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THE REDUCTIONIST ANTHROPOLOGY AND HUMAN SAFETY. THE STUDY OF PARFIT'S CONCEPT OF SURVIVAL

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ABSTRACT

In the face of the ideology and the practice of transhumanism and of dynamically developing technologies of genetics, robotics, information science and the nanotechnology the essential changes of the condition of the individual and social life are becoming more and more real. Most general visualising these progressive changes and threats they are carrying which, was conducted as part of the so-called constitutive reductionism by Derek Parfit. In the article there is discussing Parfit's analyses in the context of bioethics problems.

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INTRODUCTION

Let me introduce briefly main theses of Derek Parfit's¹ concept of personal identity. I will deal with the concept not because it is inventive or particularly valuable from a cognitive point of view. I will deal with the concept, as it has been discussed and is a contemporary follow up of psychological and subjectivist concept of a human being in the British thought developed since the 16th/17th century. Other reason of my

considerations is contemporary development of transhumanism² and GRIN technology³ aimed on the fulfilling the Parfit's thought experiments with surviving the person.

The current discussions on bioethical issues such as inadmissibility or admissibility of transplantation, abortion, euthanasia, cloning or in vitro fertilization show the presence of arguments for the measures, which, although it is generally referred to in mass media and often serving propaganda purposes, has its roots in concept of a human being similar to Parfit's proposal. It is worth noting that a final comparison of different philosophies of the human be-

1 More on this subject: T. Grabińska, *Abortion and Euthanasia in Constitutive Reductionism of Derek Parfit*, "Życie i Płodność 2", 2010, p. 7-13 – the content of this paper is involved in our considerations; T. Grabińska, Ł. Suliga, *The Enslavement with Temporary Character in the Derek Parfit's Personal Identity Concept*, „Wolność osoby – Wolność obywatela”, cz. 2, Disputationes Ethicae V, Częstochowa 2010, p. 21-47., and in Parfit's papers, D. Parfit, *Personal Identity*, *The Philosophical Review* 80 (1), (1971); Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford 1984.

2 M. More, N. Vita-More, *The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future*, New York 2013.

3 GRIN technology is the connecting of new technologies of genetics (G), robotics (R), informational technology (I), nanotechnology (N).

ing – subjectivist and reductionist philosophies (such as Parfit's philosophy) with those, which originate from Aristotelian and Thomistic stem (as in the Christian personalism), makes it possible to reach sources of views and understand difficulties, which are generally impossible to overcome in a possible program of overcoming of differences.

LOCKE'S PSYCHOLOGISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY

John Locke⁴ adopted a psychological criterion of personal identity, according to which a given person's identification with oneself is determined by so-called realised memory, which means that identification with oneself is determined by memories, which are referred to continuously. In accordance with the criterion for identity of a given person it would be most important to preserve continuity of memories in his/her entire biological life. Derek Parfit⁵ revised the so-called natural view of personal identity. To this end Parfit used thought experiments involving transplantation of respective brain hemispheres to different bodies and combining various brains (various consciousnesses) in one body and other experiments. As a result of similar experiments and more detailed so-called spectres, in which even more organs (physical spectre), even more consciousnesses (psychical spectre) and, in total, even more organs and consciousnesses (combined spectrum) are transplanted to a human being, Parfit came to a conclusion that personal identity may also be unspecified⁶ and that one had better refer to survival of a person.

In the light of Parfit's thought experiments and his clinging to the criterion of Locke's personal identity it could, for example, be that one person will appear as two persons, as two bod-

ily individuals with their consciousnesses transplanted could have the same course of memories (memory). Thus, Parfit came to a conclusion that Locke's criterion is inadequate, all the more it had been criticised much earlier (in the 17th century) by Thomas Reid⁷ for its lack of non-transitivity. (If a middle-aged person identified with a person in childhood due to some memory W, and the same elderly person identifies with the middle-aged person, then, despite the fact that the person no longer has any memories in her/his memory W, is the elderly person the same person from his/her childhood?). Moreover, the very memory tends to efface memories.

Parfit proposed a criterion of survival of a person based upon his Relation R. Similar to Locke's criterion, this criterion has a psychological nature, but it is more general, as Relation R means causal connection and/or psychical connections⁸. Psychical states are not only limited to memories, but also include likes, intentions and so-called quasi-psychical states. For Parfit, survival of a person does not require preservation of all memories, but a merely continuous transformation of memories and other psychical states in time (this way Parfit removed Reid's charge of non-transitivity). Thus, connection of psychical states will be sufficient and not the necessary simple continuity. It would only be amnesia that could exclude occurrence of Relation R, i.e. it would exclude survival of a person.

PARFIT'S REDUCTIONISM

Locke distinguished between a person and a human individual. The same biological human being (individual) does not always have to be the same person. Parfit combined personal identity (in the sense of survival) with a brain, which was not necessarily treated as the same biological organ. The brain identity (in the sense of survival) and, at the same time,

4 J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Indianapolis 1996, and also: D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Sioux Falls (SD) 2007.

5 D. Parfit, *Personal...*

6 D. Parfit, *Reasons...*, s. 261.

7 T. Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, Edinburgh 2002.

8 D. Parfit, *Reasons...*, p. 205.

identity of a person (in the sense of survival) may also be ensured in an unnatural manner, for example, as a result of copying of mental paths or artificial reconstruction of the brain. Parfit even admitted a supernatural reason for preservation of personal identity (survival) – as a result of resurrection⁹.

Parfit's concept of a person in his reductionism (referred to as constitutive reductionism) limits (reduces) a person to selected attributes (here: psychological and psychical, conscious and mental), which are manifested externally in phenomenal reality (phenomenon). Thus, it is a reductionist and phenomenalist concept of a person. I have pointed out an important paradox about the type of concept – let me refer to it as a paradox of subjectivity and objectivity (S/O)¹⁰. A particular person is to prove outside – to others with its deepest subjective feeling that he/she is that or other person and that he/she knows or does not know that he/she is that or other person. The paradox made itself felt at once, when Parfit established that, finally, there was no need to ascertain existence of a person with that or other identity, however, it is enough to verify facts of manifestations of a person empirically (by the person's acts)¹¹ in a sense of making it objective.

However, Parfit did not limit (reduce) a person to his/her brain. It is understandable in case of his concept, as the brain, in a biological sense, may be subject to various deformations and, thus, it cannot always represent a person. Thus, we still need this external objectivisation, which is manifested in states of corporeality in external phenomenal reality (thus we have constitutive reductionism). Let us add that due to S/O paradox the price is a characteristic blurring of autonomous character of a person.

Parfit did not deem it proper to express judgments about existence of particular persons. This way, he avoided deciding on a number of persons in his thought experiments of connecting (merging) of several persons into one or constructing replicas. It is not existence of particular persons (as the same or not the same as those before the experiment), but psychical connection and its external representation in body responses that matters: Although a person differs from his/her body and each series of thoughts and experiences, the person's being includes only those elements and constitutes of such elements¹². Persons may exist connected with one another (not only as autonomous being), as the very sense of existence is understood by Parfit as fulfilment of Relation R and this condition only¹³.

A person in Parfit's constitutive reductionism is determined by Relation R.¹⁴ According to Parfit, this relation may also be preserved, when there is no direct connection of psychical states, but it may be preserved in a weakened sense: when there is a connection of Parfit's so-called quasi-psychical states, i.e. quasi-memories, quasi-intentions, quasi-likes, quasi-intents etc. Quasi prefix indicates here other than natural causes of psychical states, for example, reincarnation, transplantation of copying of memory paths.

Relation R, which guarantees survival of a person, may be preserved unnaturally, which is connected with the possibility of so-called manifold. It may be that more than one person will prove the same psychical and psychological structure and it may happen that accurate corporal and psychic replicas may appear, which are parallel to the original and have their origins in other place and time than the original. When asked about, whether such a replica will be the same given person, Parfit provid-

9 D. Parfit, *On the Importance of Self-Identity*, "The Journal of Philosophy", 68 (20) (1971), p. 689. In transhumanist vision the resurrection is to be planned in posthuman world.

10 T. Grabińska, *Abortion...*

11 D. Parfit, *Reasons...*, p. 210.

12 D. Parfit, *The Unimportance of Identity*, [in:] H. Harris, *Identity*, Oxford 1995, p. 13-45.

13 D. Parfit, *iReasons...*, p. 340-341.

14 *Ibid...*, p. 262.

ed a complex response: a future person will be me, if he/she is me in Relation R, just as I am now, however, when no other person is me in Relation R. Thus, those would not be the same persons, but, as Parfit stated, persons connected closely with a given person and a replica will be a continuation of a given person and not the same person. However, when the original disappears, splitting will also disappear and a replica will become the same as the original. Thus, a replica guarantees survival of the original and it does not determine personal identity between a replica and original.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ANTHROPOLOGIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR BIOETHICS

Since the other half of the 20th century the concept of a person formulated by Derek Parfit has been widely discussed.¹⁵ In the subject literature the concept is criticised from numerous points of view¹⁶. The criticism includes issues, which relate directly to an analysis of bioethical problems such as transplantations, abortion, euthanasia or cloning. Similar to a much more earlier John Locke's¹⁷ concept of a person in British circles, Parfit's concept of a person assumes reduction of a person to his/her mental and psychical sphere. Parfit discusses Locke's criterion of personal identity reduced to continuity of memory in his thought experiments and deliberates over survival of a person in case of transfer of memory contents from one body to

another or, as he mentions, transfer of a brain directly. Regardless of, whether such thought experiments are real, the problem of identity, or, as Parfit postulates, the problem of survival of a person becomes important in the light of new medical techniques of transplantation¹⁸ and cloning.

Ethical problems of abortion, euthanasia, cloning or transplantation are resolved in a different manner in philosophical anthropology, which assumes psychical and physical unity of a person just as, for example, Aristotelian and Thomistic unity and such problems are resolved in a different way in anthropologies, which reduce a person to his/her states of consciousness – such as, for example, Locke's anthropology and partly Parfit's anthropology and it is different in materialistic and mechanistic anthropologies.

The discussion of bioethical problems in the light of Parfit's concept shows again that resolutions depend on an anthropology adopted. Thus, we deal with a problem of grounds of bioethics. Different anthropologies will lay foundations for different kinds of ethics, under which the same problems will be evaluated and valued in a different way. Even if, as in modern philosophy, one departs from systemic formulation of philosophy and emphasizing of grounds of deliberations concerning a human being in the human ontology, the problem of identity of a person still appear in theoretical deliberations and in practice of detailed sciences, including mainly psychology and biomedical sciences.

In Locke's anthropology, which has an enormous impact upon the human philosophy in British circles, a person is not merely a biological being (individual), but a person is limited (reduced) to a continuous stream of consciousness, i.e. to so-called realised memory. A person is himself/herself (the same person) as long as memory preserves its continuity. This psychological criterion of identity

15 S. Schneider, *Science Fiction and Philosophy. From Time Travel to Superintelligence*, New York 2010.

16 Parfit's works are criticised from three points of view. The criticism involves: 1) methodology of thought experiments and method of justification of theses with the use of the same, e.g. Kathleen V. Wilkes, *Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments*, Oxford 1988; 2) coherence of the concept of a person in constitutive reductionism, e.g. Harold W. Noonan, *Personal Identity*, Routledge, London 1989; 3) practical and ethical consequences of reductionism, e.g. Robert M. Adams, *Should Ethics Be More Impersonal* in: J. Dancy (ed), „Reading Parfit”, Oxford 1997, p. 265, and criticism from the point of view of personalism.

17 J. Locke, *An Essay...*

18 As in transhumanist project.

of a person (self-identification) has been criticised from the beginning¹⁹.

In spite of this and, to a considerable extent, due to subjectivistic features of the British philosophy, Locke's concept is still significant for the human philosophy and resolving of ethical issues. Parfit refers to the concept (i.e. so-called natural view of personal identity), revises it and publishes his own version of reductionism. As a result of thought experiments, Parfit challenges adequacy of the term of „personal identity”. The experiments lead to difficulties in determination of personal identity based on memory²⁰. Parfit considers so-called survival of a person involving psychical connection despite change of corporeality, as the most adequate representation of a person.

Parfit thinks that a new criterion of self-identification of a person makes it possible to avoid problems with establishment of identity. Some critics are right in disagreeing with Parfit's arguments for departure from the term of „personal identity”. However, let us look at Parfit's concept and his thought experiments from the perspective of resolution of bioethical problems. According to Parfit, survival is most important for being a person, including survival in a different body. A person's survival does not require Locke's continuity of memories (as in the case of a supernatural situation – resurrection²¹) or it does not necessarily involve memories of actually experienced events. A psychical connection (by way of Relation R introduced by Parfit) will do²². It will be enough to preserve quasi-memories (generally – so-called quasi-psy-

chical states) acquired from other person naturally or artificially (just as in the case of transfer of memory paths from the brain or other parts of the brain of one individual to another).

Parfit's concept of a person is a reductionist one in a sense that it distinguishes only between certain features in a person and assigns a sort of ontic character to the features. Thus, a person is reduced to a psychological, mental and consciousness sphere. Earlier, I indicated to so-called paradox of subjectivity and objectivity (S/O) in this and similar concepts of a person. On one hand, a person, in his/her (subjective) deepest internal conviction has to identify with himself/herself and on the other hand, the exterior (objective instance) is to evaluate, whether a given person is the one that is meant or not. Therefore, among others, Parfit resigned from the term of „personal identity” and reduced an objective identification of a person to his/her manifestations, for example, through acts ascertained in the exterior²³. The psychical connection represented outside in body responses is fundamental to survival (and not for existence, as Parfit emphasizes) of a person. In reductionism (constitutive reductionism) a person is constituted in his/her external form, which, in a way, verifies his/her identity at the price of his/her autonomous character. The apparent nature of such resolution of S/O paradox will appear further in the course of consideration of bioethical problems.

SORTS OF ARGUMENTS FOR RESOLVING BIOETHICAL PROBLEMS

In justification of arguments for and against abortion, there are utilitarian and ideological arguments. Most important utilitarian arguments include the following connected arguments:

19 The earliest criticism of Locke's concept includes: J. Butler, *Of Personal Identity*, „Personal Identity”, Los Angeles 1975, p. 99-105; T. Reid, *Of Identity and Of Mr. Locke's Account of Our Personal Identity*, „Personal...”, p. 107-118;

20 Parfit, *Reasons...*, p. 261.

21 Parfit, *On the Importance...*, p. 689.

22 Parfit, *Reasons...*, p. 262.

23 *Ibid...*, p. 210.

- economical (due to so-called costs of child raising),
- social (due to a low status of multi-children families),
- political (due to demographic advantage over poor and poor developed countries).

The following may be distinguished among ideological arguments:

- philosophical (due to the concept of a human being, philosophical anthropology),
- religious (due to supernatural sense of a human being),
- feministic (due to so-called autonomous character of women's decision on their own bodies).

Thus, the subject of further deliberations will include philosophical arguments. In the British philosophical tradition we may find lively reductionist concepts of a human being most often reduced to a mechanism just as in Thomas Hobbes²⁴ or to a psychical sphere just as in Locke or even to a bunch of impressions like in David Hume concept. As I mentioned, Parfit is a follower of Locke's thought (and, to some extent, Hume's concept), but I think that one may also find an implicit reference to Hobbes's image of a human being in Parfit's constitution of a human being in the exterior, blurring of a border between the interior and exterior and identification of a person by external responses.

In Parfit's concept, survival of a person involves existence of states or quasi-psychical states (instances of internal identification) and identification of manifestations of personality in the exterior. In this light, the earliest stages of human life, in his/her zygotic form, are not connected psychically with further states and are not manifested outside (e.g. in a mother's sensations). According to Parfit, there is no psychological connection (no Relation R) and,

therefore, abortion is admissible in early stages of development of a foetus²⁵. Thus, there is still a problem of determination of a borderline between appearance of connection and degree of connection meeting requirements of Relation R until emergence of self-consciousness or a degree of self-consciousness. As supporters of views of abortion believe, the problem may be solved through development of biomedical research. However, the belief ends, where it should be determined, what a consciousness is. This problem may be resolved empirically only to some extent and, therefore, generally, it cannot be technically resolved.

To establish what a consciousness is, seems to go beyond the scope of biomedical sciences. What is more, even in philosophical deliberations and attempts to capture the essence of consciousness conceptually, there are problems, which can only be solved on the basis of a linguistic convention and not on the basis of the human ontology.

It is possible to justify, in a most coherent manner, a view of unity of a human being starting from the stage of an embryo in the realistic Aristotelian and Thomistic ontology. In this concept a human being is a psychical and physical unity and his/her development is determined by potentialities, which are updated in time and subsequent stages. Thus, everything that will happen in the future individual development is, in a way, in a potential stage at the very beginning. Adoption of deliberate causation as a relation of connection removes the problem of establishment of a border of beginning of consciousness, as psychicity is always present in some form and, then, connected with physicality, it evolves into other forms in an ontic connection.

In the light of discussion between opponents and supporters of abortion it is worth reconstructing, on the basis of their arguments, an anthropological level, i.e. a level of assump-

24 T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Cambridge 2006; T. Grabińska, *Hobbes's Desire of Power as an Essence of Understanding of Entrepreneurship and Working Man*, „Młody człowiek wobec pracy, wyzysku i bezrobocia”, Kraków 2014, p. 65-86.

25 D. Parfit, *Reasons...*, p. 322.

tions (philosophical or theological and philosophical) about a human being. As I have already mentioned, in the British tradition, there is a lively concept of a human being reduced to psychical states, consciousnesses and wilful acts (e.g. wants directed by a mechanism of aversion and desires²⁶). Already mentioned Locke reduced personal identity to continuity of memories in a conscience of a given person. Despite S/O paradox, the state of such realised memories would be verifiable in external observations. If so – as supporters of the concept think – as it is not possible to ascertain, whether a zygote or early foetus is self-conscious, then it is unjustifiable to connect being of a zygote or early foetus with being of a person, who emerges from them. Thus, according to Locke's concept of personal identity, one would have to examine stages of a zygote and foetus in order to capture the moment, when self-consciousness is created.

According to Parfit, capturing of the moment of self-consciousness is decisive for the beginning of being a person, whereas a foetus becomes a human being as of its birth. According to Parfit's constitutive reductionism, Relation R has different force depending on, how strong a given person feels his/her psychical bonds with his/her earlier stages. There is Relation R or there is no Relation R at all or the relation is very weak between further psychical and mental states and the state of a foetus. Therefore, Parfit admits an early abortion and he is definitely against an abortion before delivery. The decision of abortion in a mean time should depend on a degree²⁷.

Parfit and representatives of similar concepts of a human being did not even think (due to limitations of the recognised philosophical concept of a human being) that a human be-

ing may be identified with all stages of his/her development in other than subjective and psychological manner. This is senseless for them. They are not able to imagine that opponents of abortion do not articulate a requirement of psychical connection with all developmental stages. Opponents of abortion and defenders of life base their arguments on quite a different anthropology, i.e. personalistic anthropology and, if they refer to identification of a human being with all developmental stages, the identification is not of psychological or subjective character. The identification has its grounds in the Aristotelian and Thomistic ontology, which assumes that a human being is a physical and psychical unity and a dynamic being, which becomes updated in the process of development. Thus, at the very beginning, i.e. from the zygote, a human being has all that will become updated later. One has to refer to continuity here, however, this will be an ontic continuity. One may also refer to continuity in a theological sense, namely continuity of origin of creation from the Creator, which a creature cannot interfere with.

THE EUTHANASIA PROBLEM IN PARFIT'S REDUCTIONISM

The moment of a clinical death of a human being is established on the basis of indications of medical equipment, which measures the level of intensity of selected life processes. As of cessation of the processes, a human organism is pronounced dead. However, in some cases only some indicators reach the zero level, which means that an organism still lives, but is dependent (supported externally by medical equipment) or does not establish any contact with external environment (is in a coma, lethargy or dementia). In such cases additional prerequisites are required (similar to the problem of abortion) in order to justify artificial cessation of life, i.e. euthanasia.

Similar to deliberations on abortion, one could distinguish utilitarian and ideological ar-

26 C.f. Hobbes, *Leviathan*; K. Pierwola, M. Zabierowski, *The Freedom and Will in the Thomas Hobbes' approach. A Critical Analysis*, „Wolność osoby – Wolność obywatela”, *Disputationes Ethicae IV* (2009), Częstochowa 2009, p. 29-51.

27 D. Parfit, *Reasons...*, p. 322.

guments in the dilemma of admissibility or inadmissibility of euthanasia:

- utilitarian arguments, including economical arguments (due to technical costs of life sustaining referred to as artificial life sustaining, or costs of medical care of the ill person) social arguments (due to burdening of families with care of the ill person and family members, with whom no contact can be established);
- ideological arguments, including philosophical arguments (due to the human ontology) and religious arguments (due to the supernatural sense and eschatological horizon of human life).

Similar to the case of abortion, in this scope of reductionist concepts of a human being (such as Parfit's concept) we deal with a similar and irresolvable problem of euthanasia, which is connected with understanding of the essence of humanity. It is reduced to impressions or feeling of a psychical nature, then, due to difficulties in establishment of a border of self-consciousness, euthanasia may be treated as a homicide or peculiar suicide, if we assume that a person, who is losing his/her consciousness, kills himself/herself or, finally, as a peculiarly technical act of removal of physicality, which, in those concepts, does not represent the essence of a human life. On the other hand, when one ponders over requested euthanasia, i.e. making a deliberate decision on ending one's own life and the life is to be ended in participation of third persons, then, as regards reduction of a person to consciousness, in reductionist concepts focused on the course of consciousness as a determinant of a person, requested euthanasia has characteristics of both a homicide and suicide.

In his concept of a person Parfit not only solves the problem of euthanasia, but he puts it aside, cancels and proposes a sort of perspective of immortality involving replication of a person. For it is about survival (in the sense of Relation R). The survival does not have to be

realised in the same body, i.e. the same physicality. Parfit's thought experiment referred to as teleportation, which involves body reconstruction (in a teleporter) and introduction of consciousness into the body, is to make it possible for a person to survive as a replica.

It is worth mentioning again, what has already been written in other paragraph²⁸ and makes it possible to, additionally, distinguish between the problem of abortion and euthanasia in reductionist concepts of a human being. It is a problem of objectivisation of a person (as part of S/O). In case of abortion, the beginning of consciousness from a biomedical point of view is searched for. In case of euthanasia, the end of consciousness is even more difficult to capture and it is finally decided on arbitrarily or conventionally by others. Its is even worse in case of requested euthanasia, when the course of consciousness is not broken and sick physicality request for killing of its own consciousness.

In Parfit's concept of a person, the end of a person is not its definite end, as the person may survive, i.e. preserve his/her psychological connection in other body. Parfit designed (in a thought experiment) so-called teleportation as a peculiar method of prolongation of life as a result of replication of a given person. An appropriate machine (a teleporter) would reconstruct a body and transfer consciousness to the body. According to Parfit's approach, physical death does not have to mean the end of a person. A person may survive in other body or a replica of his/her body.

Similar to the issue of ethical character of abortion, the issue of ethic character of euthanasia is possible to understand in the light of adopted philosophical or theological and philosophical assumptions. If Relation R is to represent identification of a person with himself/herself, then, as a result of senile dementia, deep coma or other complaints, which extremely impair self-consciousness and psychical process-

²⁸ T. Grabińska, *Abortion...*

es, a given person is not able to survive and, thus, he/she, in a way, kills himself/herself. The meaning of physical life (body) is not fundamental to being a person. Therefore, death inflicted to the body from outside does not mean killing of the person, as the person did not exist in the psychical and mental sense earlier. In Parfit's opinion, one cannot, in case of euthanasia, perform moral evaluations, as such evaluations relate to defence of life, i.e. survival of a person in Parfit's sense, and not a material and biological corporeality. Parfit is not a materialist, idealist or Thomist, but a psychological subjectivist and immaterialist.

Similar to abortion, Parfit and followers of a similar philosophy of the human being are not able to capture the meaning of continuity of a human being, including material, substantial being other than psychological and subjective. The paradox of S/O, which I have raised, is even more apparent in case of euthanasia than in case of abortion, as in case of abortion, supporters of reductionism attempt to see scientifically objectivised beginnings of self-consciousness and processes of transformation of psychical states. However, in case of euthanasia, all they have to do is to finally make an arbitrary and external evaluation of the state of being or not being a person (in Parfit's sense) by conventionally selected indicators and adjudicating group.

Finally, it is worth quoting a true ascertainment made by Warren Bourgeois, one of the contemporary disputers, including those of Parfit's disputers – as a consequence of reductionism, a person becomes „an ephemeral being moving in and out of the body secretly“²⁹.

THE „BALD MAN“ PARADOX AND PARFIT'S SPECTRES

Among his concepts referred to as thought experiments and transplanting of one part of a hu-

man being to other human being, Parfit distinguished between so-called spectra. A physical spectrum corresponds to a real transplantation. During the transplantation, parts of one human being are transplanted to another human being. In a physical spectrum as a thought experiment, more and more consciousnesses and, in a combined spectrum, more and more bodily organs and consciousnesses are transplanted at the same time. The problem connected with identity of a person or Parfit's survival of a person in other body involves understanding of transformation of one person into another. For Parfit it is a theoretical problem rooted in his concept of a person. It may be a real problem in case of transplantation of numerous organs of one person to another. It is certainly connected with an eternal logical problem, but, as I am going to show, it is only partly connected with the problem. In logics, this problem is referred to as, for example, a paradox of a „bald man“.

The „bald man“ paradox is ascribed to Eubulides³⁰. Due to semantic blurriness of the terms of „bald man“ it cannot be defined equally. One cannot capture a quantitative border of not being a bald man yet and being already a bald man. In case of Parfit's spectres, the paradox would be as follows. No one can deny that, if an organ (not a brain) belonging to a person B is transplanted to a person A, this person is still himself/herself. If, however, another organ of the person B (not a brain) is transplanted to the operated person A, then, in accordance with what we have recognised before, the person A is still himself/herself. Continuing the procedure, it would turn out that all organs (except for the brain) belonging to the person B could be transplanted to the person A and the person A would still become the same as it was before the experiment.

However, the issue of gradual transplantations does not correspond to the gradual losing of hair in the paradox. Firstly, the reason for

29 W. Bourgeois, *Persons: What Philosophers Say About You*, Groton 1955, p. 393.

30 Y. Dolev, *Why Induction Is No Cure For Baldness*, *Philosophical Investigations* 27 (4) (2004), p. 328–344.

that is because the paradox cannot be formulated only with exclusion of one of the organs – a brain. Secondly, and this is connected with the first reservation, transplanted parts are not only calculable elements of the structure of the organism as it is in case of hair on the head. Transplanted parts of the organism, as elements of the structure, have precisely defined functions in connection with other elements. The view of Parfit's spectres in the perspective of „the bald man” paradox indicates again that a human organism is a unity of structure and function possible to capture in the concept of a human being as a psychical and physical unity and organicist whole and not in reductionist and mechanistic concepts.

As regards Parfit's approach, the most important questions is: Where in particular spectres is there still a psychical connection, i.e. to which point can we consider that a given person will survive. It is worth quoting Tadeusz Bilikiewicz's thought experiment³¹. It involves depriving of a given person subsequent body organs, one by one, and replacing the same with artificial organs (or transplanting of person B's body parts to person A gradually). In the end, the brain would be left disconnected from sense receptors. Bilikiewicz claimed that:

- a person reduced to a brain would still preserve his/her personality, but he/she would not be able to show it outside,
- the person's brain would not only contain memories, as it would operate on „a current basis” simulating existence of organs, which had been taken away, as similar to phantom symptoms.

Acceptance of transplantation despite the fact that spectrum problems are irresolvable in relation to personal identity is justified on an utilitarian basis, on one hand (survival of human life despite changed personality). On the other hand, it is justified ideologically due to, for example, value of the gift of one's own cor-

poreality for improvement of health or saving the condition of other person. However, this does not mean that the reductionist concept of a human being will be accepted – it is even to the contrary.

THE SURVIVAL BECAUSE OF THE BRANCHING OF PERSONS

Parfit deliberates over the problem of so-called branching. It appears in the thought experiment, in which memory paths or the entire brain is transplanted from one body to another and, when Parfit's teleporter makes a replica of a given person and memory carriers of that person are transferred to a new body and, at the same time, the person in its condition before the experiment is left alive. Then, if one assumes a psychological criterion of personal identity or survival, two individuals with the same or different bodies may be treated as the same person. It would be the same person in two copies. In this situation, due to unspecified character (blurring) of personal identity, Parfit resigns from the concept of personal identity and replaces it with the already mentioned survival of a person (in other bodies).

The described branching of a person admits parallel existence of the person and its replicas. Parfit does not claim that a replica is the same person³², but that it is closely connected with a given person. In the light of Parfit's thought experiments relating to branching, one may deliberate over the qualification of a cloned organism.

As far as cloning is concerned, it involves creation of an organism, which is genetically the same as the parent organism. Thus, the problem is, whether the genetic load, which carries well specified biological characteristics, includes inherited experience encoded in the consciousness of the parent organism. If this was the case, would the consciousness be revealed at the very beginning of life of a clone

31 M. Nowacka, *The reduction of bodily sphere as a therapy of future*, Archeus 2, 2001, p. 37-43.

32 D. Parfit, *Reasons...*, p. 262.

or it would become gradually revealed in the course of individual development of the clone. In the first case, early stages of development of the clone would be marked by consciousness and, therefore, the situation would be different than that evaluated by reductionist of abortion – the clone could not be deprived of life in the earliest stages of its development. If this was the case, as in the other case, the clone would repeat the stages of inherited consciousness, however, its individual being would modify considerably the contents of the consciousness. The other case seems more real, especially due to inheritance of some mental and psychological dispositions than just consciousness. Cloning may, therefore, be treated as Parfit's survival of one person in the other due to the above-mentioned close connection of the clone and parent organism. However, the clone is not the same as parent organism neither in the individual nor personal sense.

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