1585, defended by Junga.

Philosophy, which means wisdom in a broad sense of this word, is understood as causal cognition of God's and man's actions and deeds, and its main aim is to achieve, through contemplation and action, human perfection and happiness that are obtainable in this life. The material object of philosophy are real beings and not mental beings (*entia rationis*); the formal object depends on the discipline and varies in each case. Philosophizing and philosophy may exist thanks to the natural powers of the human mind which, by means of senses, ex-

perience, intuition and argumentation, has created the principles of all sciences and arranged them in a methodical order.

Philosophy is divided into theoretical (*contemplativa*) and practical (*activa*), the former one aiming at a cognition of the truth, the latter one being related to action. Next, the theoretical philosophy falls into mathematics, philosophy of nature (*physica*) and metaphysics, while the practical philosophy is further divided into ethics, economics and politics. Each of these disciplines is concerned with the causal cognition and proof—demonstrating the existence of the beings which constitute its object, applying to this end an appropriate method. Hence, metaphysics is concerned with examination of the causes as such, physics determines a relationship between the cause and the motion, mathematics is mainly occupied with the quantity, and ethics with the aim which is the main determinant of the value of human actions. What links together these separate disciplines is the general object with which they are concerned, *i.e.* the being; what divides them is the degree of abstraction that they apply: physics is concerned with material beings, the object of mathematics are quantitative characteristics of the matter, while metaphysics examines beings separated from the matter.

The main aim of the philosopher is, first of all, to solve his own moral problems and the problems of his nationals (which is possible through ethics), and then, when the indispensable peace of mind has been obtained, to examine the causes and the reasons of the reality, to cognize their Creator and to worship Him. This type of contemplation is the acme of wisdom, and while religion consists in the worship of God, human happiness involves both the contemplation and the worship.

LOGIC

The epistemological writings of the above-mentioned authors differ to a great extent in respect to both the subject matter and volume. While in the case of Hay they are limited to two theses on the scientific knowledge, in the case of Viana they include two collections of printed theses and one manuscript. The most comprehensive are the writings of Kraker. The problems of logic are discussed in two printed collections of his theses and in one manuscript. In each of them logic has a different name: *disserendi facultas*, *logica* and *dialectica*. The collections include, basically speaking, the most important problems embracing the whole body of logic.

The ideas discussed below have mainly been based on the works

of Kraker as his inheritance is the most inclusive one. However, the ideas of Viana and Hay have also been included and provided with appropriate annotations.

Logic is a cognitive aid for the human mind and a tool for all sciences. Its main purpose is to show the way and to direct human activities aiming at the cognition of the truth; the object of logic is a mental being (*ens rationis*). The same idea was expressed in a more explicit way by Viana who stated that logic is a rational science aiming at the acquirement of an ability to differentiate between the true and the false. For him, the object of logic is also a mental being. According to the three cognitive operations of the human mind, logic is divided into three parts which refer to perception, judgement and reasoning.

Passing to some particular problems connected with logic both authors deal, first of all, with the problem of universals (*universalia*). Kraker makes a very distinct division between the following aspects of the universal concepts: a) ontic (metaphysical)—as attributes (*passiones*) of the real being; b) psychological—as a condition of the object of intellect; c) epistemological—as a tool of the intellectual cognition. The universal concept is a note of the beings existing in reality; it has been created in the mind through abstraction from their individual characteristics. According to Porphyrius, there are five ways of predicating of the beings (*genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens*) and the predication that refers to them is not analogical but univocal.

The problem of the categories of beings belongs, first of all, to metaphysics but it has also an epistemological aspect on account of the different ways of predicating, and therefore it was by both authors included into logic. Thus, ten Aristotelian categories were discussed in turn with particular regard for the problem of substance, and from the accidents—for the category of quantity.

The second part of logic treats of the judgement and its outer expression, that is, sentence. Sentence means an utterance expressing truth or falsehood. The third part of logic was treated very amply. The attention was mainly focussed on the principles of syllogism.

The manuscript of Kraker's theses from 1585 includes further interesting details from the scope of logic which in some aspects differ from the principles described above. The problem of the definition which corresponds to the mental activity called apprehension (*apprehensio*) is preceded by problems of the logical division (*divisio*). The division can be made either into parts of which a given being is composed, or into factors which are related to these parts. The former division may be triple: a division of the integral being (*totius integri*),

a division into his essential parts (*essentialis*) and a division of the universal notion (*universalis*). To this division is opposed a composition (*compositio*). The definition expresses the nature of things and therefore these names can be used interchangeably. The definition is divided into the essential one, which is the main subject of dialectic, and into the descriptive one.

In order to prove something one has to use invention (*inventio*) and judgement (*iudicium*). Invention supplies proofs, while judgement controls their application through the choice of an appropriate argumentation and an adequate sequence of proofs, *i.e.* a method. According to Aristotle, there are two principal kinds of argumentation, namely: syllogism and induction. The aim and main effect of argumentation is to create scientific knowledge (*scientia*), and thanks to this to overcome ignorance. Science is a "constant habit of mind thanks to which in a clear and infallible way we come to understand things through the perception of their proper causes". The above-mentioned method assumes two forms: analysis and synthesis.

Hay and Viana also express their opinions on the subject of the scientific knowledge (*scientia*). Both ascertain its existence emphasizing the fact that it originates from the previous cognition of the cause of the thing to which it refers. Viana is also of an opinion that science is the more reliable the more it abstracts from the matter which causes the lack of certainty. He adds two other points of view to these Aristotelian opinions; both of them are connected with theology and they state that theology is a true science and that the act of faith and of science is impossible when dealing with one and the same object. It is possible, however, when the knowledge about a given object is vague.

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

In the inheritance of Hay the philosophy of nature, understood very broadly, is discussed in ten out of nineteen theses. Apart from a commentary upon Aristotle's *Physics* it also includes commentaries upon his other treatises on philosophy and nature; but these on psychology will be discussed separately. With Viana, philosophy of nature understood in this way finds expression in seven printed collections of *Assertiones* and in the manuscript of the lectures from 1577–1578. In the works of Kraker this problem also plays an important role and is included into four collections of theses out of the five collections which are known to us from autopsy. Undoubtedly, problems of the philosophy of nature also appear in two collections of the theses dealing with

philosophy in general which are known to us only from the *Polish Bibliography* by Estreicher.

All three authors discussed in the present paper have, in principle, the same conception of the philosophy of nature although some discrepancies may be noted in this respect. Thus, Hay emphasizes the fact that this philosophy is a permanent habit of the human mind, the object of which is a natural body (*corpus naturale*), i.e. a material being which is integral. Viana thinks that the philosophy of nature is a science, and moreover a speculative one which is characterized by its own specific unity and has a subsidiary function in relation to almost all sciences. Its object is a mobile being (*ens mobile*). Viana distinguishes physics from philosophy of nature. Both have the same object but examine it from a different point of view. This point of view, however, had not been stated in a precise and explicit manner. Finally, Kraker applies two names to the philosophy of nature: *naturalis philosophia* and *physiologia*. This is a science which aims at an explanation of the characteristics and structure of natural bodies, with particular regard to their principles and causes and to the properties which belong to them. Natural bodies are either simple or mixed (*mixta*); the mixed ones are, in turn, divided into imperfect and perfect: plants, animals and human beings. There are five simple bodies: heaven and four elements (*elementa*), i.e. fire, air, water and earth.

The three authors discussed here are of the same opinion that the natural body considered from a genetic point of view (*in fieri*) contains three interior principles, viz.: matter, form and its privation (*privatio*), while the elements of the natural body already constituted are only matter and form. Our authors differ, however, in their opinions concerning the matter. After Hay, the matter has its own existence and really differs from the quantity. The form is divisible thanks to the quantity which is contained in the matter. After Viana, the prime matter is a pure potency without any act; it cannot exist without a form. The substantial form is directly combined with the prime matter which is derived from the potentiality of the matter. This, however, does not refer to the rational soul which owes its existence to the creative power of God. Kraker presents his point of view which is similar to that of Hay but more developed. The prime matter is not pure potency but an actual being and a substance which has its own, although imperfect, existence. It is a being in the potency in relation to the act but an undetermined so far quantity is ascribed to it. The material form cannot exist without matter and is the reason of the essence of the being, while with the matter it is combined only by means of accidental forms which, however, are not sufficient for an

explanation of the changes in nature; it is indispensable to accept also substantial forms. Nature is the first and proper (*per se*) principle and cause of all movement and rest in beings.

Apart from two interior causes (matter and form), the authors discussed in this paper quote after Aristotle two exterior causes, efficient and final. The definition of the cause given by Kraker is very characteristic in this respect: a cause is this, from the existence of which results something else. Beings in this world are attributed with real activity. Here, Viana observes that the action of natural beings, and also of non-cognizant beings, is a directed and intentional action. Finally, all of them assume that there exists a possibility of the influence of some accidental causes, such as: chance (*casus*), fortune (*fortuna*) and fate (*fatum*). These are, however, dependent on the cognition and on God's will.

The opinions of our authors vary in respect to the problem that was quite often discussed at that time, viz.: actual infinity (*infinitum actu*). Hay states that it is possible for God to create an object infinitely large but he himself is rather against such a possibility, considering his common-sense point of view to be closer to the truth. Viana thinks that although such an object does not exist, yet in the case of quantity there is an infinite progress (*in immensum progressus*). Kraker, on the other hand, says that the number of beings in nature is not and cannot be infinite, at least not in the natural way. The same refers to the infinite mass of bodies.

In the context of the philosophy of nature and of metaphysics, the Aristotelians of Vilnius also discuss the problem of God. Hay underlines his conviction that an eternal universe is impossible; so, the world was created by God in time. Thorough investigations into the nature of the created things imply this very conclusion. God is only one, He is the pure and everlasting act, and the purpose and the efficient cause of all things. The world was created from nothing (*ex nihilo*). God has infinite power; He is free in His external actions and He exerts providence over His creatures. Referring to *Book VIII* of Aristotle's *Physica*, Viana says that the prime mover constitutes the principle of motion, and—contrary to Aristotle—that it is an entirely free cause. Similarly, he opposes the Stagirite defending the thesis which says that the world was created by God in time although it might have been created regardless of time (in respect to the undestroyable elements). Creation, i.e. the production of a being from nothing, is the act of which only God is capable. God is only one (unique), He is the purest act (*actus purissimus*), He is not subject to any movement or change, He is an immaterial being, infinite in His existence, power, perfection. God

influences the action of all creatures because everything that moves acquires its movement from another being (*omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur*). In metaphysics we find additional explications of this problem. In particular, it is emphasized that God comes to know other beings and also contingent events in the future. The problem of the prime mover (*primus motor*) was touched by Kraker when dealing with the problem of movement. In the chain of causes it is impossible to go into infinity but out of pure necessity one must reach a prime mover: one, everlasting, not moved by anybody and moving all other beings. He discussed the problem of God once again in metaphysics, stating that God is one, everlasting, He is the pure act (*actus purus*), He is the end and the cause of all things. These statements were already made by Aristotle, only he had a rather vague idea of other truths which could be cognized and proved in the natural way, such as: the creation of things out of nothing, God's infinite power, His free will in action and His providence in relation to all beings.

PSYCHOLOGY

When dealing with the philosophy of nature in a broad sense of this word, the authors discussed in this paper also considered psychology giving comments upon Aristotle's treatise *On the Soul*. This problem will be discussed separately here, due to its importance and to a rather comprehensive way in which it was treated by the authors in question.

Hay formulates psychology in five theses, of which only two are of truly philosophical character in the modern meaning of this word; two deal with anatomic problems, and one would nowadays belong to experimental psychology. He ascertains that every being has only one soul. The vegetative and sensitive souls perish together with the being whose form they constitute, both of them being extent with the extent of the bodies. As contrary to the peripatetic philosophy he rejects the opinion that the rational soul might be mortal or could pass from one body into another. He thinks that the belief in the existence of one soul common to all human beings (averroism) is absurd.

The psychology of Viana is more developed. His remarks on this subject are included in four collections of *Assertiones* and in the manuscript of his lectures. His opinions on psychology are even preceded by some remarks of metapsychological character. Psychology is a science as it has all the characteristics that are typical of science. In the case of psychology these characteristics are as follows: the soul is a being cognizable by the human mind; because of its nature it is a necessary being (in the sense of the cognitive necessity); it has a definite unity;

through the action of intellect it is detached from the individuals; finally, it is an object of some statements and rules and, in consequence, of demonstration.

The soul exists in the order of things, and its existence can be proved a posteriori and also a priori—in a way. It is cognizable, its cognition basing partly on the motion of the animated beings (*ex ipsa animalium motione*), partly on the cognition and the particular action of the mind (*ex cognitione et singulari mentis agitatione*), and partly on some information acquired from sensorial impressions (*ex figura externa sensui oculorum exposita*).

Although Viana quotes two well-known Aristotle's definitions of the soul, he himself supports the definition which is to some extent a combination of those two, namely: "Soul is an incomplete substance, the prime act and the substantial form of the human being". Being a substance, that is, nature, the soul is in the whole body but its powers act in different parts of the subject. Blood is an integral part of the animated being, while hair, nails, etc. are not, and as such they are not animated by the soul. Following Aristotle's opinion, there are three degrees of life and the corresponding three kinds of soul: vegetative, sensitive and rational. But only the rational soul is wholly present in the whole body and in every one of its parts. In spite of this indivisibility of the soul, one may distinguish in it, in Aristotle's opinion, five powers (*facultates*): vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, motive and intelligent. Man has only one soul; intelligent, immortal, created by God and being the principle of all human actions. Most of the powers of the soul (*pleraeque*) really differ both from the subject, that is, the soul as such, and from one another. The specific character of the powers (*ratio formalis*) depends on the actions they perform and the objects towards which they are directed.

Senses are active and passive. Although sensible species (*species sensiles*) have a stimulating and determining effect on the power, they are not yet the cognition itself. Viana rejects the opinion suggesting the existence of double senses, *i.e.* active and passive. Senses are divided into external (sight, hearing, etc.) and internal: common sense (*sensus communis*), instinct (*aestimativa*) and sensitive memory (*memoria*). Senses do not err in relation to their proper object but they may sometimes make a mistake when directed to an object less proper (*obiectum minus proprium*), or to their general object. General objects of the senses are: magnitude, shape (*figura*), number (*numerus*), movement and rest.

Viana assumes that the soul is the true (*vere*) form of man giving to him life and all that is connected with life. All the rational souls are

characterized by the same fundamental (substantial) perfection, their action being, however, different. They differ among themselves numerically, due to the fact that they are commensurate to particular bodies (*commensurationes ad diversa corpora*).

Cognitive power is the main characteristic feature of a rational soul. The prime object of intellectual cognition are universal beings, while individual beings are only secondary and indirect objects. Intellect has a double function: active (*intellectus agens*) and passive (*intellectus possibilis*); both these functions are really the same. The object of the intellectual cognition in the state when the soul is united with the body, i.e. during the earthly life, is a concrete, material being (*ens materia concretum*), while the object of human cognition as such is a being as such (*ens in universum*). Cognition is possible thanks to the intelligible species originating from objects. Due to the action of the intellect, these species become a "mental word" (*verbus mentis*) which differs from the act of cognition as such. The rational appetite (*appetitus rationis*—will) and the sensitive appetite form two different realities.

K r a k e r discusses the problems of psychology only in the manuscript of the theses from 1585. Nevertheless, he does point out to some problems not mentioned by Hay and Viana. Man is a perfect unity of compounds (*mixtum perfectum*). Soul in general sense is—following Aristotle's ideas—the first perfection (act) of a natural body which is organic and able to live (possesses life in potency). The powers of the soul differ from one another in the type of the activities performed and in the object towards which they are directed. However, the powers of the soul differ from the soul itself only mentally (*ratione*). The vegetative soul has an ability (power) to assimilate food, to grow and to reproduce. Five external senses (the most important is sight) and three internal senses (common sense, imagination, i.e. an ability to reproduce visible objects, and memory) are the powers of a sensitive soul. For sensitive cognition no active sense (*sensus agens*) is needed. The body of animals is not composed of continuous parts but of an appropriate system of non-continuous (contiguous) parts (*partes contiguas*). The rational soul, the essential characteristics of man, is immortal; is a true substantial form of the man; is only one in one man; is an intermediate form between the immaterial and material forms; is partially dependent on the body; exists as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in every part of the body. Human soul possesses a capacity of intellectual cognition, the adequate object of which is the being. The soul has also the free will which directs it towards the good as such; on the other hand, it also has a possibility to act or not to act and to choose between the good and the evil.

As it results from the above quoted arguments, psychology is—in the opinions of the authors in question—in principle, a speculative discipline which uses the method of metaphysical reflection. Experience is applied in this discipline, to some extent, only in the problems concerning the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul (senses).

METAPHYSICS

The collection of Hay's theses includes only two theses on metaphysics: one refers to the previously discussed problem of God, while the other deals with the problem of the existence of the nine types of accidents of which one predicates analogically (an idea similar to that of Kraker); accident is the first (before substance) object of our cognition. The problems of metaphysics are related in a more extensive way by Viana (in two collections of theses and in the manuscript of his lectures) and by Kraker (in the manuscript from 1585).

Kraker is of the opinion that the main task of metaphysics is a "contemplation" of the beings which in their essence are deprived of any matter, without taking into consideration, however, the problem of individual beings; the means of cognition is reason (*lumen naturale*). The first and adequate object of metaphysics is a real being as such which, in this meaning, is analogical.

Viana gives a similar conception of metaphysics. He also prescribes to it the same object, underlining, moreover, that mental beings and accidents are not its objects.

Kraker divides metaphysics into three classes: the object of the first class is a being as such together with its principles and attributes, the object of the second class are ten kinds of beings (categories), while the object of the third class are separated substances and God. In the context of the first part, Kraker discusses the problem of universals. Universal does not exist in the order of things beyond individual beings but it constitutes a "nature common for many beings, expressed by a term and a notion, belonging to many designates and detached from them through the action of reason".

Both authors speak about the essence and existence as metaphysical principles of the being. But, while Viana underlines several times their real distinction, Kraker ascertains that although existence in the created beings is not identical with their essence, yet there is no real distinction between them; existence is merely a final, interior "*modus*" of the essence which differs from it only mentally. Subsistence (*subsistentia*) is, according to him, the last positive act of the existing nature, differing from this nature only mentally. Hence, it follows that the supposi-

tum adds nothing new to the subsistence of the being. The notion of the being predicates quidditatively (*quidditative*) of the essence of all the complete beings, of their differences and of some of their characteristics; as far as existence is concerned, its quidditative predication refers only to God.

From the most general principles of the being, Kraker emphasizes, first of all, the principle of noncontradiction in the formulation: "*Fieri non posse, ut idem simul insit et non insit eidem et secundum idem*"; from the transcendental predicates of a being, both authors mention unity, truth and good.

Viana states that the active potency, of which only God is capable, has its correspondent in the world of the contingent beings, *i.e.* the passive potency which includes all that is not contradictory in itself. Concerning the problems of the relation his point of view differs from the tomistic approach: the relation does vary from its foundation but only formally. The essence of the relation (*ratio formalis*) depends on its term; thus, such is the relation as its term is.

Kraker also discusses other problems. The principle of individuation of the substance is neither a quantity, nor matter, but, first of all, it is a form which is individual out of itself; also, it intercepts some characteristics from the outside which contribute to its individuation.

According to Kraker immaterial substances may be cognized only by the effects of their actions. Their natural cognition is unreliable and inaccurate. They are, however, much more numerous than it was judged by Aristotle.

The problems of God, which are included into the metaphysics as discussed by all three authors in question, have already been related in the remarks on the philosophy of nature.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

When we compare, in respect to the number, the writings of the authors discussed here, there is one thing that surprises us: a small number of theses in the case of Hay (only one collection known to us) and an exceptionally large number of items in the case of Viana (ten printed collections), in spite of the fact that both of them were lecturing on philosophy for the same period of time, that is, for 3 years. In the case of Hay this state of affairs obviously resulted from the fact that his activity in Vilnius fell into the period when philosophical education there was only at the starting point and the conditions of work were particularly difficult, indeed pioneering. Viana was working later, under more established conditions. With his ten collections of theses, he oc-

cupies a very prominent position among Polish philosophers of the 16th century, notwithstanding the fact that those were only collections of theses prepared for disputations. It seems that this favourable situation was also due to two other factors, namely to his enormous activity and his connections with Nicolas Christopher Radziwiłł, the owner of a printing house where all of Viana's philosophical theses were printed.

A comparison of the number of theses belonging to particular disciplines clearly shows that there is some equilibrium between them although metaphysics is treated rather briefly, while the philosophy of nature, in the general meaning of this word, occupies most of the space. It is characteristic that in the writings of Hay and Viana there are no references to teaching ethics which at that time was included into the programme of philosophical studies at other schools sponsored by the Jesuits. Similarly, there are no mentions of mathematics although it is otherwise well-known that during the first course (in Hay's time) the lectures on this subject were delivered by Kraker, and during the second course in philosophy (in Viana's time) the lecturer was the Englishman James Bosgrave. Yet one of the collections of Kraker's theses includes both ethics and mathematics.

The philosophy represented by the professors discussed here follows, in principle, the philosophy of Aristotle, and therefore it is fully justified to apply to them the name of Vilnius Aristotelians. They are, however, the first Aristotelians whose writings have been accessible to us. As it has been mentioned at the beginning of this paper, before Hay three philosophers lectured on philosophy there, but so far all the attempts to find their works, be it only in the form of manuscripts, have proved a failure.

During the above-mentioned period of 15 years (1571-1586) the lectures on philosophy consisted, for the most part, in comments on the treatises of Aristotle. The selective character of the works of the authors discussed in this paper (apart from Viana's manuscript, we know only the collections of the theses which merely included some of the problems discussed during the lectures) does not allow us to assert if all the philosophical works of the Stagirite were commented upon. We are able, however, to determine which of the treatises were commented upon, at least to some extent.

At the very beginning a concise introduction to the whole body of logic, called dialectic or prolegomena, was taught (both by Viana and by Kraker). Next, comments on the *Isagoge* of Porphyry were given (with particular regard to the problem of universals), and, indirectly, also Aristotle's *Categories* were touched. A part of the lectures was directly devoted to the *Categories* (in the case of both Viana and Kra-

ker). Then, other treatises from the *Organon* were considered, except the *Topics* and the treatise *On Sophismates*. In the philosophy of nature, the *Physics* of the Stagirite was the first subject of comments, including also the problem of God (this problem was again touched in metaphysics); attention was also paid to the treatises: *On Generation and Corruption*, *On the Heavens*, the *Meteorology* (lacking in the case of Kraker) and *On the Soul*. Finally, metaphysics and ethics were taught (together with economics and politics). It should be mentioned here, however, that ethics and mathematics were included only in the writings of Kraker. During a three-year course, the first year was devoted mainly to logic, the second to the philosophy of nature together with mathematics, and the third to metaphysics and ethics. Considering the ample programme of the philosophy of nature, the lectures on this subject sometimes started already at the end of the first year and were finished at the beginning of the third year.

The philosophy represented by the authors in question is not, however, pure Aristotelism. It includes some modifications introduced mainly under the influence of Thomas Aquinas. Following his ideas, the authors mentioned here also reject some of Aristotle's ideas, e.g. the everlasting existence of the world. In the problem of the rational soul, Hay rejects the materialistic interpretation of Aristotle (suggesting that the soul is mortal), and in the problem of God he underlines that the Stagirite accepted the existence of God but he misconceived some of His attributes. Viana is of a similar opinion; moreover, he rejects Aristotle's concept of God's limited freedom and he questions some other ideas of the Stagirite's. The influence of Thomas Aquinas on Kraker, who in the above-mentioned problems is in agreement with his predecessors, is more evident in his statements implying that being is an adequate object of intellectual cognition, and that movement is non perpetual although perpetuity of movement is not contradictory.

The influence of Duns Scotus on Hay's ideas, which caused heated discussions with Viana and was one of the reasons accounting for Hay's departure from Vilnius, is revealed in his theses asserting that the matter has its own existence. However, we are familiar with only some of his ideas. On the other hand, the theses, subject to censorship and representing, as a matter of fact, the officially taught doctrine, were certainly not the best means to express one's personal views. Probably, his lectures contained more scotistic elements.

Viana represents relatively pure Thomism. The influence of Scotism can be observed perhaps solely in the thesis that there is no real but only a formal distinction between the relation and its foundation.

It is characteristic of Viana's mode of philosophizing that he gives

a number of opinions on a given subject (quite often together with the respective proofs) and then he chooses the one which he thinks to be true. This can be observed, first of all, in the manuscript of his lectures. Apart from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, he also quotes the advocates as well as the opponents of the proclaimed ideas, namely: from the Arabic philosophers—Averroës, from the scholastics—Albertus Magnus, Bonaventura, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Durandus, John of Jandun, Cajetanus, and besides the scholastics also, among others, Pomponazzi, and from his contemporaries the Jesuit philosopher and theologian the Spaniard Francis of Toledo (Toletus, d. 1596).

Probably under the influence of the Spaniards who were professors at the Collegium Romanum, some deviations from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas are to be noted in some of Kraker's ideas. And thus, he asserts that the essence and the existence are not really distinct, that the form is combined with matter by means of contingent forms, that the prime matter is not a pure potency but an actual being and a substance which possesses its own imperfect existence; the prime matter is provided with a quantity. What is very characteristic is the definition of the cause which runs as follows: cause is "something from the existence of which results something else" (*id, ad cuius existentiam sequitur aliud*); this definition is a modification of the concepts of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. In psychology, particular attention should be paid to the statement that the powers of the soul differ from the soul itself not really but only mentally, and that the body of animals is composed of contiguous parts.

Among the philosophical works of the Jesuits in Poland which are known to us, the writings of Kraker are the first which include ethics, treated—as far as the volume is concerned—equally with other disciplines; they also include mathematics. Within the scope of ethics some economical and political problems were also discussed. The theses were, as a matter of fact, based on Aristotle's ideas but some attempts were made to adapt them to the conditions existing in Poland (*e.g.* critical remarks in respect to trade where some corrupt practices occurred at that time, a condemnation of usury, an appraisal of monarchy as a system of government and of the religious unity in the nation). Unfortunately, dictated texts of Kraker's or Hay's lectures are not available and therefore it is impossible to estimate their ideas in a more detailed and precise manner.

On the basis of the materials available at present, it may be concluded that the philosophy of the authors in question equals the contemporary European level and even reveals ambitions of certain philosophical independence. Hay and Kraker studied philosophy at the Collegium

Romanum and Viana in Alcalá. Therefore, they tried to implant in Poland the knowledge acquired at those high schools, which were famous all over the world.

A reflection on the philosophy represented by the authors in question sometimes gives an impression that because they wanted to modernize the inheritance bequeathed to them through the tradition—this tradition being Aristotelian—they tried to interpret the Stagirite in a “modern way”, that is, to combine some new ideas with the old ones, asserting that it was inherent in Aristotle’s thought. Therefore, one can conclude that the influence of Aristotle was dominant, but that there arose and persisted some doubts and critical remarks concerning certain points of his philosophy which at a later stage abated his authority and even resulted in the total rejection of his ideas in a number of philosophical circles.