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Franklin Delano Roosevelt – the false “hero” of U.S. foreign policy

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**FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
– THE FALSE “HERO” OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY**

Streszczenie:

W swoim tekście autor koncentruje się na polityce zagranicznej administracji Franklina Delano Roosevelta. Autor przekonuje, że dość powszechna ocena Roosevelta jako błyskotliwego mistrza polityki zagranicznej jest w większości niezasłużona. Autor zarzuca Rooseveltowi i jego administracji zdecydowanie zbyt miękką i zbyt ustępliwą politykę w stosunku do stalinowskiego Związku Sowieckiego w czasie II wojny światowej oraz zlekceważenie Szoah. Pierwszy z owych zarzutów w dużym stopniu można wytłumaczyć olbrzymią penetracją administracji Roosevelta przez wywiad sowiecki.

Summary:

In the text the author focuses on the foreign policy of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt's administration. The author argues that the quite common evaluation of Roosevelt as a brilliant master of foreign policy is largely undeserved. The author accuses Roosevelt and his administration of being decidedly too soft and concessive towards the Stalinist's Soviet Union during the World War II as well as neglecting the Shoah. The first charge could be, to a substantial degree, explained by the enormous penetration of Roosevelt's administration by the Soviet intelligence.

Słowa kluczowe:

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, amerykańska polityka zagraniczna, II wojna światowa, Związek Radziecki, holocaust

Key words:

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, US foreign policy, World War II, the Soviet Union, the Holocaust

Introduction

Franklin Delano Roosevelt is quite widely regarded among Americans as one of the best U.S. presidents in history. He is frequently enumerated together with such presidents as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln as the most distinguished leader of America in the past¹. According to many Americans, F.D. Roosevelt is “one of the greatest presidents of the United States who won the most devastating war in the history of humanity”², “most successful foreign policy president”³, “strong leader”⁴, “successful political leader”⁵, “the juggler”⁶, “wartime statesman”⁷, or “the last great president”⁸. He is in particular praised for allegedly “skillful management of World War II”⁹. Especially American scholars used to think highly of FDR. One of the rankings, that is basically a composite of four different surveys in which American academics were asked to rank the most successful U.S. presidents, awards F.D. Roosevelt a second rank with only Abraham Lincoln above¹⁰. FDR almost became a mythical figure for American society, particularly those who sympathize with the Democratic Party. Undoubtedly, his presidency fell in the extremely important moment in world’s history – the World War II. Nevertheless, a great deal of Roosevelt’s foreign policy actions, behaviors, decisions and choices he made during his 13 years in office – particularly in the light of the previously unknown salient documents and information that have been revealed in recent years – seem to be at least dubious if not entirely disastrous to U.S. national interest. The generally very good assessment of his foreign policy seems to be a result of an intensive, long-standing, and massive public relations campaign.

¹ Robert Dallek in his extensive study of Roosevelt’ incumbency expressed it this way: “If any President comes close to giving us a model of what other chief executives might aspire to during their presidential terms, however, Roosevelt surely ranks with George Washington and Abraham Lincoln as the place to begin”. See: R. Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, p. 552.

² S. Vander Hook, *Franklin D. Roosevelt, 32nd U.S. President*, Edina 2008, p. 94

³ J. Miks, *Who was the best foreign policy president?*, 20.09.2012,

Globalpublicsquare.com, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/09/20/the-best-foreign-policy-presidents/> (10.07.2015).

⁴ W.F. Kimball, *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1991, p. 4.

⁵ R. Dallek, *op. cit.*, p. 552.

⁶ In a positive sense of this word like in the title of the book: W.F. Kimball, *op. cit.*

⁷ *Ibidem.*

⁸ *Historian: FDR Was The Last Great President. Let's Never Have Another*, NPR.org, 06.10.2014,

<<http://www.npr.org/2014/10/06/354082227/fdr-was-a-great-president-but-do-we-really-want-another-great-president>> (15.07.2015).

⁹ J. Miks, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ N. Silver, *Contemplating Obama’s Place in History, Statistically*, NYTimes.com, 23.01.2013, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/contemplating-obamas-place-in-history-statistically/?_r=0> (15.07.2015).

The intention of the author in this paper is to revise and reassess this positive image and undeserved good fame of F.D. Roosevelt and his administration as a purportedly great statesman surrounded by equally great aides who altogether pursued wise, prudent, successful and morally legitimate foreign policy. The text focuses merely on foreign policy issues. Hence, Roosevelt's administration domestic and economic policies are not the subject of the study and evaluation here.

Altogether, two accusations against FDR's administration are put forward in the paper. Firstly, its foreign policy was definitely too compliant, too flexible and too submissive towards the Stalinist's Soviet Union, which was to a large extent an effect of an astonishingly enormous infiltration of the highest circles of U.S. foreign policy-makers at the time by the Soviet intelligence. Secondly, F.D. Roosevelt's White House is accused of a fatal negligence of the Holocaust problem and not doing enough to help European Jewry survive the genocide they were subjected to.

Roosevelt administration's policy towards the Soviet Union

Generally speaking, F.D. Roosevelt's foreign policy during World War II enabled totalitarian Soviet Union subjugate Central and Eastern Europe to the detriment of the U.S. national interests in the long-term. It must be necessarily emphasized that such an outcome of the World War II cannot be treated as an inevitable and inescapable in advance. If Washington during wartime more staunchly opposed Stalin's plans, perhaps not all Eastern European countries, but without doubt, more European countries would avoid communist tyranny after the war. French political leader Charles de Gaulle in private conversation with Winston Churchill criticized FDR for letting Stalin enslave Central and Eastern Europe. He believed that it could not have happened without the yielding policy of the White House during the war. The British prime minister shared this view.

Apologists of Roosevelt's wartime foreign policy should bear in mind that whenever Washington decidedly opposed to Moscow's actions, Stalin conceded and restrained himself from aggressive steps. For example, despite Stalin's demands the U.S. did not agree on occupation of Hokkaido island by the Red Army¹¹. Even more convincing is the case of Turkey. After Yalta conference Stalin ordered Georgy Malenkov and Anastasas Mikoyan to work out a proposition of postwar transformation of Turkey. To make long story short, Soviet dictator intended to annex Turkish part of Armenia as well as southern part of former Batumi region to the U.S.S.R. On top of that, Stalin was going to compel Turkey to give the Soviet Union a go ahead for opening of Soviet naval bases in a strategically important region of the Black Sea Straits. On March

¹¹ B. Sokołow, *Wojenne plany Stalina*, „Magazyn Historyczny Mówią Wieki” 2015, no. 2 (661), p. 23.

19th, 1945, Moscow renounced the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality that had been concluded 20 years earlier. Furthermore, approximately 1 million of Soviet soldiers were deployed alongside the Soviet-Turkish border. That definitely did not bode well for Turkey. On 7th June, the same year, the contemporary Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov, called the Turkish ambassador in Moscow demanding a revision of the Soviet-Turkish border. During the Potsdam Conference Stalin insisted that the U.S.S.R got its share in commandeered Italian navy's vessels before August 1st, 1945, in order to make them ready for military operation against Turkey as early as 1945¹². This time Washington (precisely Truman administration) said clearly "no!". And Stalin conceded. It is salient to note that the Potsdam Conference had taken place before nuclear bombs exploded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, therefore before the United States got a strong argument in its hands in diplomatic struggles and "tenders".

Another excellent example how firm opposition to Moscow's aggressive steps and intentions were successful is Iran. In 1945 Stalin created a quasi-state called the Azerbaijan People's Government that he planned to annex to Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad which was to be a puppet state of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the last republic in the medium to long run had to expand territorially overtime on territories of Turkey, Iraq and Syria that were inhabited by Kurdish population. However, as soon as Washington and London decisively protested, Stalin did not hesitate long and simply abandoned the two marionette states. As a consequence, Soviet troops withdrew from northern Iran. Then Iranian Army entered the communist republics and their leaders either fled to their former protector state or were executed¹³. All what was needed to make Stalin order to withdraw Soviet armed forces from Iran was to resolutely say "no!".

All the above mentioned instances irrefutably prove that a successful diplomatic rebuff to Stalin was possible without resorting to war. Characteristically, all these cases of effective opposition to Moscow's aggressive actions occurred after Roosevelt's successor – Harry S. Truman – took office. Where there is a will, there is a way. The whole problem with FDR was that he notoriously did not have a will to repel the Soviet Union. FDR seemed not to care at all about the fate of the Eastern half of Europe. On September 3rd, 1943, he stated to archbishop Francis Spellman, to his surprise, that Eastern European nations simply would have to bear Soviet hegemony¹⁴.

Instead of creating a unified, "common front" with Churchill against Stalin, Roosevelt mostly preferred a "common front" with Stalin against Churchill. For instance, FDR and his administration did not support Churchill's proposition to

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 21-22.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 21.

¹⁴ Cf. D. West, *Wielkie kłamstwa Ameryki: Tłumienie niewygodnej prawdy*, Warszawa 2014, p. 300 and S. Butler, *Roosevelt and Stalin: Portrait of a Partnership*, New York 2015, p. 121, 504.

conduct an offensive on the Balkan Peninsula. Contrary to this offer of British diplomacy, that to a significant degree was intended to thwart Soviet designs of conquest of Southern Eastern Europe, the U.S. government was in favor of opening a new front in France despite the fact that such high-ranking American generals as Dwight D. Eisenhower¹⁵, Carl A. Spaatz¹⁶, Ira C. Eaker¹⁷ and Mark W. Clark¹⁸ unambiguously opted for further advance in Italy and in the Balkans rather than invasion in France¹⁹. Gen Clark expressed it this way:

“The weakening of the campaign in Italy in order to invade southern France, instead of pushing on into the Balkans, was one of the outstanding mistakes of the war (...) Stalin knew exactly what he wanted ... and the thing he wanted most was to keep us out of the Balkans (...) It is easy to see therefore why Stalin favored Anvil (the landing in southern France) at Teheran.”²⁰.

The British government and the U.S. generals were not the only circles that repeatedly tried to convince the White House to the Balkan option. As well, John C. Wiley – an expert in Soviet affairs employed in the Office of Strategic Services (the wartime forerunner of the CIA) had the similar opinion. On August 11th, 1943, he wrote a letter to the president in which he tried to persuade him to carry out an invasion of the Balkan Peninsula because it would thwart malevolent Soviet designs in this part of the European continent²¹. Roosevelt ignored these suggestions giving preference to the opinion of Harry Hopkins who fiercely pushed for invasion in France²². Advisors of FDR were convincing him that Churchill by forcing concept of offensive in the Balkan Peninsula instead of France, in reality, intended to recover the British imperial influences for the U.S. money and military effort²³.

The U.S. wartime government made many other controversial decisions that fundamentally influenced allied military operation in the European front. The U.S. 3rd Army under the command of gen. George S. Patton at the end of the war advanced in such a fast tempo that it could liberate the considerable part of Czechoslovakia including its capital city – Prague, nonetheless Wash-

¹⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower was at the time a Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

¹⁶ Carl A. Spaatz was a commander of Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

¹⁷ Ira C. Eaker was a commander of the Eighth Air Force that was responsible for bomber campaign against the Third Reich.

¹⁸ Mark D. Clark was a commander of the U.S. Fifth Army that fought in Sicily and the Apennine Peninsula.

¹⁹ D. West, *Wielkie...*, pp. 297-299, 308. In contrast to what Henry Kissinger claims, the U.S. generals did not object to invasion on the Balkans from the beginning of joint planning. See: H. Kissinger, *Dyplomacja*, Warszawa 1996, p. 438.

²⁰ M.W. Clark, *Calculated Risk*, New York 2007, pp. 293-295.

²¹ Cf. J. Schechter and L. Schechter, *Kompromitujące sekrety Ameryki: Jak NKWD i KGB kształtowały historię Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki*, Warszawa 2007, p. 152 and D. West. *Wielkie...*, pp. 239-40.

²² D. West, *Wielkie...*, pp. 284-286, 291, 295, 302-303, 306-308

²³ A. Fedorowicz, *Gdyby wolność nadeszła z Balkanów*, „Newsweek Historia” 2015, no 5, p. 23.

ington ordered it to stop almost at the outskirts of Prague and Vienna²⁴. The U.S. troops were deliberately halted West of Elbe river by the White House despite having ahead of them as an opponent a very weak German 12th Army²⁵, whose soldiers extraordinarily willingly surrendered to Americans and Brits in contrast to the Red Army whom they hated and feared. What is more, in these important days FDR was staunchly encouraged by Churchill to hasten the advance of the U.S. armies in the Eastern direction but he foolishly refused²⁶. Originally, the U.S. were going to take Brandenburg with Berlin, however, later the presidential administration decided to waive this land to Soviets because somebody cared for Soviet occupation zone to be sufficiently extensive²⁷.

The U.S. president appeared to be exceptionally naïve toward Stalin and the Soviet Union. FDR either could not appropriately read Stalin's intentions or he did not want to properly read it. It was worrying for British wartime leaders, who – in general – were more distrustful and skeptical as to the communist power²⁸. Sometimes Roosevelt's gullibility and credulity was truly astonishing. For instance, he confessed to William C. Bullitt his belief that if he fulfilled Stalin's wishes and desires not requiring anything in return, the leader of the Soviet Union would restrain his demands, become loyal partner and, as a ramification, they together would build new postwar deal in the globe²⁹. To be precise, FDR said to Bullitt who warned him against putting too much trust and hopes in Soviet dictator:

"Bill, your facts may be right. I do not question your reasoning, but there is just a chance that Stalin is not that kind of man. Hopkins says that he is not and that he only wants security for his country, and I believe that if I give him all the help he needs without asking anything in return, 'noblesse oblige,' he won't try to annexe territories and will work, with me to construct a new world of democracy and peace. (...) Bill, it's my responsibility and not yours. I'll take the risk."³⁰

Indeed, Roosevelt unwisely took the risk and entirely failed. Was he really so blind or, perhaps, he merely pretended to believe in Stalin's good will? Other time, on September 30th, 1941, during the press conference Roosevelt stated that the Soviet Union respected religious freedom and freedom of conscience³¹. Was he truly so silly or maybe he was just cynical? As a British historian Rich-

²⁴ Cf. B. Sokołow, *op. cit.*, p. 23 and D. West, *Wielkie...*, p. 299.

²⁵ B. Sokołow, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

²⁶ A. Stempin, *Co zrobić z Niemcami*, „Newsweek Historia Extra: 70. rocznica zakończenia II wojny światowej” 2015, no. 2, p. 110.

²⁷ B. Sokołow, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

²⁸ A. Beevor, *Berlin 1945: Upadek*, Kraków 2009, p. 200.

²⁹ D. Tołczyk, M. Rosolak, *Samooszustwo Zachodu*, „Historia Do Rzeczy” 2013, no. 9, p. 26.

³⁰ *How We Won the War and Lost the Peace*, “The New Times”, Vol. 15, No. 2, 14.01.1949, p. 1, < <http://alor.org/New%20Times/pdf/NT1502.pdf> > (16.07.2015).

³¹ D. West, *Wielkie...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 278, 293.

ard Overy hints, FDR genuinely believed that Soviet-American agreement and consensus is both possible and reachable. On the part of him it was an extreme naiveté because there was plenty of evidence that confirmed Soviet desire of supremacy in Central and Eastern Europe³².

Roosevelt personally believed in a quite peculiar so-called theory of convergence. The followers of this set of views predicted that the political and economic systems of the United States and the Soviet Union over time would become increasingly more similar to each other. In other words, this theory assumed that Soviet political system should gradually but inevitably evolve into democracy. In turn, Soviet economic system ought to progress slowly but steadily into more capitalist and liberal. Similarly, U.S. economic system – in the FDR' belief – would in future become more nationalized. State control of business in the U.S. in coming decades was to increase substantially. In such a way communism and capitalism would slowly but inescapably become similar to each other or, to put it differently, converge³³. Theory of convergence was a sort of “an article of faith” for the then U.S. president³⁴. To put it mildly, the course of events did not confirm Roosevelt's prognoses.

Many decisions that were somehow related to the U.S.S.R. and that Roosevelt took during his four terms in office were, to say the least, morally dubious even at that time of immoral politics widespread among great powers. At the end of 1933, FDR established diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thereby, he departed from the policy of his five predecessors in the White House who consequently denied entering into diplomatic relations with the Soviet state. Moreover, he did it, even though earlier he received many signals from Ukrainian activists about ongoing horrendous famine in the Soviet Union³⁵. Roosevelt could not choose the worse moment for extension of diplomatic relations to totalitarian power than that when it was finishing the process of brutal extermination of millions of its own citizens. After the infamous Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt commanded a deportation and settlement of the U.S. citizens of Japanese descent in special internment camps³⁶. Perhaps the most disgraceful was Roosevelt administration's conduct towards former Red Army soldiers that, due to various reasons and under different circumstances, decided to fight alongside Wehrmacht against the Soviet Union. Stalin categorically demanded turning them in the hands of infamous NKVD and Smersh secret services. London and Washington once again bowed

³² R. Overy, *Krew na śniegu: Rosja w II wojnie światowej*, Gdańsk 1999, p. 334.

³³ Cf. D.J. Dunn, *Caught between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow*, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington 1998, pp. 3, 5, 8, 20, 27, 72, 170, 263, 279-281 and D. West, *Wielkie..., op. cit.*, pp. 220, 281, 300, 426.

³⁴ D.J. Dunn, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

³⁵ T. Snyder, *Skrwawione ziemie: Europa między Hitlerem a Stalinem*, Warszawa 2011, p. 79 or T. Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, New York 2012, p. 57.

³⁶ B. Simms, *Taniec mocarstw: Walka o dominację w Europie od XV do XXI wieku*, Poznań 2015, p. 418.

to Stalin's will. What is worse, the authorities of the U.S. and the U.K. earlier, before surrendering, had officially promised Vlasov army soldiers that they would never ever hand them over to the Soviets³⁷. The Western powers, in an example of outright betrayal, unceremoniously broke their pledge and de facto sentenced hundreds of thousands of people either to death or a long-standing imprisonment in Gulag camps. Roosevelt is partially responsible for this wicked act of treason³⁸. In clear-cut contrast to the U.S. and U.K. authorities, which did not make any problems as regards handing over Soviet prisoners of war to Stalin, Moscow on its part made terrible difficulties in releasing American prisoners of war that were held in Japanese and German prisoner-of-war camps situated at the territories later liberated by the Soviet soldiers. Historians estimate that even up to 20.000 of American soldiers that were classified as missed in action may have been secretly held captive in Gulag³⁹. It is indeed a shockingly high number. Roosevelt sent two telegrams to Stalin in which he pled for prompt release of the U.S. soldiers held against their will in miscellaneous places controlled by the Soviets. Although FDR on March 3rd, 1945, wrote: "I regard this request to be of the greatest importance.", Stalin authoritatively responded: "...on the territory of Poland and in other places liberated by the Red Army, there are no groups of American prisoners of war...". Then FDR on March 17th, 1945, sent another telegram in which he noticed: "This Government has done everything to meet each of your requests. I now request you to meet mine in this particular matter." This time Stalin insolently and dismissively answered: "I have to say that former American prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army are in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps in good conditions, at any rate in better conditions than former Soviet prisoners of war in American camps where they have been partially placed together with German prisoners of war and where some of them were subjected to unfair treatment and unlawful inconveniences up to beating as it was reported to the American Government more than once"⁴⁰. Stalin's answers resembled to some degree the tactics he chose responding to questions asked by the Polish government in exile about the fate of the Polish officers taken captive by the Red Army in September 1939. Stalin lamely explained, to express it mildly, that they all fled to Man-

³⁷ D. West, *Wielkie...*, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

³⁸ For more on this case, see: N. Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta: The Secret Betrayal of the Allies 1944-1947*, London 1977 and J. Epstein, *Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation*, Old Greenwich 1973.

³⁹ For more on this subject-matter, see: J.D. Douglas, *Betrayed*, 2002. Also D. West extensively elaborated on this problem in the 11th chapter of her book, see: D. West, *Wielkie...*, pp. 347-379.

⁴⁰ All the quoted citations in: S. Butler (ed.), *My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2005, p. 298-302. See also: D. West, *Wielkie...*, pp. 351-352, 355-356.

churia. Afterwards, the presidential administration resigned from next attempts of bringing imprisoned American military men back home⁴¹.

Notably, an issue of Katyń massacre is worth mentioning in this context, among other things, because at that time it reverberated through the Western world. Both British and U.S. authorities received overwhelming evidence proving Soviet guilt for this heinous war crime⁴². The British prime minister handed over so-called O'Malley's report that unequivocally pointed at the true perpetrator of the carnage⁴³. Interestingly, the report mentioned above recommended not forgetting about the crime in the relations with the Soviet Union to the Allies' leaders⁴⁴. Nonetheless, at the top of the U.S. and U.K. governments decisions were made to cover up the real murderers of Polish prisoners of war. Another Soviet crime had to be swept under the rug. When the U.S. diplomat George Earle tried to convince the contemporary incumbent president of his motherland that Katyń massacre was in reality a Soviet wrongdoing, he got an answer: "George, this is entirely German propaganda and a German plot. I am absolutely convinced the Russians did not do this."⁴⁵ As a matter of fact, these two sentences speak more about Roosevelt's attitude to Katyń mass murder than a thousand of words. Once more, what comes here to mind is the question: Was Roosevelt really so stupid to believe the Soviet version of events or did he only pretend to be stupid ahead of G. Earle? Historians know for sure that neither Roosevelt nor Churchill took up the issue of Katyń massacre in negotiations with Stalin at Yalta. Moscow was not chastised in order not to slight Stalin. Amicable relations between great powers had to be perpetuated. Opponents of this policy within the White House were jettisoned like G. Earle who was sent to remote Samoan Islands after he had suggested to Roosevelt that he

⁴¹ B. O'Reilly, M. Dugard, *Killing Patton: The Strange Death of World War II's Most Audacious General*, New York 2014, p. 269.

⁴² To be fair, one needs to mention that at least one of Roosevelt's co-worker – Averell Harriman – was convincing him in a letter that Germans are the true perpetrators of the extermination of Polish officers in Katyń forest. Harriman, in turn, was convinced – at least for some time – to this untrue version by his daughter, Kathleen, who took part in a Soviet disinformation presentation and inspected the site of the war crime. This inexperienced young journalist naively and gullibly believed in Soviet insolent lies de facto playing a role of, to use Lenin's terminology, useful idiot. See: S. Butler, *Roosevelt...*, p. 331.

⁴³ A. Paul, *Kłamstwo katyńskie*, „Wprost”, 09.04.2006, p. 79.

⁴⁴ A. Zechenter, *Ostateczne rozwiązanie kwestii polskiej*, „Gazeta Polska”, 11.04.2012, p. 21.

⁴⁵ Cf. *The Katyn Forest Massacre. Hearings before the Selected Committee Part VII*. Washington 1952, p. 2204,

< http://www.archive.org/stream/katynforestmassa07unit/katynforestmassa07unit_djvu.txt> (16.07.2015) and L.R. Coatney, *The Katyn Massacre: An Assessment of Its Significance as a Public and Historical Issue in the United States and Great Britain, 1940-1993*, Ibiblio.org, December 1993, <http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/wwii/special.studies/katyn.massacre/katynlrc.tx> (16.07.2015).

might go public with his knowledge about Katyń war crime⁴⁶. American press got a strict prohibition not to write about Katyń affair in such a manner that the U.S.S.R. would be presented as a culprit⁴⁷. It would not be an exaggeration to conclude that the U.S. president knowingly became Stalin's principal accomplice in hushing up the inconvenient truth about the massacre in Katyń woods⁴⁸. After the death of the leader of the Polish government in exile, gen. Władysław Sikorski, in a mysterious air crash in Gibraltar on July 1943, investigations on Katyń massacre were blown over.

The issue of Poland's future loomed large at the Tehran and Yalta conferences. Behind the scenes of the first of the mentioned conferences, the U.S. president admitted to Soviet leader that the Polish question was a subject of interest to him chiefly in the context of incoming presidential elections in 1944⁴⁹. What is more, this conversation took place in total secrecy from the Brits⁵⁰. Sometimes one may get an impression that for the U.S. wartime leader an alliance with the totalitarian and revisionist Soviet Union was more important than with democratic and conservative British empire. British chief of staff, gen. Sir Alan Brooke, concisely summed up FDR's demeanor in Tehran with one short sentence: "Stalin has got the President in his pocket."⁵¹ On June 1944, FDR in a conversation with the Polish premier Stanisław Mikołajczyk was asked by him what precisely had been determined in Tehran as for the future shape of Poland's borders. Roosevelt responded lying through his teeth that unlike Churchill he had not broached this issue and that he had objected, again in contrast to Churchill and again in blatant disregard for truth, to the change of borders. Woefully, he shifted all the blame for extremely disadvantageous for Poland arrangements from Tehran on British leader, at the same time obviously whitewashing himself. Finally, he assured Mikołajczyk that Stalin did not pursue the annihilation of Poland and that he in person would care for independent and strong Poland⁵².

During Yalta conference leaders of the United States and Great Britain actually did not bring up a discussion as for the question of future Poland's borders accepting Soviet demands in advance. They only were content with

⁴⁶ FDR ordered G. Earle not to reveal in no accounts any information he got or opinions he had as for the Katyń massacre to public opinion. See: A. Paul, *Katyń: Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy*, Warszawa 2007, p. 339.

⁴⁷ P. Zychowicz, *Zdrada sojuszników*, „Uważam Rze” 17-23.09.2012, p. 69.

⁴⁸ A. Krajewski, *Tajna wojna o Katyń*, „Newsweek”, 11.04.2010, p. 18.

⁴⁹ W. Borodziej, *Strefy wpływów i równowaga*, „Magazyn Historyczny Mówią Wieki” 2015, no 2 (661), p. 13.

⁵⁰ L. Pietrzak, *Alianci przeciw Polsce*, „Uważam Rze Historia” 2013, no. 11/12 (20/21), p. 44.

⁵¹ A. Roberts, *Wrong But Not Forgotten*, WSJ.com, 01.03.2013, <<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324445904578286410707586312?cb=logged0.5675263601113548>> (19.07.2015).

⁵² K. Józwiak, *Wspólnik Stalina*, „Uważam Rze Historia” 2015 no. 6 (39), pp. 43-44.

some minor corrections of the New Polish-Soviet border⁵³. Moscow's voracious territorial appetites were not stymied. In fact, purposes that the U.S. diplomacy wanted to reach in Yalta as concerns Poland were restricted to ensuring a post of prime minister for Stanisław Mikołajczyk, limited territorial compensation for Poland at the Germany's expense for the lost territories in the east granted to the U.S.S.R and, quite arguably maybe the most salient demand of Washington, guaranteeing the American companies possibly high contribution in expected postwar reconstruction of Poland's economy⁵⁴. As a matter of fact, crucial decisions in Livadia Palace, in a beautiful resort at Crimean Peninsula, were taken in private talks of Stalin and Roosevelt. Churchill was notified of them later⁵⁵. His impact on the decisions made there was significantly constrained. And this is the U.S. president who ought to be primarily blamed for this detrimental shortage of unanimity among Western powers at Yalta. Such unanimity would be very helpful in foiling unbridled Moscow's demands.

FDR mistakenly calculated that if the Soviet empire got security guarantees, it would respect all the established agreements and accords⁵⁶. As later course of developments proved, these calculations were, to put it euphemistically, unduly sanguine. Sly Soviet dictator, in contravention of his earlier obligations, fully subjugated Poland as well as the rest of Central and Eastern Europe imposing on it atrocious and brutal Soviet-style totalitarian regimes. Should not the White House expect these things?

When the Warsaw Uprising broke out, Churchill and Roosevelt together asked *generalissimus* Stalin to make airbases situated at the lands east of the Polish capital city and occupied by Soviet troops available for landing of British and American bombers that took off from airbases in Britain and southern Italy and were conducting supply missions to the Polish partisans⁵⁷. Such a consent would considerably facilitate the task for Anglo-American pilots. Stalin declined, therefore unambiguously presenting a lack of goodwill on the part of him. After this decision George Kennan ultimately lost any delusions about future relations between the Western powers and the Soviet empire. But even that did not convince Roosevelt to change his optimistic views about Soviet leadership and the U.S.S.R.

In truth, FDR's administration used to even notoriously turn a blind eye to decidedly unfriendly acts of Soviets that took place on the U.S. soil. Why? In short, to satisfy and soothe Stalin. There is strong and convincing evidence that FDR, at least to some extent, knew about unfriendly Soviet actions in the U.S. The crimes and anti-American acts carried out by the Communist Party USA

⁵³ W. Materski, *Ponad głowami Polaków*, „Magazyn Historyczny Mówią Wieki” 2015, no 2 (661), p. 27.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 25.

⁵⁵ L. Pietrzak, *Cienie Jalty*, „Uważam Rze Historia”, 2015, no. 2 (35), p. 36.

⁵⁶ W. Batóg, *Roosevelt jako Wilson*, „Magazyn Historyczny Mówią Wieki” 2015, no 2 (661), p. 18.

⁵⁷ A. Bullock, *Hitler i Stalin*, vol. 2, Warszawa 1999, pp. 321-322.

(CPUSA) were glossed over on a routine basis over the years in which Roosevelt lived in the White House. To give just one example of such an action, on May 16th, 1942 – soon before the visit of Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov to the United States – Earl Browder, an infamous leader of the equally infamous CPUSA, had been released from the custody⁵⁸. FDR did not hold the U.S. communists to account for their numerous illegal activities. It is an enormous contrast in comparison to the White House's attitude toward the German American Federation⁵⁹ which had been consequentially halted and neutralized in those years⁶⁰. When whistleblower, Whittaker Chambers, decided to testify about his experiences as a former member of CPUSA and a Soviet agent, FDR personally endeavored to put an end to an investigation into that matter pursued by a congressman Martin Dies and later, in an act of a mean revenge, hindered his political career⁶¹. Even more telling is Roosevelt's negligence of action in the light of his knowledge about counterfeiting of the U.S. currency on a giant scale by the Soviet intelligence agencies. According to Herbert Hoover, FDR's predecessor in the office, he notified him personally of this extraordinarily harmful to elementary U.S. interests practice pursued by Moscow⁶². Knowledge about these unpleasant facts did not prevent Roosevelt's administration from forging normal diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.

Revealingly, Soviets dared to draw up a list of the U.S. diplomats that presented, according to them, unacceptably anti-Soviet views and handed it over to the White House in demand of removing them from offices⁶³. Analysts employed in the Department of State with anti-communist outlook were systematically and consequentially either marginalized or fired from their positions⁶⁴. The White House during the Second World War suppressed every information that would put the Soviet Union in the bad light. Especially, Stalin – this benevolent “uncle Joe”, as the U.S. wartime propaganda untruthfully presented him – needed to be portrayed only in good light. In such a manner, withholding of weighty information regarding the U.S.S.R. became something normal in the U.S. during the World War II. Thus, unfavorable for Moscow books and newspaper articles were routinely censored by the Office of War Information – the institution swarmed with Soviet agents of influence⁶⁵ and communists⁶⁶. In-

⁵⁸ W. Batóg, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

⁵⁹ Also known as German American Bund.

⁶⁰ A. Bernstein, *Amerykańscy naziści*, „Historia Do Rzeczy” 2015, no. 6 (28), p. 66.

⁶¹ D. West, *Wielkie...*, pp. 79-80.

⁶² H. Hoover, *Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover's Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath*, (ed.) G. Nash, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 2011, p. 26.

⁶³ Cf. M.S. Evans, H. Romerstein, *Stalin's Secret Agents: The Subversion of Roosevelt's Government*, New York 2013, pp. 225-226 and D. West, *Wielkie...*, pp. 221, 279.

⁶⁴ Cf. M.S. Evans, *Blacklisted by History*, New York 2007, p. 2. and D. West, *Wielkie...*, pp. 157, 221, 360-361.

⁶⁵ As Wikipedia accurately explains *an agent of influence is an agent of some stature who uses his or her position to influence public opinion or decision making to produce results beneficial to the country whose intelligence service operates the agent*. See: *Agent of influ-*

stead, such pathetic masterpieces of propaganda like a book and film “Mission to Moscow” were promoted.

On the one hand, people who clamored for reaction against Soviet crimes and malevolent acts like George Earle, Martin Dies, Elisabeth Bentley, Whitaker Chambers, Gareth Jones were very often fired, sacked, publicly scoffed, slandered, defamed or, finally, sent into exile. On the other hand, propagandists and liars like Walter Duranty (correspondent of “The New York Times” who was awarded with Pulitzer prize) and Joseph E. Davies were promoted in the media. Lamentably, FDR’s administration amazingly often inspired these mean acts.

Soviet espionage infiltration of the U.S. over Roosevelt’s presidency

It remains beyond doubt that various Soviet intelligence agencies pursued sweeping espionage activity in the United States of America during the four-term tenure of president Roosevelt. Impressively, Soviet intelligence managed to penetrate the highest rank of the American political establishment. It should be highlighted that OGPU/NKVD’s and GRU’s endeavors were remarkably successful and fruitful. An American historian – Robert K. Wilcox – summed it up with the following words: “Soviets recruited many American leftists. Stalin’s agents were everywhere. In army, in secret services, in government, even in the White House in the closest milieu of the president. All these people not only were gathering information for Moscow, but also impacted on the U.S. policy, pushing it in the direction Stalin would wish. Senator McCarthy was right when he later talked that our government was swarmed with communists.”⁶⁷.

The U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Service – the forerunner of the latter National Security Agency – since February 1943 intercepted and gleaned cryptograms that had been dispatched through telegraph lines by employees of the Soviet diplomatic posts in the U.S.⁶⁸. After a well-known Soviet coder Igor Guzenko had deserted to Americans, the U.S. cryptoanalysts were able to break most of the Soviet codes and ciphers. The whole top secret operation of breaking Soviet cryptograms was code-named “Venona”. After declassifying Venona’s acts it turned out that over Roosevelt’s incumbency the Soviet intelli-

ence, Wikipedia.org, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agent_of_influence> (17.07.2015). For more on the role and specificity of agents of influence, see: A. Kowalski, *Rosyjski sztylet: Działalność wywiadu nielegalnego*, Łomianki 2013, p. 51.

⁶⁶ M.S. Evans, H. Romerstein, *Stalin’s...*, New York 2013, pp. 107-108.

⁶⁷ R.K. Wilcox, *NKWD zamordowało Pattona*, „Historia Do Rzeczy” 2013, no. 7, pp. 58-59.

⁶⁸ Cf. H. Romerstein, E. Breindel, *The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America’s Traitors*, Washington 2001, p. 3 and T.A. Kisielewski, *Wszystkie wpadki CIA*, „Historia Do Rzeczy” 2014, no. 3 (13), p. 54.

gence services recruited at least 349 active agents⁶⁹, not including minor informants. The former U.S. counterintelligence officer Peter Wright wrote about that shockingly high infiltration:

“By the late 1940s enough progress was made in the New York/Moscow and Washington/Moscow KGB channels to reveal the extent of massive Russian espionage activity in the USA throughout and immediately after the war. More than 1200 cryptonyms littered the traffic, which, because they were frequently part of "Spell/Endspell" sequences, were often the easiest things to isolate in the traffic, even if they could not be broken. Of those 1200, more than 800 were assessed as recruited Soviet agents. It is probable that the majority of these were the low-level contacts which are the staple currency of all intelligence networks. But some were of major importance. Fourteen agents appeared to be operating in or close to the OSS, five agents had access, to one degree or another, to the White House, including one who, according to the traffic, traveled in Ambassador Averill Harriman's private airplane back from Moscow to the USA. Most damaging of all, the Russians had a chain of agents inside the American atomic weapons development program, and another with access to almost every document of importance which passed between the British and U.S. governments in 1945, including private telegrams sent by Churchill to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman.”⁷⁰.

The actions, decisions, attitudes, stances and Roosevelt's foreign policy in its entirety cannot be explained without the full realization of the level to which Soviet *agentura* penetrated into highest ranks of the U.S. policy-makers at the time. The frameworks of this text make it impossible to elaborate on that matter too much – there were absolutely too many Soviet spies around FDR to describe extensively their influence on him in a relatively short text, albeit three of them deserve special attention. Namely, Alger Hiss⁷¹, Harry Dexter White⁷² and – above all – Harry Hopkins. The foregoing spies were probably the most influential, the most efficient and the most detrimental to the interests of the U.S. Thanks to these three traitors Moscow's leverage over FDR's decisions and actions was substantial.

Alger Hiss was a premier U.S. president's advisor during the proceedings of the Yalta Conference. At that time he fulfilled a function of the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs and a Deputy of the Secretary of State. He was an agent of Soviet military intelligence – GRU. After the war his spying activity was detected. As a result, Hiss was sentenced to five years' imprison-

⁶⁹ N. Davies, *Europa walczy 1939-1945: Nie takie proste zwycięstwo*, Kraków 2008, p. 537.

⁷⁰ P. Wright, P. Greengrass, *Spycatcher*, Richmond 1987, p. 139. For Polish translation of this passage, see: P. Wright, *Łowca szpiegów*, Warszawa 1991, p. 166.

⁷¹ N. Davies, *Europa...*, Kraków 2008, p. 537.

⁷² N. Davies, *Europa...*, p. 537.

onment⁷³. Because of him, without doubt, Stalin had a significant advantage over the rest of the so-called Big Three whilst they negotiated a postwar order in Yalta⁷⁴. Although Hiss was adamant that his role in Yalta was at the most auxiliary, contemporary historians do not give credence to his claims. On the contrary, currently it is broadly believed that he exerted a significant impact on final arrangements enacted in Yalta and when the things were getting too hot for him, he just wanted to maximally belittle his role. It was nobody else but Hiss who led negotiations in Yalta over the repatriation of Soviet citizens staying in POW's camps controlled by the Americans and Brits⁷⁵. In the light of this information no one should be amazed that London and Washington so unceremoniously betrayed Soviet POW's giving them to bloodthirsty Smersh and NKVD. In reality, Hiss prepared many U.S. diplomatic documents in Yalta⁷⁶ and as a stalwart agent of GRU realized Moscow's commands. His role in Yalta Conference may be even greater upon realization of the fact that after the conference ended, Hiss travelled to Moscow, where he secretly received a medal in recognition of inestimable credits he rendered the Soviet state. The medal was delivered to agent "Ales" – Hiss' code name given to him by the GRU – from the hands of exceptional scumbag infamous prosecutor Andrey Vyshinsky⁷⁷. What is worth mentioning, the so-called Van Vliet's report that brought up the Katyń mass murder problem putting the blame for it on the U.S.S.R. government, was sent in to the division of the Department of State headed by Hiss. Soon the inconvenient report mysteriously vanished from the archives⁷⁸. Guess who might have had a hand in it! In short, he was a very efficacious agent of influence.

Harry Dexter White was even more damaging to the U.S. interests than Hiss⁷⁹. De facto, he was the second most important official in the Department of Treasury⁸⁰. He was the one who established details of Lend-Lease program, a major beneficiary of which was the Soviet Union⁸¹. Additionally, he was the crucial figure on the Soviet intelligence operation code-named "Snow", which principally boiled down to inducing war between Japan and the U.S. Within the frame of this operation Soviets used their intelligence assets both in Japan, and in America in such a way to make these two countries fight each other. By this,

⁷³ R. Włast-Matuszak, *McCarthy – amerykański bohater*, „Historia Do Rzeczy” 2015, no. 2 (24), p. 50.

⁷⁴ R. Overy, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

⁷⁵ D. West, *Wielkie...*, p. 264.

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 359.

⁷⁷ H. Romerstein, E. Breindel, *The Venona...*, pp. 136-137.

⁷⁸ D. West, *Wielkie...*, p. 429.

⁷⁹ H. Romerstein, E. Breindel, *The Venona...*, p. 30.

⁸⁰ D. West, *Wielkie...*, p. 176

⁸¹ For brief information on American supplies for U.S.S.R. within the Lend-Lease program, see: T. Pawłowski, *Jak Zachód uratował Stalina*, „Historia Do Rzeczy” 2014, no. 6 (16), pp. 55-57. For extensive information on this subject, see: A. L. Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aide to the U.S.S.R. in World War II*, Lanham, Plymouth 2010.

Moscow wanted to destroy belligerent Japan, which very seriously threatened the Soviet Union from the east, with America's hands⁸². Not dwelling upon the subject, H.D. White was asked by his Soviet case officer to add new demands addressed to Japan into the U.S. diplomatic cables which were absolutely unacceptable for Tokyo and which – as expected by Moscow – were the straw that broke the camel's back. Imperial Japan, after receiving these claims, took a fateful decision to set off for war with the USA. Publicly charged with being a Soviet spy, H.D. White died three days after he had emphatically denied all charges testifying during official hearing in Congress. Reportedly, he got a heart attack⁸³. At least that was told to the public. Was his death natural? Personally, I doubt it. It is more arguable that he was poisoned or eliminated in other way.

Unquestionably, the most valuable Soviet agent in the U.S. in those years was Harry Hopkins. Hopkins undoubtedly stands out in the history of espionage. His work for Moscow gave it more advantages and favors than even espionage practiced by another famous spy who worked for communist power – Richard Sorge⁸⁴.

Evidence damning Hopkins for espionage for Soviet intelligence is very serious, if not irrefutable. Deciphered and uncovered Soviet cables unequivocally point to Hopkins as an agent appearing in a secret Soviet correspondence under the operational cryptonym "Source 19"⁸⁵. Oleg Gordievsky – a former KGB colonel who in secrecy worked for British intelligence and later fled to the West – recollected that once he attended a special lecture for KGB officers at which the experienced KGB officer giving lecture discussed the topic of Harry Hopkins – the most helpful Soviet agent in the U.S. over the World War II as the lecturer informed the listeners⁸⁶.

Harry Hopkins was a kind of grey eminence in the White House. He was the closest aide of the president. Hopkins was for Roosevelt more or less like cardinal Richelieu for the king Louis XIV. He had larger sway on the president than anybody else, not barring the first lady – Eleanor Roosevelt⁸⁷ and the first daughter – Alice Longworth. FDR liaised with Hopkins for many years. He hinged on Hopkins greatly. Roosevelt and Hopkins were very close friends. Together with their wives they used to eat common dinners, typically five days

⁸² Succinct information about operation "Snow" and H.D. White's role is included in the second chapter of the following book: J. Schechter and L. Schechter, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-91. An extensive and perhaps the best study on the operation Snow is the following monograph: J. Koster, *Operation Snow: How a Soviet Mole in FDR's White House Triggered Pearl Harbor*, New York 2012.

⁸³ D. West, *Wielkie...*, pp. 181, 188.

⁸⁴ Information delivered by Richard Sorge enabled Stalin to redeploy troops from the Soviet Far East to the Western part of the U.S.S.R and, in consequence, to repulse Wehrmacht and win a crucial battle of Moscow in winter 1941-1942.

⁸⁵ H. Romerstein, E. Breindel, *The Venona...*, p. 214.

⁸⁶ C. Andrew, O. Gordijewski, *KGB*, Warszawa 1999, p. 254.

⁸⁷ Tellingly, Eleanor Roosevelt also had very pro-Soviet and pro-communist outlook. See: K. Józwiak, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

a week⁸⁸, which realizes the closeness of their mutual relationship. As historian David L. Roll phrased it: "It was the chemistry between Hopkins and Roosevelt, however, that proved so fateful to the nation and the world"⁸⁹. According to Averell Harriman, Harry Hopkins was the only person from Western delegations to whom Stalin showed signs of personal sympathy⁹⁰. One may say that Hopkins was irreplaceable both for Roosevelt, and for Stalin.

Hopkins pursued many conversations with Churchill and Stalin. He attended the bulk of meetings of the Big Three (and Big Two in different configurations). He was the one who promoted officials in the White House. He persuaded the president to nominate Edward Stettinius – Hopkins' protégée – as a Secretary of State⁹¹. Stettinius on his part had suspiciously close relationships with, besides Hopkins, Hiss too⁹². Many officials employed in the White House either formally or informally came under Hopkins. Hopkins did irreparable damage to the cause of the Free World. Hopkins was the chief of Lend-Lease program. Once George C. Marshall expressed his opinion on "Hopkins' job with the president" as being "to represent the Russian interests"⁹³. Marshall opined this in 1957. Did he already know that year that Hopkins was a traitor?

There is no doubt that Hopkins consequentially and astutely moulded Roosevelt's opinions always in Moscow's favor. Hopkins oftentimes professed pro-Soviet opinions. He was the main follower of the offensive in France and, concurrently, a main opponent of the offensive in the Balkans amongst all U.S. political and military leaders of that time. Hopkins even dared to rebuke Churchill for his constant and persistent attempts of forcing through invasion on Balkans. According to gen. W. Clark, at some point of time Roosevelt seriously considered an organization of offensive at the eastern shores of the Adriatic Sea, but Hopkins successfully discouraged the president from this idea⁹⁴. When the Polish government in exile called for the Red Cross' investigation over the mass murder in Katyń forest, Hopkins labeled the Poles "troublemakers, interested only in preventing their large estates from falling into Russian hands"⁹⁵. He induced the U.S. president to make multitude of decisions and actions advantageous to the Soviet Union and to the detriment of either the U.S.

⁸⁸ D. West, *Wielkie...*, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

⁸⁹ D.L. Roll, *The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler*, Oxford 2013, p. 7.

⁹⁰ D. West, *Wielkie...*, p. 297.

⁹¹ D. West, *Wielkie...*, p. 155

⁹² Indeed, Joe McCarthy was right when he opined that the Department of State had been overrun by communists. Cf. R. Włast-Matuszak, *op. cit.*, p. 50 and T. Pompowski, *Mc Carthy miał dobre karty*, *Historia.focus.pl*, 23.08.2008, <<http://historia.focus.pl/swiat/mccarthy-mial-dobre-karty-344>> (20.07.2015).

⁹³ Cf. D. West, *Blinding History*, *DianaWest.net*, 26.09.2014,

<http://dianawest.net/Home/tabid/36/EntryId/2913/Blinding-History.aspx> (18.07.2015) and

D. West, *Wielkie...*, pp. 161 and 208.

⁹⁴ M.W. Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-295.

⁹⁵ D.L. Roll, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

or U.S.' allies. Ardently doing Moscow's bidding Hopkins persisted with his efforts to foil help for the Polish Home Army during the Warsaw Uprising. Hopkins convinced Roosevelt that Warsaw problem will be solved by sure win of Soviets at the eastern front, so there was no need for the U.S. diplomacy or military to intervene⁹⁶. The FDR's advisors disinformed him – in many cases not without deliberate inspiration from Soviet intelligence – as concerns the situation in Warsaw engulfed by uprising⁹⁷.

In general, Hopkins' case is an illustrative example of how dangerous a well placed agent of influence of the foreign and unfriendly power could be. Hopkins eclipsed every other official in the White House as regards the influence he had on the decision-making process and he eclipsed every other Soviet spy as to usefulness for the communist cause. His influence on Roosevelt was profound. He was experienced, skillful and devious in "handling" with the president. He flatly demurred at any trials to initiate a serious cooperation with German anti-Nazi conservative opposition because that would be dangerous for Stalin's plans. Hopkins admired *generalissimus* Stalin⁹⁸. He tried to induce in FDR a sense of helplessness, incapacity, weakness, even defetism as concerns Washington's possibilities to exert effective leverage on the Soviet empire. Hopkins, this evil spirit of president Roosevelt, unfortunately, often was quite successful in these efforts. "The Russians have the power in Eastern Europe... and the only practicable course was to use what influence we had to ameliorate the situation."⁹⁹ – said the U.S. president to a group of senators on January 1945. Hopkins sowed a field of Roosevelt's mind with seeds of despondency and weakness and Stalin reaped the benefits. Especially, in the last months when ailing FDR struggled with serious illness, Soviet agents took the matters into their hands to the point in which FDR de facto became incapacitated.

Troublingly, not only the White House had been heavily penetrated by Soviet spies. As well, Soviet intelligence managed to recruit a good deal of spies inside American nuclear program¹⁰⁰. Even the boss of this program, Robert Oppenheimer, betrayed by subtle and indirect cooperation with Soviet intelligence – though he personally did not make secret documents available to Soviets, he tacitly approved revealing of secrets to them by his subordinates¹⁰¹. GRU and NKVD managed to infiltrate even the U.S. secret services – for ex-

⁹⁶ N. Davies, *Powstanie '44*, Kraków 2004, p. 459.

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 498.

⁹⁸ D.L. Roll, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 371.

¹⁰⁰ K. Grünberg, *Szpiedzy Stalina: Z dziejów wywiadu radzieckiego*, Warszawa 1996, pp. 141-152.

¹⁰¹ R. Stefanicki, *Złodzieje bomby A*, „Ale Historia Extra” 2013, no 2 (3), pp. 45-47.

ample, a personal assistant of William Donovan, director of the Office of Se-crete Services spied for the Soviet Union¹⁰².

FDR and the Holocaust

The negligence and defiance of tragic fate of European Jews is perhaps the gravest charge against FDR's foreign policy. Disturbingly, for Roosevelt's eu-logists, he did not do much to save European Jews from the doom. Of all press conferences the U.S. president participated in 1933, only in one he briefly talked about the persecution of Jews in the Third Reich. It happened from the initiative of asking journalist. There was not a single mention of Jewish ques-tion in the next 348 FDR's press conferences¹⁰³.

When soon before the World War II, an erupted ship "St. Louis" with Jew-ish refugees from the Third Reich onboard was helplessly roaming across the Atlantic in spite of a beseeching letter from them addressed to Roosevelt him-self, he refused the passengers to disembark on the U.S. soil. In effect, the ship was forced to return to Germany. Most of these unlucky people later died in Holocaust. In addition, Washington did not press for Cuban authorities to re-ceive refugees – Havana was an original destination of the voyage, but over its course Cuban government changed the laws in a such a way that every earlier permission for entry unexpectedly had been canceled. As historians determined, the president of Cuba, Federico Laredo Brú, was afraid of the U.S. reaction. It is highly likely that if the U.S. authorities had brought this question up, Cuban president would have acceded letting the refugees go ashore and settle in Cu-ba¹⁰⁴.

On November 1st, 1943, the Big Three issued the so-called Moscow's De-clarations in which they listed a number of Nazi war crimes, including execu-tions of Norwegian, Belgian, Dutch and French hostages as well as Cretan peasants. Suprisingly enough, there was not a single mentioning of Jews in this declaration although about 5 millions of them had been exterminated so far. Yet, Katyń war crime was mentioned in the declaration, even though, falsely, it was ascribed to the Germans¹⁰⁵. James G. McDonald, a chairman of the Presi-dent's Advisory Committee on Refugees heavily, criticized Roosevelt's actions as for the Holocaust which in his conviction were deplorably inadequate to the solemnity of the situation. In McDonald's opinion, there was no time "for lengthy discussion of this problem", but Washington and London should com-

¹⁰² For more information on that, see: K. Grünberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-137. Interesting information about Soviet-American race for construction of nuclear bomb is included in: R. Przybylski, *Bombowe zmagania*, „Uważam Rze Historia” 2013, no. 8 (17), pp. 84-85.

¹⁰³ R. Medoff, R. Weiman, B. Zuccker, *Whitewashing FDR's Holocaust Record*, 15.09.2006, p. 11.

¹⁰⁴ P. Zychowicz, *Ameryka nie dla Żydów*, „Historia Do Rzeczy” 2015, no. 3 (25), pp. 32-33.

¹⁰⁵ T. Snyder, *Skrwawione...*, Warszawa 2011, p. 371.

mence “immediate emergency measures to save the Jewish remnants of Europe”¹⁰⁶.

For sure, FDR had a credible intelligence information about ongoing Shoah at least since August 1942. Over time information was becoming increasingly more accurate and precise¹⁰⁷. The White House never ordered bombardment of the concentration and death camps, despite the fact that since December 1943 Auschwitz-Birkenau was in reach of allied bombers taking off from the airbases in southern Italy. Since the spring of 1944 Western powers had an absolute superiority in the air in the European theatre of operation. On August and September 1944 American bombers two times bombed factories situated very close to Auschwitz-Birkenau, however, gas chambers had never been bombed. The decision not to bomb Auschwitz-Birkenau was taken almost instantly, after less than 24 hours of analysis – amazingly quickly taking into account its vast importance for lives of tens of thousands of people¹⁰⁸. Knowing that fact, can we believe that this problem was thoroughly discussed and considered in the U.S. political and military circles? The predominant majority of Jewish leaders repeatedly asked the White House for bombing the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp, firmly opting for this unrealized action¹⁰⁹. First and foremost, one thing could be done for certain. Washington could publicly warn or threaten governments of the Third Reich and its satellite states that they would suffer very serious consequences if they continued with the extermination of Jewish population. Actually, at least Alan Dulles suggested such a step¹¹⁰. Well, the White House certainly did not overreact on this problem. Churchill was incomparably more eloquent and firm in support of the European Jews than his partner from behind the ocean¹¹¹.

Jan Karski – probably the most famous wartime emissary of the Polish government in exile – met and talked with the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson and with the president Franklin D. Roosevelt. In all these conversations he broached the incredibly paramount question of genocide being perpetrated at that time on the Jews on areas taken over by the Third Reich. He appealed for an immediate action, bombardment of railway

¹⁰⁶ R. Medoff, *James G. McDonald, FDR, and the Holocaust, 1943-1944*, The David S. Wyman Institute for Holocaust Studies, 01.05.2011, p.1-2.

¹⁰⁷ D.S. Wyman, *Mój kraj zawiódł*, „Rzeczpospolita” 02.02.2008, p. ?

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*. Detailed analysis of the whole problem can be found in the chapter “The Bombing of Auschwitz” in: D.S. Wyman, *The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945*, New York 1987, pp. 288-307. This chapter is accessible at: <<http://wymaninstitute.org/special-reports/BombingAuschwitz.pdf>> (20.07.2015).

¹⁰⁹ Cf. D.S. Wyman, *Mój...* and R. Medoff, *The Roosevelt Administration, David Ben-Gurion, and the Failure to Bomb Auschwitz: A Mystery Solved*, WymanInstitute.org, <<http://wymaninstitute.org/special-reports/TheFailureToBombAuschwitz.pdf>> (20.07.2015).

¹¹⁰ A. Hassell, S. MacRae, *Przymierze wrogów. Tajemnice współpracy wywiadu amerykańskiego i niemieckiego podczas II wojny światowej*, Warszawa 2008, p. 340.

¹¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 343.

leading to the concentration and death camps and widespread issuing passports in blanco for the Jews. Karski in his talk with Roosevelt did not mince his words, but honestly and plainly stated: “With the Jews, they [that is Germans – P.F.] want to destroy the entire Jewish nation biologically [organically]. I brought an official announcement for my Government from the Government Delegate [for Poland] and the Home Army Commander, saying that if the Germans don't change their methods toward the Jewish population, or if there is no Allied intervention – whether it is through repressions, or other methods - if there are no unexpected circumstances, in a year and a half from my departure from the country, the Jewish population in Poland (...) will cease to exist”. Apparently disinterested, FDR replied: “The Allied Nations are going to win this war. (...) Justice will be done. Your country will be alive again more prosperous than before. Criminals will be punished. The United States will not abandon Your country. (...) Do I understand correctly, young man, that before the war Poland was essentially an agricultural country but is not Poland an agricultural country? (...) With your agricultural economy you need horses?”. “No Jewish problem was mentioned until the end of the conversation which lasted one hour twenty minutes. (...) He didn't ask a single question on Jews” – Karski recollected¹¹². Most obviously, FDR preferred to talk about peculiarities and complexities of the Polish farming. Does someone need a more convincing proof of Roosevelt's dismissiveness of the Holocaust?

Conclusions

FDR's concessions to Moscow were by no means immaterial, unimportant or negligible ones. They concerned crucial issues and vitally important problems. Roosevelt decisively too often acceded to Moscow's demands. De facto, Washington accorded Central and Eastern Europe to Moscow. All these accusations of FDR's foreign policy cannot be easily deflected. If only Roosevelt was more dogged in negotiations with Stalin, he could achieve much more positive effects. However, not wanting to vex Stalin, Roosevelt agreed to the prevailing majority of his numerous calls and claims. Roosevelt honestly admitted to Stalin: “This Government has done everything to meet each of your requests.”¹¹³. For one thing, he should care for the U.S. interests and not for U.S.S.R.'s interests. The results of dismissive foreign policy of FDR were taking its toll on the

¹¹² Quotations from: *An account of Karski's conversations with president Roosevelt (1943)*, http://www.karski.muzhp.pl/karski_en/misja_raporty_karskiego_rozmowa.html (20.07.2015); A. Tycner, *Człowiek, który próbował zatrzymać Holokaust*, „Historia Do Rzeczy” 2014, no. 4 (14), p. 54. and *Jan Karski about his meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1943*, YouTube.com, 23.03.2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=475&v=paP02Us8CyM> (20.07.2015). Interestingly, the passage unfavorable for FDR has been omitted in translation in first of the sources mentioned above.

¹¹³ S. Butler (ed.), *My Dear...*, p. 300.

U.S. in later years in Korea and Vietnam. Prudence, wisdom, long-term thinking, chivalry and ethics were mostly alien to FDR's foreign policy.

Roosevelt should have properly interpreted implacable facts. Instead, he persistently clung to his theory of convergence and other debatable views regarding the Soviet state and his leader which from the prospect of time seem to be nothing more than a typical wishful thinking. FDR treated Stalin as a man with whom he could reach a durable accommodation. Stalin treated FDR as his political challenger. The wartime president of the United States preferred to see a good-natured "uncle Joe" in Stalin than an extremely cruel and unscrupulous tyrant whom he really was¹¹⁴. Stalin frequently and strongly pursued the U.S.S.R.'s interests, whereas FDR pursued American interests rarely and weakly. Instead of bringing matters of American POWs held in USSR, to a head, Roosevelt politely pled Stalin for his reaction. For these very reasons, FDR must be named a dupe, for want of a better word¹¹⁵. It takes two to tango, but the contemporary leader of the American nation did not want to understand it. Roosevelt might have not wanted a confrontation with the Soviet state, but Stalin headed for this exact confrontation.

Roosevelt's guilt is all the more obvious in light of the fact that all U.S. ambassadors to Moscow, except for Joseph E. Davies, warned him about the real intentions of Stalin. They were unpleasantly surprised with FDR's ductile policy towards Moscow and ostentatious fraternization with Stalin¹¹⁶. Standley very frankly told Roosevelt that Soviets "considered him Santa Claus"¹¹⁷. Laurence Steinhardt, on his part, warned FDR that Stalin understood only a language of force¹¹⁸ and every concession from the White House towards Moscow was interpreted there as a manifestation of weakness¹¹⁹. Roosevelt regrettably ignored all these and many other similar warnings and cautions. Ultimately, realignment of the U.S. diplomacy's stance as to the Soviet Union came too late to prevent the Soviet domination in the Eastern part of Europe and the communization of China. Culpability of FDR's administration for this unfavorable course of events is unquestionable.

All these commendations of Roosevelt's excellent foreign policy are unfounded and unwarranted. FDR was not a juggler of foreign policy, but rather a clown. On the whole, Soviet *agentura*'s mischief led to irrecoverable damages to the U.S. foreign policy. The Soviet Union was, at least equally if not more, contingent on the Western powers, as the Western powers were contingent on the Soviet Union in their struggle with the Nazi empire. Stalin so desperately needed help of the West that he did not hesitate to ask London for sending a

¹¹⁴ H. Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 449.

¹¹⁵ Actually, it was William Bullitt who first called FDR a dupe. See: D.J. Dunn, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

¹¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 10.

¹¹⁸ A. Stempin, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

¹¹⁹ D.J. Dunn, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

military expeditionary force to Soviet Caucas¹²⁰. Lend-Lease could have been an excellent bargaining chip if only FDR had a will to take advantage of this card. Keep in mind that the western most industrialized and most heavily populated part of the Soviet Union was ravaged and devastated by war in bright contrast to the territory of the continental United States, which remained untouched by hostilities.

Additionally, Roosevelt ought to be burdened with responsibility for prolonging the bloody war in Europe. Churchill did not want to proclaim unconditional surrender of Germany as an objective of the war. The British prime minister reasonably assumed that such a proclamation would be a grist to the mill of Goebbels' propaganda and as a result German soldiers in belief that their adversaries were going to completely ruin and humiliate their motherland, would get a strong motivation to fiercely fight with the allied troops instead of quickly surrender to them¹²¹. In retrospect, it seems that Churchill was right. Notwithstanding these, by all means, rational argumentation Roosevelt actually compelled Churchill to his and Stalin's wish of unconditional surrender¹²². Another equally stupid Roosevelt's administration deed was Morgenthau's plan which posited total deindustrialization of the German economy after the war¹²³. Information of such plans immediately and unavoidably resulted in heightened morale of German troops and, in consequence, killed more soldiers on all European fronts. Dissensions between Churchill and Roosevelt were not irreconcilable at all. But convinced about his great wisdom, FDR instead of taking into account Churchill's opinions and suggestions, which were usually accurate, preferred rebuking the British premier for accusing Stalin of expansionism what he pointed out to Churchill on one occasion¹²⁴.

The FDR administration's malpractice and negligence in foreign policy allowed the Kremlin to, undeniably, dictate the future of the postwar European continent at the cost of millions of people who had to live, suffer and die under the communist dictatorships for the decades to come. Roosevelt, who is even today so vaunted for his purportedly skillful foreign policy, be it willingly or not, contributed to it. Spurred on by Soviet agents, FDR often made decisions detrimental to the U.S. national interests in the long run. Crediting FDR vast foreign policy achievements is a misunderstanding. Regrettably, so many people still are buying this official line, full of lies and half truths. Even today Roosevelt's foreign policy is oftentimes acclaimed in the U.S., whereas in reality, his mismanagement of foreign policy was disastrous, at least in many respects.

¹²⁰ H. Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

¹²¹ Also, William Donovan and Allen Dulles considered demand of unconditional surrendering as a severe mistake. See: A. Hassell, S. MacRae, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-338.

¹²² A. Stempin, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

¹²³ Interestingly, Morgenthau was a puppet in H.D. White's (Soviet spy) hands. See: D. West, *Wielkie...*, pp. 335 and 357.

¹²⁴ A. Stempin, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

Importantly, FDR is also responsible for allowing the Soviet espionage to blossom in America during his twelve years tenure. Instead of clamping down on Soviet spies he principally did nothing. Not wanting to anger Stalin he preferred to ignore the obvious facts. His guilt is all the more grave because he knew what was happening. According to House representative, Martin Dies, Roosevelt once confided to him during tête-à-tête that many of his best friends were communists¹²⁵. And Soviet spies – he should add as well. FDR ought to have instantly get rid of such people from his environment. He did not do this. Paradoxically, by this inaction Roosevelt partly confirmed his opponent Thomas Dewey who charged him with procommunist sympathies¹²⁶. Roosevelt remained straddled with advice of his communist friends (who unrelentingly served not for the U.S. best interests but for Soviet cause). His communist aides leveraged him to let Stalin conquer half of Europe. Too trusting and too credulous FDR was vulnerable to, usually subtle, manipulation and deceit.

Last but not least, FDR cannot be shirked from responsibility for not helping the Jews. It is indeed hard to concur with FDR' apologists that he did everything to minimize the number of Jewish victims of the demonic genocide. Roosevelt's conspicuous silence and lack of deeds to help the Jews survive the Holocaust should be flatly condemned and deprecated. Actions speak louder than words. Likewise, inaction in bombardment of Nazi death camps speak louder than thousands of words.

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¹²⁵ M. Dies, *Martin Dies' Story*, New York 1963, p. 144.

¹²⁶ B. O'Reilly, M. Dugard, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

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