

# Damian Pierzak

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## The Case of Apollo and Hyacinth in the "Second Tetralogy" Attributed to Antiphon

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**Damian Pierzak**

University of Silesia, Katowice  
Faculty of Philology

## The Case of Apollo and Hyacinth in the *Second Tetralogy* Attributed to Antiphon

**Abstract:** Paris school of myth criticism has proved that some modern theories can be applied to Ancient Greece as well as to the so-called savages, but not regardless of the course of history in a given society. The present paper, divided into four parts, is in its method indebted to this approach. The author has chosen the myth of the death of Hyacinth for it has not yet been studied this way. The development of the science of modern mythology is taken into consideration at the outset. Then, the myth of Apollo killing unintentionally his lover is presented according both to the ancient authorities and in view of the various scholars. The main section includes new examination of the myth against the background of the *Second Tetralogy* commonly attributed to Antiphon.

**Key words:** Hyacinth, Apollo, myth, *Tetralogies*, Antiphon

The myth of Apollo and Hyacinth viewed within the framework of the whole Greek mythology provides the example of quite a straight story. Nevertheless, it has been given some scholarly interest through the last two centuries, although many distinguished scholars devote barely two sentences to it. First of all, I would like to contribute to that subject somewhat more vastly in this article. The second thing concerns the attitude. The myth was also neglected in the ways of its explanation. Only recently it has been slightly suggested (cf. p. 63, n. 35) that it can be somehow interrelated with the case of the *Second Tetralogy*. In what follows I shall make some efforts to support such a possibility. The introductory chapter necessarily contains an overview of the modern studies of myth, for in the next sections I will refer to those data where needed.

## Preliminary Remarks

Myths are not just stories, since in addition to the telling of a tale they create peculiar symbolic language of a given, whether ancient or modern, community. Those, accordingly, develop in the course of time serving many different purposes, some being an explanation of a ritual,<sup>1</sup> others, to stick to the most simple examples for now, bringing the answer of how to behave, or how not to. At the thresholds of the modern world of science there were some misleading points of view, based on plain etymological assumptions, and resulting in such definitions as: “Mythology, in the highest sense, is the power exercised by language on thought in every possible sphere of mental activity.”<sup>2</sup> It appears to me to be an echo of what had been called “the rationalizing movement,” which was probably initiated by Fulgentius (5th century AD), who in turn derived it from the earlier Greek mythographers (Pherecydes, Hellanicus, Euhemerus, etc.). Interpreting myths only by relating to the etymology of their characters’ names (no matter how deep it riches) has been simply not enough. It was already proved clearly that the analysis of such a complex and manifold phenomenon as broadly conceived myth cannot be performed superficially. Ernst Cassirer himself pointed out, while establishing his system in volume two of *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, that *function* in contrast to *form* is a feature of myth as well as of language, both of which operate in the mental constructions of what we call “the world of things.” This path-finding idea was especially valuable in contrast to the formerly stated theories of, so to speak, unitarian formalists, for whom the goal was to reveal the true origin of myth, for instance: dreams (Tylor), collective unconsciousness (Jung), or the pan-Babylonian theory. The special attention as well was paid to the universal astrological origin (Solar/Lunar/Stellar).<sup>3</sup>

The important notion that society is a true model of myth was implied by the Durkheimian school of sociology,<sup>4</sup> that gave us the awareness of the heterogeneity

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<sup>1</sup> This idea was primarily extended by J.G. Frazer in his *The Golden Bough*, and followed by the so-called Cambridge Ritualists with J.E. Harrison as the leading figure.

<sup>2</sup> M. Müller: “The Philosophy of Mythology.” In: *Introduction to the Science of Religion*. London 1873, p. 355, quoted by E. Cassirer: *Language and Myth*. Trans. S.K. Langer. New York 1953, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibidem*, pp. 14f. Cf. E. Cassirer: *Die Begriffsform im mythischen Denken*. Leipzig und Berlin 1922, *passim* (esp. pp. 49ff); Idem: *An Essay on Man*. New York 1944, p. 93: *vinculum functionale*; M.F. Ashley Montagu: “Cassirer on Mythological Thinking.” In: *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*. Ed. P.A. Schlipp. Evanston 1949, pp. 370f.

<sup>4</sup> See É. Durkheim: *Le formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*. Paris 1912, after E. Cassirer: *An Essay...*, p. 106. Cf. P. Honigsheim: “The Influence of Durkheim and His School on the Study of Religion.” In: *Essays on Sociology and Philosophy*. Ed. K.H. Wolff. New York–Evanston–London 1960, p. 238. Similar ideas were produced quite simultaneously, probably indirectly, in America by F. Boas.

and complexity, through which we are compelled to study the phenomena. “It was the bringing together of disparate elements that characterizes the nature of [...] myths.”<sup>5</sup> This present line of thought leads to a general assertion that once a particular myth appears, it appears adherent in form to a society and it has, in most of the cases, some practical purpose. Much of what had been said so far applies generally to almost all peoples, but regarding the Ancient Greece we are dealing with a more sophisticated mythical experience by virtue of the development of literature. Here we must make ourselves remember that the story often demands to be altered with accordance to a given political situation or even to an author’s state of mind. Nonetheless, the oral tradition tends to keep some characteristic themes intact.

Since the number of different theories concerning myth is too abundant to comment on each of them, though many are fruitful and relevant, we shall only deal with these which might clarify our view on subject we deal with. It would be unlikely, though, not to comment on the achievements of Claude Lévi-Strauss, whose contribution to the science of myth, if I may use this term, is by all means overwhelming. His greatest impact in this scope is obviously making use of the structural approach which was previously superficially exercised but never applied to such an extent. The general theoretical view is hardly complicated: No matter how numerous and different the myths and tales from all over the world, they can be reduced to a small number of simple types consisting of a few elementary functions. There are some logical processes, according to his method, which underlie the roots of mythical thinking.<sup>6</sup> For this reason, however, the theory of Lévi-Strauss lacks at least one essential factor in spite of the Greek mythology, namely the story-telling. But, fortunately, the gap was to some extent filled by G.S. Kirk, who, being a classical scholar, took the opportunity to improve the structural approach. He describes his idea as follows: “My own view of the possible origin of myth lays much more stress on the gradual development of narrative structures, of stories, with complex symbolic implications coming in almost incidentally.”<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> S.S. Jones: “Representation in Durkheim’s Masters: Kant and Renouvier, II: Representation and Logic.” In: *Durkheim and Representations*. Ed. W.S.F. Pickering. London–New York 2000, p. 69.

<sup>6</sup> See C. Lévi-Strauss: “The Effectiveness of Symbols.” In: Idem: *Structural Anthropology*. Trans. C. Jacobson, B.G. Schoepf. New York 1963, pp. 203f; Idem: “The Structural Study of Myth.” In: Idem: *Structural...*, p. 224 = Idem. In: *Journal of American Folklore* 1955, vol. 270, no. 68, pp. 439f (under the same title). For the comparison of myth and art, cf. Idem: *La Pensée sauvage*. Paris 1962, pp. 32ff.

<sup>7</sup> G.S. Kirk: *Myth. Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures*. Cambridge 1970, p. 280. For the criticism of Lévi-Strauss, cf. e.g. pp. 46, 48, 61; See also: M.P. Carroll: “Lévi-Strauss on the Oedipus Myth: A Reconsideration.” *American Anthropologist*, NS, 1978, vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 805–814 (esp. pp. 805–809); J. Bremmer: “Oedipus and the Greek Oedipus Complex.” In: *Interpretations of Greek Mythology*. Ed. Idem. London 1990, pp. 41f. One of the most distinguished figures to criticize Lévi-Strauss, among other things for the cherry-picking examples from geographical areas of totemism, is Paul Ricoeur. For his judgment see e.g.: P. Ricoeur:

The structural analysis of myths has undoubtedly many advantages, but when undertaken without a broader scope, especially within a given society, it often leads to fallacy and becomes meaningless. In order to use it “properly,” we shall follow the devices of J.-P. Vernant, who relied on structuralism only with retaining of the historical inquiry.<sup>8</sup>

## The Myth

The story we are concerned with can be briefly outlined in the following way: Hyacinth, the descendant of Oebalus, a young lover (*erōmenos*) of Apollo, lived somewhere near Amyclae on the Peloponnese. When they were practicing together throwing the discus, the lad was accidentally killed by the god and died on the spot.<sup>9</sup> The boy was of outstanding beauty, and after death had been turned into a flower, to which his name was given thereby.<sup>10</sup> Some late authorities claim that Apollo had a rival (*anterastēs*), Zephyrus or Boreas, against whom after some time he eventually won the young man’s love. According to this, the jealous wind caused the unfortunate event by blowing the discus towards the lad.<sup>11</sup> The myth

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*Du texte à l’action. Essais d’herméneutique II.* Paris 1986, pp. 147ff; G.S. Kirk: *Myth...*, p. 49; I. Rossi: “The Unconscious in the Anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss.” *American Anthropologist*, NS, 1973, vol. 75, no. 1, p. 21. It was similarly with G. Dumézil, whose tripartite division of Indo-European societies met the difficult exception of the Greeks. See K. Dowden: *The Uses of Greek Mythology.* London and New York 1992, p. 21.

<sup>8</sup> See J.-P. Vernant: *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece.* Trans. J. Lloyd. New York 1990, pp. 7–10. Cf. M.P. Carroll: “Lévi-Strauss...,” pp. 812ff; W.B. Tyrrell, F.S. Brown: *Athenian Myths and Institutions. Words in Action.* New York and Oxford 1991, pp. vf: “By grounding the myths in the customs, practices, and institutions of Greek society, these scholars [sc. J.-P. Vernant alongside M. Detienne and P. Vidal-Naquet – D.P.] have shown that myths are a verbal expression of beliefs, concepts, and practices operating in all aspects of culture.” For the contribution of the “school of Paris,” see also: W. Burkert: “Oriental and Greek Mythology: The Meeting of Parallels.” In: *Interpretations...*, pp. 10 and 34, n. 4.

<sup>9</sup> See “Apollod.” 1.17, 3.116 Wagner. Cf. Hygin. 271.1.3 Rose; Plin. *NH* 21.66.1ff Mayhoff; Plut. *Num.* 4.5.1ff Perrin. Servius has Eurotas as the alternative father: *A.* 11.69.2f Thilo. Other sources point directly on Amyclae, see: C. Calame: “Spartan Genealogies: The Mythological Representation of Spatial Organization.” Trans. A. Habib. In: *Interpretations...*, pp. 164, 166. For the general overview and the testimonies, see also: Greve: “Hyakinthos.” In: *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie.* Ed. W.H. Roscher. Leipzig 1884–1890, Bd. i, pp. 2759–2766. Cf. U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: *Der Glaube der Hellenen.* Berlin 1931, Bd. i, p. 106. The abbreviations of ancient authors’ works are with accordance to *LSJ* and *OLD*.

<sup>10</sup> Serv. *A.* 9.433.2f Thilo.

<sup>11</sup> See Luc. *Salt.* 45 Harmon; Serv. *B.* 3.63.3ff Thilo: [...] *et Hyacinthum amatam tam a Borea quam ab Apolline: qui cum magis Apollinis amore laetaretur, dum exerceret disco, ab irato Borea eodem disco est interemptus et mutatus in florem nominis sui.*

itself is probably an old one. We know that Apollo is in origin an Asiatic deity, and that nouns and proper names containing the *-nth* stem were pre-Greek. Another fact is that Hyacinth most plausibly was kind of a local god, presumably connected with nature, and his cult was spread around Amyclae. The interpretation, which at first sight results from the so presented framework, would be likely attached to the operating of some particular religious displacement. Here – the cult of Hyacinth superseded by that of Apollo being symbolically envisaged as the accidental killing of one god by another.<sup>12</sup> In fact, such an assessment, right I suppose, prevails today among the scholars.<sup>13</sup> There have been at least two different lines of interpretation, the older of which includes the explanation by means of natural phenomena,<sup>14</sup> and the latter pointing at the rites of passage.<sup>15</sup> At the early stage of its emergence, and at least to sometime after the establishment of Apollo's cult on Peloponnese, the myth could have been considered in the very way we have already described it. However, there is that odd detail concerning Hyacinth's death. He was struck by a discus, an object not necessarily popular before the first Olympic games were recorded (8th century BC).<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the boy's "sacrifice" in itself causes some

<sup>12</sup> Moreover, as Pausanias tells us, Hyacinth's monument in Amyclae was situated below the statue of Apollo. See: Paus. 3.1.3 Spiro: καὶ Ἰακίνθου μνημαῖ ἐστὶν ἐν Ἀμόκλαις ὑπὸ τὸ ἀγάλμα τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος. Cf. ibidem 3.19.3. W. Burkert finds this mortal companion (*sterblichen Doppelgänger*) an ordinary practice. See W. Burkert: *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche*. Stuttgart 2011 (Zw. Auf.), p. 309.

<sup>13</sup> See e.g.: M.P. Nilsson: *The Mycenaean Origin of Greek Mythology*. Berkeley 1932, pp. 68, 76; H.J. Rose: *A Handbook of Greek Mythology*. London and New York 1964, p. 117; J. Forsdyke: *Greece before Homer. Ancient Chronology and Mythology*. New York 1957, p. 108; P. Chantraine: *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire de mots*. Vol. iv, Paris 1977, s.v. Ἰακίνθος (p. 1149); J. Richer: *Sacred Geography of Ancient Greeks*. Trans. Ch. Rhone. New York 1994, p. 70; J. Davidson: "Time and Greek Religion." In: *A Companion to Greek Religion*. Ed. D. Ogden. Malden–Oxford–Carlton 2007, pp. 212. Cf. F. Graf: *Apollo*. London–New York 2009, pp. 33f. C. Calame treats the event as an etiological account of the founding of a rite, see: C. Calame: "Identities of Gods and Heroes: Athenian Garden Sanctuaries and Gendered Rites of Passage." Trans. Ch. Strachan. In: *The Gods of Ancient Greece*. Eds. J. Bremmer, A. Erskine. Edinburgh 2010, p. 247. Here is, I believe, recently the most direct opinion on the subject: G.S. Kirk: *The Nature of Greek Myths*. Harmondsworth 1985 (1974), p. 128: "[B]ut actually the beautiful boy must have been, with that name, a pre-Hellenic god whom Apollo merely absorbed into his own worship." Compare, however, H.J. Rose's rev. of M.J. Mellink: *Hyakinthos*. (Diss.) Utrecht 1943. In: *JHS* 1945, vol. 65, pp. 129f.

<sup>14</sup> It has been proved that *Hyakinthia* was celebrated at the beginning of summer, hence some authorities maintained that Hyacinth represents the spring, Apollo thus being an image of the new season, and the discus symbolizes the sun. See: M. Pettersson: *Cults of Apollo at Sparta. The Hyakinthia, the Gymnopaediai, and the Karneia*. Stockholm 1992, p. 12.

<sup>15</sup> See L. Ziehen's rev. of H. Jeanmaire: *Couroi et Courètes. Essai sur l'éducation spartiate et sur les rites d'adolescence dans l'antiquité hellénique*. Lille 1939. In: *Gnomon* 1940, vol 16, no. 10, p. 442, and C. Roebuck's rev. of A. Brelich: *Paidés e Parthenoi I*, Roma 1969. In: *AJPh* 1972, vol. 93, no. 2, p. 360. Cf. M. Pettersson: *Cults of Apollo...*, p. 14.

<sup>16</sup> And yet it recurs in Homer as a sort of entertainment, see e.g. *Il.* 2.774 Allen = *Od.* 4.626 von der Mühl = 17.168. Perhaps the Greeks became accustomed to it in the "heroic era," cf. *EM*,

exegetical difficulties, for if we try to take it as an alimentary offering, it does not solve anything. Hyacinth as a flower, no matter with which species be it identified today, is of none practical use for a human being whatsoever.<sup>17</sup> One could have also detected some traces of nature's rebirth, especially following the account of Ovid (*Ov. Met.* 10.164ff Miller–Goold: [...] *quotiensque repellit | ver hiemem, Piscique Aries succedit aquoso, | tu totiens oreris viridique in caespite flores*). The motif of a vegetation god viewed as a young man would actually fit in Greeks' ancient religion,<sup>18</sup> however it still does not provide any satisfactory solution of the *Diskos-Wurf*. In the following pages, examining the myth against the background of the early development of classical Greek culture, I shall attempt to display that we are certainly dealing with a sort of confusion between Huizinga's *homo ludens* and Burkert's *homo necans*.

The first pragmatically relevant hint comes from relatively late source, namely Lucian's *Dialogues of the Gods*. We should not be reluctant towards it by virtue of its date, because the proper idea of a myth is never clearly understood *in illo tempore*, to use M. Eliade's catchy term. In the dialogue Hermes asks Apollo to explain what happened to his unfortunate young lover. Answering the question the other god justifies his deed through a quite long apology. Here is a part of the conversation (*Luc. Dial.D.* 16.1.11ff Macleod): ER. Οὐκοῦν ἐμάνης, ᾧ Ἄπολλον; ΑΠ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ δυστύχημά τι ἀκούσιον ἐγένετο. Surely the defensive tone can be felt in a phrase like "it was an accident. It took place unwillingly." Maybe it is just adherent to this specific literary genre, but let us not rule out another possibility, to which I shall now proceed.

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s.v. Gaisford: Σεμáινει λίθον τροχοειδῆ εἰς γυμνάσιον ἠρωϊκὸν ἐπιτήδειον. Cf. also *LSJ* (s.v.) with references, and W. Burkert: *Griechische Religion...*, p. 168: "Merkwürdig vom Mythos umspinnen ist der Diskos-Wurf: Apollon selbst hat dabei seinen jugendlichen Liebling Hyakinthos getötet – als ob der Wurf mit der unberechenbaren Steinscheibe ein Zufallsopfer suche." On the possible military origin of the discus throwing competition, see: S. Instone: "Origins of the Olympics." In: *Pindar's Poetry, Patrons, and Festivals. From Archaic Greece to the Roman Empire*. Eds. S. Hornblower, C. Morgan. Oxford–New York 2007, p. 79. There were other Peloponnesian myths dealing with competitiveness, e.g. of Pelops and Hippodameia or Polydeuces being an excellent boxer.

<sup>17</sup> See R. Buxton: *Forms of Astonishment. Greek Myths of Metamorphosis*. Oxford 2009, pp. 223ff. Cf. M. Detienne: "Culinary Practices and the Spirit of Sacrifice." In: *The Cuisine of Sacrifice among the Greeks*. Eds. M. Detienne, J.-P. Vernant. Trans. P. Wissing. Chicago and London 1989, p. 5. The rebirth as a flower can serve as the initiatory rite's motif. Cf. T.F. Scanlon: *Eros & Greek Athletics*. Oxford and New York 2002, p. 73; n. 15 above.

<sup>18</sup> See: A.W. Persson: *The Religion of Greece in Prehistoric Times*. Berkeley–Los Angeles 1942, p. 151; H. Frankfort: "The Dying God." *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 1958, vol. 21, no. 3/4, pp. 143 and esp. 148. Cf. J. Larson: "A Land Full of Gods: Nature Deities in Greek Religion." In: *A Companion...*, pp. 56–71. Hyacinth's name was traditionally linked to grief, see: N. Lane: "Some Illusive Puns in Theocritus, *Idyll* 18 Gow." *QUCC*, NS, 2006, vol. 83, no. 2, p. 23, and cf. *LSJ*, s.v.; *Ov. Fast.* 5.223f Alton–Wormell–Courtney.

## The *Second Tetralogy* in Context

The *Tetralogies* are a group of three texts each dealing with a case of homicide. All are purely hypothetical and aim at presenting an example of speech that could be delivered in various cases at the court of law. The first is concerned with willful murder, the second with the accidental killing (K. J. Maidment called it “death by misadventure”), and the third with homicide in self-defence. This *corpus*, in general, must have been created in an atmosphere of the sophistic movement, for the sophists were fond of the arguments, which Aristotle discerned as “artificial proofs” (*pisteis entekhnoi*).<sup>19</sup> Those are based only on premises, and not on evidence and witnesses’ testimony. To argue, whether or not the *Tetralogies* were written by Antiphon, is not our worry in the present study.<sup>20</sup> What matters to us is that since the scholarly discussion on the subject lasts until today, for our purposes it can be stated simply thus: If Antiphon did not compose it, the author was either influenced by him, or contributed somehow to his work, or finally, which I would prefer, both were subjects to the same intellectual wave. One way or another, it would be an exaggeration to say that in the period when rhetoric was born, it was already *confused* or *filled* with mythological data, but we can be sure that myths had their impact on almost every literary issue in Classical Athens.<sup>21</sup>

Let us now take a look at the case of the *Second Tetralogy*. I think it best to quote what K. J. Maidment has already written, for it gets to the point succinctly yet remaining comprehensible: “The *Second Tetralogy* is concerned not with establishing facts but with interpreting them. X was practicing with the javelin in the gymnasium. Y ran in front of the target just as X was making the cast, and was killed. Y’s father prosecutes X for accidentally causing his son’s death.”<sup>22</sup>

<sup>19</sup> See esp. his *Rhet.* 1355<sup>b</sup> 35 Ross. Cf. e.g. D.H. *Lys.* 19.1 Usener–Radermacher.

<sup>20</sup> Readers interested in that field are referred to: *Minor Attic Orators I: Antiphon, Andocides*. Ed. K.J. Maidment. Cambridge, Mass.–London 1982, pp. 36ff; M. Gagarin: *Antiphon the Athenian. Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists*. Austin 2002, pp. 52–63. Cf. K.J. Dover: “The Chronology of Antiphon’s Speeches.” *CQ* 1950, vol. 44, no. 1/2, pp. 44–60; A. Lanni: *Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens*. Cambridge–New York 2006, p. 90.

<sup>21</sup> See e.g. J.C. Davies: “Mythological Influences on the First Emergence of Greek Scientific and Philosophical Thought.” *Folklore* 1970, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 23–36; *Liryka grecka I: Jamb i elegia*. Ed. K. Bartol. Warszawa–Poznań 1999, p. 336: “powoływanie się na autorytet Homera staje się z czasem modne w argumentacji retorycznej [...]” Cf. J. de Romilly: *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens*. Trans. J. Lloyd. Oxford and New York 2002, pp. 162ff. In Antiphon’s first speech (e.g. 1.17, 1.20 Gernet) we can summon at least several mythological characters: Clytemnestra, Orestes, Heracles and Deianira, Medea or Circe, see: M. Gagarin: *Antiphon the Athenian...*, pp. 146, 151f. It suffices only to mention Gorgias’ *Helen* and *Palamedes* or Alcidas’ works. Cf. also And. 1.129 Maidment.

<sup>22</sup> *Minor Attic Orators I...*, p. 86.



There is at least one other source that provides us the similar discussion. According to Plutarch, Pericles himself along with Protagoras spent a whole day wondering, who in such a situation was to blame – whether the javelin, or the thrower, or even judges of the contest.<sup>23</sup> In times when sport was not as “professional” as it is nowadays, such dilemma may have occurred from time to time not just hypothetically. My intent is to suggest that the myth of Apollo and Hyacinth, primarily serving as an illustration of some religious reformation, in due time became adjusted to the other sphere of life.

I shall now perform an analysis of the two passages which I deem the most relevant for the study of this myth’s development. One comes from Pseudo-Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*, and is, I believe, the oldest mention of it, and another from Euripides’ *Helen*, for it is the closest to the period when the *Tetralogies* were composed:

ἦ δ’ Ἰάκινθον ἔτικτεν ἀμύμονά τε κρατερόν τε Φοῖβος ἀκερσεκόμης ἀέκων κτάνε νηλέϊ δίσκῳ	ἐπλ]όκαμον Δ[ιομ]ήδ[η]ν· ]α, τόν ρά ποτ’ αὐτὸς	ἦ κώμοις Ἰακίν- θου νύχιον ἐς εὐφροσύναν, ὄν ἐξαμιλλασάμενος ἴτροχῶ τέρμονι δίσκουτ ἔκανε Φοῖβος, κτλ. <sup>24</sup>
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These obviously are not too copious for the *essential* sources. We are able, however, to notice that the testimonies, thanks to which the reconstruction of the general plot is possible at all, are considerably late, mostly Latin paraphrases of some Greek predecessors. I suppose we should be grateful even for how little we have got, for hopefully it might be enough to shed some new light on this “discovered” myth. On the part of the first passage, after all the commonplaces being removed, we receive an information that long-haired Phoebus himself once killed Hyacinth unintentionally (*aekōn ktane*) with the pitiless discus (*nēlei diskō*). “Weapon’s” epithet being traditional<sup>25</sup> is of no importance here of course. Matters that if such a version was sang by a Boeotian author in about 8th/7th century BC, more probable the fact it was already well-known in 6th/5th-century BC Athens. It is likely therefore that the playwright was not forced to pay too much attention to each detail. And accordingly, it cannot be excluded that the poet, dealing with so widely spread piece of mythology, exploited it with a bit of “learned” or “exotic”

<sup>23</sup> Plut. *Per.* 36.5 Ziegler.

<sup>24</sup> [Hes.] fr. 171.5ff M.–W. = P.Oxy. 1359 fr. 4.5ff G.–H. Cf. Paus. 3.19.5 Spiro; E. *Hel.* 1469ff Diggle. For the date of the *Catalogue* see: J. Strauss Clay: “The Beginning and the End of the *Catalogue of Women* and its Relation to Hesiod.” In: *The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women. Constructions and Reconstructions*. Ed. R. Hunter. Cambridge–New York 2005, p. 25, nn. 2f.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. e.g. *Il.* 3.292, 4.348, 5.330, 12.427 Allen; *Od.* 4.743, 8.507, 10.532, 11.45 von der Mühl; Hes. *Th.* 316 Solmsen (of bronze). For other “pitiless objects,” see e.g. *Il.* 10.433 Allen (bond); *h. Merc.* 385 A.–H.–S. (payment).

colouring.<sup>26</sup> He thus concerned himself with the circumstances, in which the boy died (*hon eksamillasamenos ekane*), and especially with the object (*trokhō termoni diskou*). Even though the text here is reconstructed, it certainly possessed a kind of rhetorical imprint (*synekdochē* in case of Diggle's reading).<sup>27</sup> It remains to admit that both the myth and the dilemma conveyed in the *Second Tetralogy* were to some extent popular at the time. On the level of symbolical thinking even the fact that different throwing devices were exercised (the discus and the javelin, respectively) is not of particular interest, since "they [=myths] are," as Northrop Frye wrote extending Cassirer's theory, "in fact, the communicable ideogrammatic structures of literature. [...] The basic structure of myth is a metaphor, which is very similar in form to the equation, being a statement of identity of the 'A is B' type."<sup>28</sup>

Now I would like to sketch briefly what appears to underlie the case of the *Second Tetralogy*. After a short proem was performed, the prosecutor states: "I accuse him not of killing my son deliberately, but of killing him by accident" (ἐκόντα μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐπικαλῶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἄκοντα δέ).<sup>29</sup> Estimated by modern standards, such an accusation would not appear as serious as it was in Classical Athens. But we cannot ignore the differences between our view, in which reason finally begins to overcome superstition, and the ancient attitude thoroughly filled with the ideas of blood-revenge and *miasma*.<sup>30</sup> To those very facts (sic!) the speaker subsequently refers more than once (e.g. 3 α 2, 3 γ 12). The defendant on his own behalf states that since accidents always happen due to *hamartia* on the part of someone, therefore the person guilty of it (ἡμαρτηκῶς) must be discovered in order to solve the question (3 β 6):

<sup>26</sup> See: D. Mastrorade: *The Art of Euripides. Dramatic Technique and Social Context*. Cambridge–New York 2010, p. 122 (with n. 67). Cf. A. J. Podlecki: "The Basic Seriousness of Euripides' Helen." *TAPhA* 1970, vol. 101, pp. 412f; M. Wright: *Euripides' Escape-Tragedies. A Study of Helen, Andromeda, and Iphigenia among the Taurians*. Oxford and New York 2005, pp. 56ff.

<sup>27</sup> F. Lourenço: "Two Notes on Euripides' Helen (186; 1472)." *CQ*, NS, 2000, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 602f, suggested, following Willink's conjecture, to read the corrupted line: τροχὸν ἀτρέμονα δίσκῳ. Then we should treat *diskō* as instrumental connected with ἔκανε, and *trokhon atremona* becomes, accordingly, an accusative of respect governed by the participle. The arguments are convincing at this point, although I disagree with the assertion that Helen's third stasimon is the first utterance of Hyacinth's death (see his p. 603 and above in this paper, n. 24. Cf. T. F. Scanlon: *Eros...*, p. 74). For the MS tradition see e.g. *Euripidis fabulae*. Ed. J. Diggle. Vol. iii, Oxford–New York 1994, p. v.

<sup>28</sup> N. Frye: "Myth as Information." *The Hudson Review* 1954, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 234f = Idem: *Anatomy of Criticism. Four Essays*. Princeton–Oxford 152000 (1957), p. 123.

<sup>29</sup> Antipho 3 α 2. Here and further the text and the translation after: *Minor Attic Orators...* (the Loeb Classical Library series).

<sup>30</sup> The motives so transparent in the stories of Orestes and of Alcmaon (on the spelling of his name, see: *Greek Epic Fragments*. Ed. M.L. West. Cambridge, Mass.–London 2003, p. 5, n. 3). Aeschylean tragedy efficiently provides instances, see: *A. Th.* 70, 680ff; *A.* 1643ff; *Ch.* 1048ff; *Eu.* 40ff, 281, 600ff Murray. Cf. H.J. Treston: *Poine. A Study in Ancient Greek Blood-Vengeance*. London 1923, pp. 276ff.

οἱ τε γὰρ ἀμαρτάνοντες ὡς ἂν ἐπινοήσωσί τι δρᾶσαι, οὗτοι πράκτορες τῶν ἀκουσίων εἰσίν· οἱ τε ἐκούσιόν τι δρώντες ἢ πάσχοντες, οὗτοι τῶν παθημάτων αἴτιοι γίγνονται.

For it is those guilty of error [*hamartanontes*] in carrying out an intended act who are responsible for accidents; just as it is those who voluntarily do a thing or allow it to be done to them who are responsible for the effects suffered.

With this in background, since Y ran in front of the javelin, “He was accidentally guilty of an error [ἀκουσίως δὲ ἀμαρτῶν] which affected his own person,” X continues (3 β 8), “and has thus met with a disaster for which he had himself alone to thank.” This is one possible tactics of the defence, and we could easily imagine even the javelin taking the responsibility for an “accidental killing.” It suffices to remind either of the mentioned above conversation held by Pericles and Protagoras, or of the *Bouphonia*, part of a *Diipoleia* festival during which the guilt eventually befell the knife.<sup>31</sup> The most important result, consequently, is that “He has punished himself for his error [...]” (τῆς δ’ ἀμαρτίας τετιμωρημένος ἑαυτὸν ἔχει τὴν δίκην). Father of the victim, on the other hand, relies on another oddity about this case, namely the lack of witnesses and evidence. How could be anyone else put into charges, if neither of the spectators (*theōmenoi*) nor of the trainers (*paidagōgoi*) testifies anything? He strengthens this statement by presenting the appropriate law to the court (3 γ 7):

ἐγὼ δὲ τὸν νόμον ὀρθῶς ἀγορεύειν φημι τοὺς ἀποκτείναντες κολάζεσθαι· ὅ τε γὰρ ἄκων ἀποκτείνας ἀκουσίους κακοῖς περιπεσεῖν δίκαιός ἐστιν, ὅ τε διαφθαρεῖς οὐδὲν ἦσσαν ἀκουσίως ἢ ἐκούσιως βλαφθεῖς ἀδικοῦτ’ ἂν ἀτιμώρητος γενόμενος.

[A]nd I maintain that the law is right when it orders the punishment of those who have taken life; not only is it just that he who killed without meaning to kill [*akōn apokteinas*] should suffer punishment which he did not mean to incur; but it would also be an injustice to the victim, whose injury is not lessened by being accidental, were he deprived of vengeance.

Both of the two parties attempt to win the case from a different angle. Y’s father calls upon the blood-revenge (ἀδικοῦτ’ ἂν ἀτιμώρητος γενόμενος) on the one hand being afraid of *miasma* threatening the city because of the one who has taken life (ἀποκτείνας), and willing to fulfill the duty of a relative, which was to avert his son’s spirit (who was *prostropaios*, see: 3 δ 9, cf. 1 γ 10) from the living

<sup>31</sup> The axe was under the figurative trial too, but, according to Pausanias, became finally acquitted. See W. Burkert: *Homo Necans. The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth*. Trans. P. Bing. Berkeley–Los Angeles–London 1983, p. 140. Cf. J. Bremmer: *Greek Religion*. Oxford 1994, p. 42. See also: Paus. 1.24.4 Spiro, Schol. Ar. *Nub.* 985c–d Holwerda.

by means of vengeance, on the other.<sup>32</sup> He represents a member of a little bit obsolete community,<sup>33</sup> but, despite the wholly hypothetical character of the *Tetralogies* altogether, we are not in position to judge his beliefs. I presume that it is X who would enjoy our sympathy, for his argumentation is somehow more reasoned and honest (imagine a boy running in front of one's car today and his father demanding blood-shed). The speech for the defence is generally built up of the question, due to whose error (*hamartia*) is the youth's death. Everyone should bear the consequences of their own deeds, and "the boy, who perished through his own error," follows in the second speech for the defence (3 δ 8), "punished himself as soon as he had committed that error" (ὁ δὲ παῖς ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἁμαρτίαις διαφθαρεῖς, ἅμα ἥμαρτέ τε καὶ ὕφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐκολάσθη).<sup>34</sup> It leads, finally, to the case of Apollo, whose *hamartia* was precisely depicted in the considerable amount of sources. Let us take another look now at Ovid's view (*Met.* 10.162–219 referred to above). In the following lines (198f Anderson): *tu dolor es facinusque meum; mea dextera leto | inscribenda tuo est. Ego sum tibi funeris auctor*, Apollo, in words bearing almost legal colouring (*facinus, inscribere alicui aliquid*),<sup>35</sup> admits that the accident is his fault.<sup>36</sup> Philostratos the Elder, though very carefully, tells of the god's terrible error (*Im.* 1.24.1 Benndorf–Schenk): δεινὴ μὲν ἢ διαμαρτία καὶ οὐδὲ πιστὴ λέγεται κατὰ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος. The fact of *accidental* killing, as we have seen, was underlined already as early as the pseudo-Hesiodic *Catalogue* was composed. Another epic poet, who flourished in the 2nd century BC under Attalus III, Nicander of Colophon, devoted a few lines to that matter:

ὄν Φοῖβος θρήνησεν ἐπεὶ ῥ' ἀεκούσιος ἔκτα  
παῖδα βαλὼν προπάροιθεν Ἀμυκλαίου ποταμοῖο  
πρωθήβην Ἰάκινθον, ἐπεὶ σόλος ἔμπεσε κόρη  
πέτρου ἀφαλλόμενος νέατον ἤραξε κάλυμμα.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Cf. D. Cohen: "Theories of Punishment." In: *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law*. Eds. M. Gagarin, D. Cohen. New York 2005, p. 172; D.M. MacDowell: *The Law in Classical Athens*. Ithaca 1978, p. 12: "Above all, if a man is killed, his family is expected to exact vengeance from the killer."

<sup>33</sup> For the X's alleged contribution to the society, see: C. Carey: "Rhetorical Means of Persuasion." In: *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*. Ed. I. Worthington. London–New York, p. 36.

<sup>34</sup> For the difference between *timōria* and *kolasis*, cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1369b Ross.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *OLD*, s.v. *inscribo* 5a–b: "to be recorded as a legal owner of," "to record as responsible for" (with reference to *Met.* 10.199).

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Mart. 14.173 Heraeus–Borovskij: *Flectit ab invisio morientia lumina disco | Oebalius, Phoebi culpa dolorque, puer*. Commenting on the very passage of Ovid, L. Fulkerson refers to the *Second Tetralogy*. See: L. Fulkerson: "Apollo, Paenitentia, and Ovid's *Metamorphoses*." *Mnemosyne* 2006, vol. 59, no. 3, p. 395, n. 21: "[S]imilar to the argument advanced by Apollo." Cf. *Ovid's Metamorphoses. Books 6–10*. Ed. W.S. Anderson. Norman 1972, ad 10.196–199.

<sup>37</sup> Nic. *Ther.* 903ff Gow–Scholfield. It is plausible that the idea of a discus reflecting from a rock (*petrou aphallomenos*) is to be ascribed to Nicander. Later Ovid took it over, maybe directly from *Theriaka*, albeit his version is much more poetic (*Met.* 10.183ff: *at illum | dura repercusso su-*

We have not hitherto paid much attention to the third participant, who would normally make an important witness, but we had reasons not to. First of all, *paidotribēs* played so little part in the *Tetralogy* just because “the writer is throughout endeavouring to exhibit the possibilities of the *πίστις ἔντεχνος* as such.”<sup>38</sup> Secondly, the first appearance of the Zephyrus motif is dated long after Antiphon’s activity. And yet we shall attempt to offer some arguments on behalf of his inclusion in the present study. On the part of the former objection it can be proposed that even if he is barely mentioned, he *is* there, and in ancient oratory, in contrast to the present, it seldom happened that something or someone was incorporated to a speech without *any* purpose. In case of the myth we might simply be dealing with coincidence. We know that canonical epic, for instance, had its counterparts in numerous “multiforms” containing alternative variants. The poet was always able to pick a satisfying version, which did not mean he was not aware of the remainder.<sup>39</sup>

Looked at thus, therefore, we are allowed to suppose that the variant including the wind to blame could have existed parallel to the canonical one by that time. In the second *apologia* the defendant narrows his previous statement and defines the error (*hamartia*). It was the boy’s movement that caused his death. Had he stood still, he would have been alive. Then we read (3 δ 4):

τῆς δὲ διαδρομῆς αἰτίας ταύτης γιγνομένης, εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ παιδοτρίβου  
καλούμενος διέτρεχεν, ὁ παιδοτρίβης ἂν ἀποκτείνας αὐτὸν εἴη, εἰ δ’ ὑφ’  
ἑαυτοῦ πεισθείς ὑπήλθεν, αὐτὸς ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ διέφθαρται.

As this running across was his undoing, it follows that if it was at his master’s summons that he ran across, the master would be the person responsible for his death; but if he moved into the way of his own accord, his death was due to himself.

The means of the *paidotribēs* and Zephyrus are hardly comparable at first sight, the former performing his duties, and the latter jealously depriving his would-be of life. But in spite of Northrop Frye’s already quoted assertion, they can be both reckoned as broadly conceived “third party.”

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*biecit verbere tellus | in vultus, Hyacinthe, tuos.*) For the distinction of *solos* from *diskos*, see: Schol. Hom. *D. II.* 23.826b Erbse; *contra* Schol. Nic. *Ther.* ad. loc. Crugnoła. For the troublesome reading of *verbere* and other emendations, see: *Ovid’s Metamorphoses...*, ad. loc.

<sup>38</sup> *Minor Attic Orators...*, p. 110.

<sup>39</sup> See e.g. S. Lowenstam: “Talking Vases: The Relationship between the Homeric Poems and Archaic Representations of Epic Myth.” *TAPhA* 1997, vol. 127, pp. 21–76; A.T. Alwine: “The Non-Homeric Cyclops in the Homeric *Odyssey*.” *GRBS* 2009, vol. 49, pp. 323–333. Cf. M. Lefkowitz: *Not Out of Africa. How Afrocentrism Became an Excuse to Teach Myth as History*. New York 1996, p. 71.

Keeping the abovementioned in mind, we can now distinguish: X for Apollo, Y for Hyacinth, and Z (quite conveniently) for Zephyrus (=paidotribēs).

## Conclusions

Given the considerable sketch of the problem, we may now try to adumbrate some final notions. Speaking within the confines of the common features underlying the conventional structures, we are able to discern a simple scheme regarding the myth of Apollo and Hyacinth: X accidentally kills Y with a participation of Z (in later versions). On the assumption of the equation “A is B” we can submit various factors under X, Y, and Z, which were to larger extent discussed in the section entitled “The Myth.” Many of them are probably right for subsequent periods in the development of the myth. In section entitled “The *Second Tetralogy* in context,” however, we argued that for Classical Athens there is some noteworthy possibility to look at, for it comprises the most relevant variables for the community’s imaginative thought. Moreover, the story changes to even greater respect ever since the literacy has been established.<sup>40</sup> The *Second Tetralogy*, then, presents a good example of a work exposed to the influence of the story-telling, which was suggested later in “The *Second Tetralogy* in Context.” There remains one last thing to say, even if it be only a mere guess. We implied above that the courts of law in Athens were affected by the superstition. Perhaps Apollo, symbolizing the enlightenment, was therefore also to represent the new order of justice, for we know the god, despite his remorse, could not be punished for what he did.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, the early Greek law is still a difficult question to examine on the one hand, and it is certainly not my field of expertise on the other. I cannot resist, finally, citing few more lines from Lucian’s *Dialogue XVI* (Luc. *Dial.D.* 16.1.6ff Macleod):

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<sup>40</sup> See: G.S. Kirk: “Greek Mythology: Some New Perspectives.” *JHS* 1972, vol. 92, p. 75: “[A] tale’s emphasis can alter from generation to generation in response to changing social pressures and preoccupations.” Ibidem, at p. 77: “Greek mythology as we know it is a *literate* mythology [...] elaborated and adjusted for the several generations in accordance with developed literary criteria” (emphasis in the original). Cf. Idem: *The Nature...*, pp. 27f: “A tale must have some special characteristic for this to happen [sc. to be passed from generation to generation – D. P.], some enduring quality that separates it from the general run of transient stories.” Cf. also: J. Gould: “On Making Sense of Greek Religion.” In: *Greek Religion and Society*. Eds. P. Easterling, J.V. Muir. Cambridge 1985, pp. 1–33; J. Bremmer: “What is a Greek Myth?” *Interpretations...*, pp. 4.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. M. Chappell: “The *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*: The Question of Unity.” In: *The Homeric Hymns. Interpretative Essays*. Ed. A. Faulkner. Oxford–New York 2011, pp. 76f.

ΕΡ. Τέθνηκε γάρ, εἰπέ μοι, ὁ Ἰάκινθος;

ΑΠ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΕΡ. Πρὸς τίνοσ, ὦ Ἄπολλον; ἢ τίς οὕτως ἀνέραστος ἦν ὡς ἀποκτεῖναι τὸ  
καλὸν ἐκείνο μαιράκιον;

ΑΠ. Αὐτοῦ ἐμοῦ τὸ ἔργον.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> This is not the only Greek myth that illustrates the accidental killing by throwing the discus. It would be worth studying it comparatively with the other ones, for instance the case of Perseus and Acrisius (for which cf. G.S. Kirk: *The Nature...*, p. 149).