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Ethics and the function international community

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ETHICS AND THE FUNCTION INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Introduction

No doubt, missing economic opportunities have been spread in the world, though unevenly over the last decades. In the light of outcomes of international course of actions that have been confused, pressures for more results came from international organisations for example. Through the millennium development goals set by the United Nations in September 2000, we endeavour to set targets and deadline at which better human welfare should be completed. By 2015, the international community seem to be committed to halve that 30 per cent of the world population that lived in the absolute poverty of less than one dollar a day in 1990; provide universal primary education; ensure a sustainable growth compatible with the preservation of the environment; reduce under-age-five mortality by two-thirds and maternal mortality by three-quarters; halve the population without access to safe drinking water. Nevertheless, did the game play by international agencies when they have dealt with national difficulties be a cause of unconstructive economic outcomes? Will these organisations be effective at all to reach the millennium development goals? There is anything else in the role of these organisations other than the diminishing effect on the autonomy in domestic economic choices?

The aim of this article is to approach these challenging questions by looking at a special feature of ethics and moral. Our thesis is to view the conduct of international organisations as lacking of exact ethical and moral

codes in order to gain distinctive consensus and commitments on mainstream programmes. Ethics and moral must be designed as two interconnected concepts to enable all national and international economic agents engineer effective policies and commitments. In the next section, we outline what has been achieved in international economic affairs and focus on the distinction between ethics and moral. We unveil distinctive levels of involvement for domestic and external partners about an ethical road map ahead, and suggest a new ethical-value commitment, which, *inter alia*, concerns all actors to agree on mutually accepted conditions and programmes and accomplish targets through equal bases. That this new logic stimulates domestic economic ownership and international commitment for credible programmes while keeping all of the actors involved fully accountable. The final section provides concluding remarks.

Ethics and Moral Codes

Actually, there are many aspects to understanding how ethical values have been developing during the few last decades. They are revealing in many ways concerning domestic economic and political affairs, not least in the sphere of international affairs. Although these values originate from religion and ties to the Greek word *ethos*, while moral is from the Latin word *mores*, morality pertains more to a personal sphere of ethics, and ethics itself is connected to rules and widely accepted principles, which affects a much larger audience.

Consequently, to the substantive issue concerning distinctions between moral and ethical codes that are magnified by phases of deepening interaction between nations and regions, there is still the requirement to envisage ethically satisfactory behaviour in the sphere of international economics, thus complementing critical scrutiny of domestic values regarding truth and social justice. Living in harmony with valuable norms and standards of excellence, attending to the betterment of social well being, these are the ultimate goals of any international community.

The exact role of ethics and moral alike is what the literature voided in the past. They are considered crucial to strengthening international relief and world financial stability, but this must occur not at the expenses of an effective country's economic upturn. Their authority pertains to international and

domestic economic dimensions; the ethical components of institutional policies and norms, and efforts to revitalise the economy when it is either in a danger even of a tiny slowdown or help rescue suffering populations and perilous emergencies. This sounds like going back to Adam Smith's 1759 observations on charity, in some ways. Serious efforts by these institutions to overlook economic troubles are very revealing in a financial world of certain selected market failures and domestic ineptitudes. Although we reject Mises' (Mises, 1949) critique of economic interventionism and the state's manipulation of the market, which could produce undesirable consequence and in turn further rounds of intervention, we do think the issue of a government recipient's behaviour as we should recognise a determinant of charitable giving as long as there are specific forms of assistance by international agencies (see Birch, 1998). Still the literature debates on the quality of institutional design and which part play geography and natural endowment as additional causes of the missed socio-economic development. In fact, the trait of national institutions might be the cause of income level differences (Acemoglu *et al.*, 2001; Rodrik *et al.*, 2002); perhaps also geography and resource endowments as claimed, among others, by Jeffrey Sachs (2003). Still, this drives us to understand the difference between what is moral and ethical and what has to be done to combine these two values in a judicious setting.

Besides the moral attitude to lend support, we make the case for an ethical approach that bounds international organisations not to supersede local realities. In fact, economic crises in specific regions of the world, the challenging transition in East Europe, famine and diseases, evidence that minimum and ethically satisfactory living standard for a large share of the world's population is still a long way from being achieved. As aforementioned, the United Nations millennium assembly put forward a commitment to halve the 1990 rates of poverty, hunger and access to safe drinking water by 2015 as well as to reduce the rate of child mortality by two thirds. The international community renewed these commitments at Monterrey and Johannesburg meetings in 2002, when has been reformulated concrete steps towards official development assistance worth 0.7 per cent of donor countries' GNP. However, even that 0.7 would generate \$142 billion each year, while the sum need to rise to \$443 billion if the millennium development goals are to be met, Besley and Burgess (2003). While the UK finance minister, Gordon Brown, advanced the proposal to create an international finance facility aimed at doubling aid, the Presidents of Brazil and

France at the end of January 2004 insisted on a special global alliance against hunger and poverty, which may include a taxation of profits generated by globalisation through taxing arms sales or unspecified financial transactions. With this in mind, the point of our discussion is to call for a new ethical approach to these issues, and make clear the distinction between moral and ethical views upon methods of action or logic followed by international organisations.

The Logic of International Organisations: Domestic Affairs

The years of the Great Depression, exchange rate instability, and unproductive protectionism that damaged the world economy leading to the Second World War, led to the creation of major international economic agencies with responsibility for stabilising global financial markets. The complex commitment to establishing an acceptable base for ethical behaviour prompted a set of policies aimed at achieving economic and financial stability, and providing adequate economic resources to poor countries. Tackling inflation and unbalanced public finances, prompt trade liberalisation, creating governance and strengthening financial systems, appeared to be ethically truthful, guiding principles. Contrast this with the current negative perception; that the IMF appears much like a global sovereign, instead of enhancing and improving wealth at the community level. The case of Russia in the 1990s is revealing, economically and politically, as it rests on the most authoritative examples of what actually occurred during the past decade throughout much, if not all of East Europe. Linking Russia, Argentina and other countries' economic failure to the IMF, is revealing at several levels.

Observers elaborate on this point. One view is articulated by Joseph Stiglitz (2002), the prominent former chief economist of the World Bank, and former chief White House economic advisor, states that the much touted transition strategies of international agencies like the IMF, were responsible for moving Russia and other transitional countries into poverty, beginning in the very early 1990s. What is the underlying theme of Stiglitz's writing? On one side, Stiglitz (2000) argued that economists working at the IMF are frequently not very professional. Although many come from prominent universities, Stiglitz states they would often not be as good as better-trained local eco-

nomists. At the same time, Stiglitz casts doubt on the logic the IMF has followed in Russia.

This unenthusiastic view relates more to the specific Russian case, but the essence of the argument has common characteristics we have observed when looking at economic performance among regions. Although we cannot substantiate causal linkage between international economic organisations and economic performance, one fact is clearly indisputable: real economic growth collapsed throughout East Europe after 1989. If the level for 1989 is set at 100, the Commonwealth of Independent States witnessed a fall in real GDP to 54.2 by 1998, whereas central Europe's low of 76.9 was reached by 1993. The years 1998 and 1993 were also the transition low points in industrial production. In Latin America, economic growth and crises have been managed thoughtlessly. The catastrophic crisis of late 2001 and early 2002 marks the tragic end of Argentina's initially successful, decade-long experiment with sound money and market-oriented economic reforms. The IMF consistently supported Argentina's stabilisation and reform efforts in the decade leading up to the current crisis, and often pointed to Argentina's policies as examples for other emerging market economies to emulate.

A parallel with Stiglitz may be suggestive: Stiglitz has been former chief economist at the World Bank and Mussa, the chief economist at the IMF. While the former focus's on overall commitments of the IMF globally, the latter addresses the question of what went wrong in Argentina and what important errors the IMF made in either supporting inappropriate policies or in failing to press for alternatives that might have avoided catastrophe. While Stiglitz's view implies direct responsibility on the part of the IMF, Mussa emphasises the persistent inability of Argentina's authorities at all levels to run a responsible fiscal policy, and that this was the primary, avoidable cause of the country's catastrophic financial collapse.

The IMF failed to press aggressively for a more responsible fiscal policy, says Mussa (2002), but without an ethical commitment, no one may ask for any type of direct ethical approach to policy. Even Stiglitz lacks this type of approach. Mussa (2002) also addresses the role of the Convertibility Plan, which linked the Argentine peso rigidly, and at parity with the US dollar, thus playing a central role in both the initial success and ultimate collapse of Argentina's stabilisation and reform efforts. While the IMF accepted this plan as a basic policy choice of the Argentine authorities, so long as it remained viable,

it erred in the summer of 2001 by extending further massive support for unsustainable policies, rather than insisting on new policy strategies possibly mitigating some of the damage from the tragic crisis that had become unavoidable.

Economic and Political Rationalisations

A point must be clarified at the outset. There are economic and political rationalisations regarding policymaking. Political explanations concerning IMF involvement and disaster exist especially with regard to the Soviet empire, when this was too important not to be helped (Sergi, 2003a). A simple ethical validation for the IMF was needed to be able to offer loans to transition countries, as well as finance efforts to link them with the west. Not least did concrete, substantive concerns about economic risks matter. Did a resurgence of trade and flows of capital flows between east and west demand market stability? Unquestionably, yes. The world economy would have influenced transition economies by opening local markets to foreign linkages. In addition, balance of payment disequilibria could have threatened international stability by creating waves of financial contagion from one country to the next, with the world economy not being able to bare the consequences of additional economic disorders. The risks of further economic and political implosions were immense. Moral charity and ethical yardsticks became crucial suddenly as further instability was expected to become the principal outcome should effective responses not be put through. Consequently, the IMF started signing loan and conditionality agreements with almost every country in the former Soviet bloc, and instructions for treating external imbalances, government deficits, etc. became common in the conditionality agreements.

IMF involvement in transition economics has been extreme, also the World Bank, NGO's and scholars working at academic institutions and think tanks have exercised a variety of conditionality. Not least, whilst certain NGOs moved from being deemed as watchdog to being associated with given interests, there have been unsupported and false statements that NGOs and independent experts would be much superior to governmental agencies.

Tutelage Policy

In principle, targeted aid and debt relief may serve as a takeoff into self-sustained growth or conditionality policy tutelage as a substitute for the inertia of entrenched domestic institutions and poor macroeconomic policies. However, Boone (1996) has stated that aid served to finance consumption instead of growth, and that international aid had a positive impact in the countries exhibiting good macroeconomic policies while no impact in those countries carrying out poor policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Bird (2002b) states that there is not empirical confirmation regarding a positive role for IMF conditionality policy. Indeed, the majority of Fund programmes were incomplete and not subject to accurate scrutiny (Bird, 2002a), whereas inflation projections and outcomes of programmes supported by the IMF have been systematically missed completely (Musso and Phillips, 2002). The World Bank comes under a similar allegation: reviewing and evaluating past investment projects has been unsuccessful. For instance, only some 5 per cent of World Bank's loans are evaluated but only after three to ten years from the last disbursement takes place. Indeed, these evaluations are made on a self-evaluation basis, that is, by the same functionaries and implementing agencies, thus, far from a fair and independent evaluation. Also, NGOs or other international agencies do not show superior records in such fair evaluation of objectives, and "they face some of the same incentives as official agencies to emphasize observable effort rather than focus on less observable results" (Easterly, 2003: 38–39).

Unachieved targets might put under risk the credibility of future programmes, but too much criticism on its activities is unfair as well, otherwise, one would opt for the dismantling of international agencies. Aforementioned agencies have also actually played an important role in East Europe and other regions of the world. Nevertheless, the reason for the discrepancy between what has been targeted and what in fact is achieved, is missing coordination with internal actors and in not calibrating policies locally. Transition economies and corrupt political leaders, did not coherently comply with the logic of the western consensus, despite a variety of views on the subject. However, numerous interplays shaping economic variables could not lead an international watchdog to keeping an eye on economic well-being without exercising tutelage on the complexity of the phenomenon; this is a matter of fact. In fact, despite the IMF overruling national players in the preparation of policies and not believing in

the transparency it urges on others, its ethical choices could not be concealed over time.

Yet, a generalised criticism in a way that included all the outcomes occurring in all nations fell squarely in the lap of the IMF, which was not equitable. Anyhow, it is possible to attribute reform failures either to domestic flaws or to poor external advice characterised by incompetent sequencing of economic strategies. While foreign advisers and international organisations have no total knowledge of local markets, they forced fixed-format programmes on many. In fact, when circumstances are right, for instance, the IMF does exactly what the model predicts, to tip the balance of incentives in favour of a long run strategy of fiscal and monetary restraint, but this is only a partial reinforcing of the credibility of national governments that are not all on course regarding credible political economies. Whatever the proper rationale, operational decisions are firmly based on few rigorous economic rules of conduct, which, if they existed, would provide straightforward counselling concerning a broad set of instruments. The intended beneficiaries have no voice in how money was spent or economic conditionality worked out. Although little has been said on how to design an overall policy concerning domestic incentives and accountability of all players involved in aid and conditionality. In Easterly's words, "research would likely involve principal-agent theory, organisation theory, game theory and political economy" (2003, p. 39).

In the light of criticism, the IMF recently concluded an extensive review of conditionality aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of its support programmes. This recent consultative process recognises that successful economic policy programmes must be founded on strong, credible in-country support. This remarkable development was started in September 2000, when Horst Köhler took up his post as new IMF managing director, and soon after made a big pitch for a new Interim Guidance Note on Streamlining Structural Conditionality to review the original issued in 1979. Although an Independent Evaluation Office was created in July 2001, to make fresh efforts at having an independent evaluation of the IMF's programmes, the IMF's Executive Board adopted revised conditionality guidelines in September 2002. The new focal point shifted to distinguishing between what is relevant but not critical to the objectives of a supported programme, and improving the division of the working operations between the IMF and World Bank in ways that both would share conditionality policy.

Meanwhile, the World Bank has placed economists in the field “to have staff working shoulder-to-shoulder with clients” (Stern, 2003: 49). Whilst the World Bank’s recent strategy partially reflects the issue of having credibility in its economic policies because countries have to be co-partners and not clients, sharing conditionality policy between the IMF and World Bank provides only an unfinished ethical agenda regarding criticism of what was missed from the 1979 Guidelines. Not least, the WTO is trying to help a process intended to insure free trade and equality among countries, but this is a complex task.

It is unquestionable that the IMF has been refocusing the entire spectrum regarding its very unsuccessful idea of conditionality, with the number of structural benchmarks having decreased and come under coordination with that of the World Bank. This may develop into an important step, although not definitive in itself (Sergi, 2003b). Critics are numerous and scholars continued to advance proposals, for instance to lend only to pre-qualifying countries except the cases of systemic need as proposed by the Meltzer Commission in March 2000 (Meltzer, 2000), or to create two departments: a contingent-market department and a crisis department case advanced by Caballero (2003). Nevertheless, there are prominent defenders such as Stanley Fischer (1999), who advocated the need of the IMF as a lender of last resort.

While the scientific economic community must be pleased with these responses coming from the international economic organisations, we criticise this evolution for lacking rigorous ethical underpinnings. Some argue that the IMF and World Bank may in fact have contradictory goals since the crucial task of the IMF is to eliminate current account deficits whilst that of the World Bank is to attract private capitals into a country, or simply to spur loans and aid towards low-income countries. The IMF is not an aid agency, but has in fact delivered concessional loans that have partially been forgiven, making loans equivalent to aid. Fabricius (2002), who draws on field research conducted in Ghana, Pakistan, Peru and Vietnam, recommends that the IMF and World Bank pursue a case-specific approach in deciding whether they should take the same stance, express another view. Yet, what critics do not seem to comprehend is that even though the number of structural benchmarks is reducing, and even put under coordination with the World Bank, there still lacks a combined actors’ commitment to credible, long-term adjustment policies. Even in view of the contradiction regarding theoretical IMF-World Bank outcomes, the fact that any actual support for a programme cannot guarantee credibility and commitment;

therefore, mutually shared policy may encompass the entire set of economic policies and transform such a possible contradiction into short- and long-term components of credible economic programmes. The IMF sets its conditions *de jure* or *de facto*, but in the light of a missing coordinated strategy, actors might blame the failure on something else and this might result in continuous shifting of responsibilities (Sergi, 2003a).

The Effectiveness of Policy Design

An intriguing question is why ethics has not been addressed in international economic relations, as well as the achievement of proper balance regarding domestic-external *raison d'être*, when economic institutions and actors should fit into a global ethical agenda representing stability and assistance. Financial and economic stability is a requirement for global well-being all agents must adhere to. The real world asks and wants supranational intervention of *ad hoc* agencies, keeping within the principles of ethics and capitalism, without stopping momentum towards social economic justice. For instance, Novak (1993) defines the civil society project concerning government and social activism, in which civil society operates between community and state. The IMF and World Bank have been involved in domestic affairs since the international community in the 1960s called on the IMF to apply broader concepts regarding financial stability, while looking into real growth as well. This may be read as the first step concerning ethical innovation, bringing about more discussion, while strengthening IMF performance as lender of last resort. Nevertheless, the international community cannot first profess distinctive duties for the IMF, and then assess its policy as disruptive, causing a loss of national sovereignty. This contradiction exists because there has been unclear institutional distinction between moral and ethical values and the international community failed to recognise that these two concepts must fit the same operational agenda. Recent, global economic realities call out for international institutional supervision and national equilibrium, but this can only be accomplished by accepting an ethical and moral value commitment at both international and domestic sides. A mere international involvement is not sufficient *per se* to achieve results. While the IMF and other organisations do not have to give away free money, a different ethical and moral commitment could pay off

securing better business environment at home through a distinctive commitment by national leaders and agents.

Because ethical principles and vast involvement of world institutions are widely shared around the world, failure of past attempts was more a matter of naiveté, and, at times, policies uncommitted to ethical guidelines, than of deliberately dishonest actions by international agents. Put in a different way, without a simultaneous involvement of all domestic and international economic actors, especially the responsibility of the IMF and the other organisations may look omnipresent and always ineffective, yet nobody assumes national responsibilities. We should consider the structural adjustments sponsored by the IMF and the World Bank as being insufficient to introduce coordination and credibility, as these two concepts have been kept separated in the past. Instead, we reinterpret the concepts of ethics and morality so that an effective international moral agenda become compatible with ethical principles. To circumvent this criticism we propose a new way of reasoning based on four broad steps. First that the involvement in domestic affairs has to be reckoned in terms of morality. Second that the record of socioeconomic goals ought to be within the reach of coherent policies. Third, that the choice of policy instruments that are available to policymakers must be viewed in terms of arranging a credible policy, in which both players adhere to ethical and moral obligations. Fourth, that outcome has to be coherent with devised policies and outcomes, which are answerable to all actors.

The first step of international institutions involvement pertains to moral spheres. It is virtue-centered as an individual conception based on the ideals of reciprocal help (Smith, 1759). In truth, international organisations were established for these ends.

The second step is on agreeing on economic targets, e.g. inflation, exchange rates, fiscal policy and privatisation, and this policy has an ethical dimension, because the international community has placed its trust for righteous and virtue-centered commitments with *ad hoc* created institutions. Nevertheless, we cannot deny the existence of necessary ethical and moral rules of conduct by domestic authorities in laying down the terms of objectives, instruments, and their full commitment to them. In other words, IMF experts ought to disentangle this second step in harmony with national policymakers who have a broader knowledge of domestic conditions. Ignoring this would be unethically unproductive.

The third step combines values with both agents and adherence to credible policies. An international agency has to guarantee world stability and apply ethically accepted rules, but the country obtaining a loan has a moral duty to commit to policies in an effective manner to increase socioeconomic impacts and long-term objectives. However, step two and three may have an anomalous ethical impact as long as agents propose rival explanations concerning economic strategy, or when domestic agents do not commit to any cost-effective policy. For instance, Adam Smith (1759) refers to judicious recipient behaviour to obtain aid, but the commitment to conditions chosen by an international agency might be based either on implausible objective values or on the use of non-efficient instruments.

The previously mentioned directs us to the fourth stage. If all IMF and other aid agencies were successful beforehand, would be not to confront this subject matter, as a superior, ethical commitment by these organisations would supplant further debate over conditionality. However, this has not been the case because of they had no full knowledge of domestic circumstances, and simply applied its unchangeable ethical programme, showing up in contrast between domestic and international experts on short- and medium-term strategies. The economic strategy that is dictated or at best inspired by others than national experts and policymakers must be projected to help prevent further lack of credibility and establish a national commitment. As long as the international commitment fails, this policy is an ethical failure, which pushes back to the way stage three and two have been undertaken. As long as these two phases are absolutely set by an international ethics, the failure is unethical to the international institutions. When a proper reading of steps two and three is made and is ensured a definition of ethical sustainable commitment, this sheds light on the moral commitment of a country with both the moral obligations and the ethical attitude of the international organisations.

In fact, how we can resolve the issue if the unethical failure is due to a recipient's uncommitted behaviour and not, say, to the IMF, but is the IMF itself to bear full responsibility of it as having forced a stabilisation or recovery programme that may be in theory correct but not properly accomplished by national authorities? Alternatively, what does occur if implausible discordance concerns social and economic standpoints? These two hypotheses commonly surface. The failure of the IMF's and the World Bank's approach is having overemphasised mainstream theories and applied them everywhere without

considering differing national state of affairs, and to have inspired their programmes without taking into account a country's programs. These international organisations have simply misconstrued the second and third phases of international policy effectiveness produced unethical results. There should be no autonomous approach at either extreme, that is, conditionality neither simply forced or inspired by these organisations, and based on their own ethics, nor financing countries with free money without asking them to a moral commitment in a sort of agent problem. What is suspect is that the objectives underlying prior approaches were not credible because they were defective in the social sphere, and tight economic policies having scarce credibility in being carried out. This led either to uncertain commitment by domestic agents or at best at a series of compromises when a country was able to influence international decision-making. Yet, policies are credible when are jointly and efficiently agreed by domestic and international agents by that avoiding to fall under the economic guidance of pure ethical orthodoxy of international organisations that missing adequate domestic knowledge generally imposed recipes that were not tailored to national commitment and capabilities bringing about inconsistency and failure. As the recent commitment of the IMF and World Bank seems to go in the direction of a new ethical approach by broadening the involvement of national actors, definitive operational procedures must be arranged together by all agents in a way to enable policy makers to deal with and commit to realistic programmes. Agents ought to introduce the right balance between ethical long-term outcomes and judicious internal commitments by implying a full commitment through the four stages of international experts, national government and the civil society or local experts.

Because a worldwide eye constantly oversees the economy, we do not side with those who find it realistic to dismiss the IMF and perhaps other multilateral agencies. Because they serve an essential global task, they could not be written off, but recent economic fears of world economic instability and the call for extending further aid to deprived populations are given us an opportunity to suggest the way these organisations might be working in an ethically superior manner, and we should not pass it up. We have to explicitly rethink the logical involvement of international and domestic actors according to their best interest, as what has been done so far has been ineffective at least to some extent. If the risks are that these organisations are continuing to draw on their theory, and simplistic approaches may stand in their way, the proposed approach would

drive domestic players to a position of greater trust, and in the end responsibility would attach to all for the programmes implemented or simply inspired by international economic organisations; all players would be able to come to each other's support. Such a new ethics in international economic relations requires that one look at a closer working relationship with national experts and policy-makers on one side, and international experts on the other. This could help to share information, knowledge and expertise in order to support effective policies that result from that networking. No ethically satisfactory reshaping could be implemented without a closer working activity among said actors.

Conclusion

This article sought to reinterpret functions and roles of international economic organisations in today's global environment by offering a new perspective, which opens the way to a fresh logic of tackling national sufferings in global markets. Although international economic organisations have been established to deal with these issues, many observers have regularly accused them of causing economic adversities. The criticism has gone so far that some have demanded that these organisations be closed, as the two Washington-based institutions and the Geneva-based WTO are blamed for being unethical in pursuing their statutory commitments. The economic rationales that these organisations have pursued were not capable of complying with unique domestic economic conditions and complex realities. Nor was it recognised that poor economies are unable to stick to western market principles overnight, although ample evidence confirms that market principles are superior to non-market.

Nevertheless, the IMF as well as the other organisations will operate well into the next decades and we do not join the chorus of who would derive pleasure from their disruption. In contrast, to achieve the most of the new economic agenda proposed in this article, we turn the attention to strategic economic guidelines shaped by those actors who are ethically and morally capable of designing a credible programme of recovery and structural reforms. Not counting the skill premium that international organisations convey and that may have been a roadblock to domestic involvement, the proposed novel involvement of domestic institutions and international experts must become answerable to results and to operational principles. Therefore, it is mandatory

to take forward specific different working procedures and plans through achieving economic results by way of ethics and moral. As it is unavoidable to design ethics and moral as two interrelated concepts, the rationale that connect all economic agents to their respective obligations must be deciphered by considering specifying national timing and asymmetries, viewing national and international authorities dependable and agreeably. A set of policies that is operative must be arranged in a manner that compel all actors into sharing their own responsibilities for credible programme outcomes. Keeping all actors fully accountable is possible only by drawing up plans that are ethically and morally compulsory to all.

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ETHICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Summary

The last sixty years have seen international economic organisations maintain a position at the forefront of promoting economic growth. However, these organisations have not achieved as much against certain benchmarks, and several observers have accused them of being unqualified to meet the needs of the poor and even found guilty of worse outcomes, such as famine and disease. Although these organisations have organisational behaviour and skills, many of their funded-projects lack forcefulness to such extent that they should only be answerable through achieving certain economic facts by way of ethics and moral.